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Chapter 1
Introduction
Macroeconomics is commonly distinguished into the analysis of short-run
business cycle fluctuations and the study of economic growth, which takes a
medium to long term perspective. The main goal of the business cycle liter-
ature is to identify sources of business cycle fluctuations, their implications
for welfare and the role of monetary and fiscal policy in these fluctuations.
This dissertation contains both positive and normative analyses of mone-
tary policy. At the heart of the normative analysis is the characterization
of optimal monetary policy and the evaluation of simple policy rules, which
are applied in central banks around the globe. Positive analysis is aimed
at describing the mechanisms behind real-world phenomena, which in the
present context consists of analyzing the impact of monetary policy on the
business cycle.
This dissertation makes ample use of theoretical macroeconomic models,
building on an extensive literature on business cycle fluctuations. This liter-
ature is outlined in the following in order to classify the research presented
in this dissertation and to illuminate its contribution to the literature. Mod-
els employed by researchers in business cycle analysis have evolved hugely
over the last decades. Macroeconomists until the 1970s used models which
were partly based on plausible ad hoc assumptions and empirical evidence
(see Blanchard (2000)). This approach was criticized by Lucas (1976) be-
cause of its inability to assess the impact of policy changes. When policy
changes, the argument goes, economic agents may change their behavior
in a fundamental way, so that relationships derived from past data fail to
capture agents’ behavior after the policy change. The Lucas critique led to
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the rational expectations revolution, which fundamentally changed macro-
economic modeling. Mainstream macroeconomic models are now dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models based on intertemporally
optimizing agents under rational expectations.
Two main strands of literature have developed after the rational expec-
tations revolution. The main idea of the real business cycle literature is
that business cycles are not caused by market imperfections but are the
result of variation in productivity. Thus, aggregate fluctuations arise from
changes in technology so that policy should refrain from stabilizing them
(see Prescott (1986) and Long and Plosser (1983)). The second strand of lit-
erature builds on the contributions of — to name but a few — Mankiw (1985),
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Calvo (1983) and has integrated mar-
ket imperfections such as price stickiness and monopolistic competition into
DSGE models, leading to a dynamic variant of the IS-LM model. These
models are called New Keynesian because monetary policy has an effect
on real activity in the short run. However, they also contain neoclassical
ideas, such as long-run neutrality of money and the importance of credi-
bility in policy. Therefore, Goodfriend and King (1997) coin the term New
Neoclassical Synthesis, alluding to the neoclassical synthesis incorporated
in the IS-LM model. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) provide a coherent
description of the new workhorse model in monetary policy analysis. No-
tably, while monetary policy is its main field of application, money does
not play a role in the canonical New Keynesian model, which considers a
cashless economy. Rather, the instrument used by monetary policy is the
short-run interest rate.
Researchers have used New Keynesian models to evaluate a broad set of
questions related to monetary policy. The main object of normative studies
has been the characterization of optimal monetary policy and the evalu-
ation of simple policy rules, which according to Taylor (1993) provide an
accurate description of U.S. monetary policy. With respect to both ques-
tions, the literature has reached a broad consensus. Woodford (2004), in
his survey of the literature states that "it is not a bad first approximation
to say that the goal of monetary policy should be price stability". Further,
it is generally acknowledged that simple policy rules, as long as they respect
the Taylor principle, which demands the nominal interest rate to react more
than one for one to deviations of inflation from its target, are a close sub-
stitute for optimal policy. This is shown for instance in Schmitt-Grohé and
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Uribe (2007) and Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). Further, the litera-
ture has emphasized the importance of credibility in conducting monetary
policy both in normal and in crisis times. Research has largely contributed
to the development and widespread application of Inflation Targeting, a
policy strategy which clearly communicates a medium-term policy goal to
the public and uses its policy instruments to achieve this target (see Svens-
son and Woodford, 2004). According to Eggertsson and Woodford (2004)
and Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004), the importance of credibility
increases even more at the zero lower bound: When policy cannot raise
demand by reducing current nominal interest rates, shaping expectations
by announcing future expansionary policy is the only option to stimulate
the economy.
Moreover, the literature has extended the baseline New Keynesian model
to the analysis of open economies. The setup by Galí and Monacelli (2005)
has become the workhorse model in this field. Apart from normative stud-
ies, which analyze in particular the desirability of stabilizing the exchange
rate (see Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005)), a
literature evaluating the quantitative predictions of New Keynesian open
economy models has developed. In the closed economy, the work by Smets
and Wouters (2007) sets the standard, demonstrating that an estimated
model’s out-of-sample predictions can compete with purely statistical meth-
ods. Studies analyzing estimated open economy models point to deficits,
in particular in modeling exchange rates. Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and
Villani (2007)) estimate an open economy version of Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005) and find that the model can reproduce inflation
and real exchange rate dynamics if one is willing to include a variety of ex-
ogenous shocks which represent unexplained deviations from central model
equations, such as uncovered interest rate parity. Justiniano and Preston
(2010) find that an estimated small open economy model cannot account
for the observed co-movement of U.S. and Canadian business cycles. The
authors suggest that the model’s failure to endogenously explain real ex-
change rate dynamics is at the heart of this problem.
This dissertation contributes to a wide variety of normative and posi-
tive research questions and uses different theoretical models to answer these
questions. The second and the fourth chapters present research conducted
jointly with my coauthor and supervisor Prof. Dr. Andreas Schabert.
Chapters 2 and 3 ask normative questions regarding the nature of optimal
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policy and the performance of simple rules, considering small departures
from the canonical New Keynesian model in policy (chapter 2) and in the
model environment (chapter 3). The second chapter compares the wel-
fare implications of active policy rules to those of an interest rate peg and
discusses how a peg can be implemented without generating equilibrium
indeterminacy. Building on empirical evidence by Angeloni, Kashyap, Mo-
jon, and Terlizzese (2003), which documents that monetary transmission
affects output largely through its impact on investment, the third chapter
analyzes how capital accumulation influences optimal policy, interest rate
dynamics and the performance of simple policy rules. From a methodologi-
cal point of view, the models used in these two chapters are powerful for the
type of normative research questions pursued, despite their simplicity. The
reason is that rational expectations imply that changes in the model struc-
ture and in policy are perfectly understood by economic agents, so that an
evaluation of alternative policies respects the Lucas critique. Further, the
rigorous microfoundation of New Keynesian models permits analyzing wel-
fare based on household utility instead of imposing an ad-hoc loss function,
as was common before the rational expectations revolution.
The nature of the research questions posed in chapters 4 and 5 is dif-
ferent. Both chapters contain positive analyses which aim at explaining
the impact of monetary policy on the economy, though in different con-
texts. Motivated by the policy response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis,
the third chapter analyzes the impact of unconventional monetary policy,
distinguishing between quantitative and qualitative easing. Chapter 4 ana-
lyzes the implications of the U.S. dollar’s status as the key currency in the
international monetary system. This analysis focuses on interest and ex-
change rates, asking if key currency effects can explain observed deviations
from uncovered interest rate parity. Chapters 4 and 5 stress the importance
of liquidity in understanding the effects of monetary policy on the economy
and consequently use a common modeling framework, which deviates from
the cashless, single interest rate model used in former chapters: Both chap-
ters build on Reynard and Schabert (2009), who demonstrate that modeling
the supply of liquidity in terms of open market operations fundamentally
changes monetary transmission and can align observed interest rates and
their theoretical counterparts.
The research conducted in this dissertation makes a significant contri-
bution to the literature and has interesting implications for policy makers.
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The second chapter is novel for its result that an interest rate peg, which
is usually ignored due to its violation of the Taylor principle, can raise
welfare compared to a Taylor rule. In a similar vein, the third chapter
demonstrates that the performance of Taylor rules can deteriorate when
taking into account the effects of endogenous capital accumulation on the
central bank’s trade-off. Because Taylor rules are widely used both in cen-
tral banks and in academic research, these results are interesting to anyone
working in the field. Further, the second chapter demonstrates that endoge-
nous fluctuations associated with an interest rate peg can be ruled out by
adopting an autoregressive policy rule. Apart from preventing the adverse
impact of these fluctuations on welfare, this is important for carrying out
constant interest rate projections, a tool used by policy makers in many
central banks.
The fourth chapter makes both a methodological contribution and is
highly relevant to policy makers. The literature on unconventional mon-
etary policy, with some recent exceptions such as Del Negro, Eggertsson,
Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010), has mainly employed models in which the
central bank’s balance sheet does not play a role above its impact on "the"
short term interest rate and the long-run price level, as for instance in
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). Thus, by their structure these models
must predict that open market operations are ineffective once the inter-
est rate is zero, except for their impact on expected future money supply.
In developing a framework in which both the composition and the size of
the central bank’s balance sheet are relevant for the allocation even at the
zero lower bound, the fourth chapter constitutes an important method-
ological advance, which is in part owed to the innovative contribution by
Reynard and Schabert (2009). Further, the idea of focusing on the impact
of unconventional monetary policy measures on liquidity is appealing to
policy makers who have stated that ensuring liquidity and lowering the
cost of private credit was the main aim of unconventional monetary policy
measures implemented during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (see Yellen
(2009)). The results of this analysis are twofold. First, quantitative eas-
ing can stimulate the economy at the zero lower bound. In contrast to
the literature, this stimulus does not rely on a commitment to ease future
policy, but arises because households can be cash constrained even at the
zero lower bound as long as liquidity premiums, and thus interest rates
on illiquid assets, are positive. Further, the analysis isolates a qualitative
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easing effect, which stimulates the economy by reducing firms’ borrowing
cost without extending the central bank’s balance sheet.
Chapter 5 can be considered a first step toward improving the quanti-
tative performance of New Keynesian open economy models. It focuses on
a weak spot in open economy models: The uncovered interest rate parity
condition is known to be grossly inconsistent with the data. Similar to
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007), it starts from the intuitively appeal-
ing idea that the relatively low interest rates on U.S. government bonds
are caused by liquidity premiums related to the leading status of the U.S.
dollar in the international monetary system. The chapter presents a two
country open economy model, where one country’s currency is exclusively
used in international trade. Demand and supply of the key currency are
modeled as in Reynard and Schabert (2009). This permits an analysis of
the international transmission of monetary policy shocks from a rigorously
microfounded model, implying a methodological advance compared to the
existing literature, such as Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007). Further,
the results are promising. Chapter 5 demonstrates that key currency effects
can explain the observed response of exchange rates to monetary policy
shocks, which has become known as the delayed overshooting puzzle. Un-
derstanding the effects of monetary policy on exchange rates is important
to policy makers in many central banks. Interest in exchange rate dynamics
can arise due to political pressure by firms engaged in international trade
or because a central bank’s objective function requires stabilizing the terms
of trade, as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
A few words regarding the organization of this dissertation are in order.
I refrain from giving a more extensive literature review in this introduction.
Rather, each chapter contains an introduction which summarizes the rel-
evant literature and discusses its contribution in more detail. I offer brief
concluding remarks at the end of each chapter. Further, the appendices to
each chapter can be found at the very end of this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
An interest rate peg might be
better than you think
Coauthor: Prof. Dr. Andreas Schabert*
2.1 Introduction
Recent macroeconomic research on monetary policy, which is based on
New Keynesian models, has led to a simple advice for central bankers:
Interest rates should be set in an active way. Though this device for interest
rate setting is not exactly implied by welfare-maximization, it is commonly
viewed as a useful short-cut for the latter. By raising the nominal interest
rate by more than one for one in case inflation is (expected to be) increasing,
the real interest rate rises, causing agents to save more and to consume less
such that aggregate demand and firms’ costs decline. By applying this
strategy, monetary policy can stabilize prices, which reduces welfare cost
of imperfect price adjustments.
Theoretical analysis of monetary policy has further shown that this is
not the main virtue of an active policy: It rules out the possibility of multi-
ple equilibria and thereby endogenous fluctuations (see Benhabib, Schmitt-
Grohe, and Uribe (2001), or Woodford (2003)). Due to this property, an
active interest rate setting is widely viewed as a prerequisite for macroeco-
*This chapter is based on Hörmann and Schabert (2009a). Part of it has been pub-
lished in Hörmann and Schabert (2009b).
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nomic stability. Consequently, passive policies are usually dismissed given
that they in principle allow for self-fulfilling expectations, or, sunspot equi-
libria. However, this view on active vs. passive policies is not necessarily
justified on welfare grounds, since both types of policies are not derived
from a welfare maximizing policy plan.
This chapter takes a closer look at the welfare effects of simple policy
rules. Thereby, we consider a prominent (passive) monetary policy regime,
namely a peg, which is banned from the recent literature, probably due to
its failure to guarantee equilibrium uniqueness.1 A welfare comparison in
the workhorse macro model (a standard New Keynesian model) surpris-
ingly shows that a peg can outperform a simple active interest rate rule.
This result holds for the minimum state variable solution under a peg as
well as for an autoregressive solution, where lagged inflation rates serve as
an endogenous state variable. Finally, we demonstrate that a peg can be
implemented by the central bank in a way that ensures the existence of
a unique solution, i.e. it can uniquely implement the autoregressive solu-
tion or the minimum state variable solution under a peg. While the main
purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that some simple rules are bet-
ter (or worse) than one commonly thinks, the analysis also contributes to
the debate on the alleged problems associated with constant interest rate
projections (see Honkapohja and Mitra (2005a), and Galí (2008)).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the framework,
introduces different policy specifications, and derives welfare effects. Sec-
tion 2.3 demonstrates how an equilibrium under a peg can be implemented
in a unique way. Section 2.4 concludes.
2.2 A consensus model
Consider the following simple New Keynesian model, which can be derived
from a microfounded sticky price framework and is for example also applied
in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999):
πˆt=βEtπˆt+1 + κxˆt + ut, (2.1)
xˆt=Etxˆt+1 −
1
σ
Rˆt +
1
σ
Etπˆt+1,
ut= ρut−1 + εt, ρ ∈ (0, 1),
1An exception is the recent discussion on the usefulness of constant interest rate
projections (see Honkapohja and Mitra (2005b) and Galí (2008)).
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where πˆt denotes the gross inflation rate, xˆt the output-gap, Rˆt the gross
interest rate, and ut an autoregressive cost push shock. εt is i.i.d. with
Et−1εt = 0 and a constant variance σ2ε. All variables are expressed in terms
of percentage deviations from their respective values at an efficient steady
state (see Woodford (2003)). The composite coefficient κ of the Phillips
curve is defined as κ = (1−φ)(1−φβ)(σ+ η)/φ where β is the household’s
constant discount factor, 1/σ the elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
1/η the Frisch labor supply elasticity, and φ the fraction of firms that do
not adjust their prices in each period.
Monetary policy is specified in form of simple feedback rules for the
nominal interest rate. We thus refrain from deriving an optimal monetary
policy. In particular, we consider three different simple rules for monetary
policy: i.) The rule proposed by Taylor (1993), ii.) an active interest rate
policy that is consistent with monetary policy acting under discretion, and
iii.) an interest rate peg.
2.2.1 Solutions under different simple rules
Following common practice, we restrict our attention to convergent equilib-
rium sequences. The model is simple enough to derive closed form solutions.
An active interest rate policy can be described with interest rate rules
of the form
Rˆt = wππˆt + wxxˆt, (2.2)
where wπ > 1 and wx ≥ 0. Specifically, the feedback coefficients equal
wπ = 1.5 and wx = 0.5 in case of the Taylor rule, and wπ = ρ+ (1− ρ)σε
and wx = 0 in the case of a simple active rule consistent with discretionary
policy (see Appendix A.1). In both cases, the model given in (2.1) can be
reduced to the two-dimensional system
πˆt=βEtπˆt+1 + κxˆt + ut
xˆt=Etxˆt+1 −
wπ
σ
πˆt −
wx
σ
xˆt +
1
σ
Etπˆt+1
It is well-known that this system exhibits exactly one solution when wπ > 1
and wx ≥ 0 (since the system then exhibits two unstable eigenvalues) which
allows for convergent equilibrium sequences only if the solution exhibits no
history dependence (see for instance Woodford (2001)). Thus, we know
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that both simple rules will lead to a linear solution of the following form
πˆt = auut, xˆt = buut.
Using the method of undetermined coefficients the coefficients au and bu of
this minimum state variable (MSV) solution can easily be derived:
au =
σ
(
1− ρ+ wx
σ
)
σ (1− βρ)
(
1− ρ+ wx
σ
)
+ κ (wπ − ρ)
, bu = −
au
σ
wπ − ρ
1− ρ+ wx
σ
.
An interest rate peg, i.e. a policy that keeps the nominal interest rate
at its long-run efficient level (R¯ = 1/β > 1), Rˆt = 0, leads to the following
conditions for the equilibrium sequences of inflation and the output-gap:
πˆt= βEtπˆt+1 + κxˆt + ut,
xˆt=Etxˆt+1 +
1
σ
Etπˆt+1.
It is well known that this policy gives rise to multiple equilibrium solutions.
Precisely, equilibrium conditions can be solved by other solutions than the
MSV solution, since under a peg there exist one stable and one unsta-
ble eigenvalue. Hence, there exist additional stable solutions that exhibit
endogenous state variables.
One type of solution features artificial state variables (like past expec-
tations of today’s non-predetermined variables, Et−1πˆt or Et−1xˆt ). These
solutions are well-known to support the existence of sunspot-equilibria,
where arbitrary changes in expectations (non-fundamental shocks) can af-
fect macroeconomic variables. Here, we disregard these types of solutions
and exclusively apply "well-behaved" solutions, namely, the MSV solution
and an autoregressive (AR) solution. By construction, both cannot support
sunspot equilibria, i.e. welfare reducing endogenous fluctuations.
1. Minimum state solution: As the first type of solution we consider the
MSV solution under the peg, which takes the form
πˆt = a
peg
u ut, xˆt = b
peg
u ut.
Applying the method of undetermined coefficients delivers
apegu =
1− ρ
κ
[
(1− ρ)(1− βρ)
1
κ
−
ρ
σ
]−1
, (2.3)
bpegu =
au
κ
(1− βρ)−
1
κ
.
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2. Autoregressive solution: As the second type of solution we consider
an AR solution, where lagged inflation serves as an additional state
variable. The solution form is given by
πˆt= aππˆt−1 + a
peg,AR
u ut, (2.4)
xˆt= bππˆt−1 + b
peg,AR
u ut,
where the method of undetermined coefficients yields
aπ =
1 + κ
σ
2β
+
1
2
−
√(
1 + κ
σ
2β
+
1
2
)2
−
1
β
, bπ =
aπ
κ
−
β
κ
a2π, (2.5)
apeg,ARu =
1− ρ
κ
[
(1− ρ)(1− βρ)
1
κ
−
β(1− ρ)aπ
κ
−
ρ
σ
−
aπ
σ
− bπ
]−1
,
bpeg,ARu =
au
κ
(1− βρ)−
β
κ
aπau −
1
κ
.
Note that one of the two solutions for aπ lies inside the unit circle,
while the other lies outside the unit circle. A stable solution requires
picking the stable solution for aπ, which — since
1+ κ
σ
2β
> 1
2
— must
contain the root with a negative sign.
2.2.2 Welfare effects
In this section we compute welfare effects under the alternative policies and
solutions. Following large parts of the literature, we apply a second order
approximation of household welfare of the underlying model with optimiz-
ing agents. In particular, we adopt Woodford’s (2003) approach, leading to
a quadratic loss function that measures the welfare loss of deviations from
an efficient steady state (where long-run distortions are eliminated by fiscal
transfer and long-run price stability is ensured by an inflation target equal
to one):
L = −E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(πˆ2t + λxˆ
2
t ) = −
1
1− β
(V ar πˆ + λV ar xˆ) , (2.6)
where we assumed that the economy is initially in its steady state and we
used that the equilibrium sequences under all solutions are covariance sta-
tionary. V ar πˆ then denotes the unconditional variance (here, conditional
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σ η β φ ǫ ρ σ2ε
1 1 0.99 0.75 6 0.9 1
Table 2.1: Benchmark parameter values
on the information available at the beginning of period 0) of πˆt. The weight
on output gap fluctuations satisfies λ = κ/ǫ, where ǫ is the price elastic-
ity that price setting firms face (see Woodford (2003)). The unconditional
variances are given by
V ar πˆ=
1
1− a2π
[
a2uV ar u+ 2aπauCov(u, πˆ)
]
,
V ar xˆ= b2πV arπˆ + b
2
uV ar u+ 2bπbuCov(u, πˆ),
where V ar u = 1
1−ρ
σ2ε and Cov(u, πˆ) = au
ρ
(1−ρ2)(1−aπρ)
σ2ε (see Appendix
A.2). For the computation of the variances we apply a set of standard
parameter values given in Table 2.1, which lead to κ = 0.1717 and λ =
0.029. The normalization of σ2ε does evidently not affect the relative welfare
effects. These parameter values lead to a policy rule under discretionary
optimization that is characterized by wπ = 1.5 (and wx = 0). For this
benchmark calibration we obtain the following results for the solutions and
the variances under different rules:
Taylor rule: πˆt = 3.563ut, xˆt = −3.563ut,
V ar πˆ = 66.814, V ar xˆ = 66.814, and LTaylor = −6872.52.
Policy under discretion, wπ = 1.5: πˆt = 0.878ut, xˆt = −5.268ut,
V ar πˆ = 4.057, V ar xˆ = 146.05 ; and Lactive = −823.56.
Interest rate peg MSV: πˆt = 0.696ut, xˆt = −6.267ut,
V ar πˆ = 2.552, V ar xˆ = 206.739, and Lpeg,MSV = −846.74.
Interest rate peg AR: πˆt = 0.665πˆt−1 − 0.182ut, xˆt = 1.323πˆt−1 − 5.244ut,
V ar πˆ = 1.241, V ar xˆ = 176.639, and Lpeg,AR = −629.45.
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The results show that the Taylor rule yields the worst welfare result, which
is due to the most effective output gap stabilization that comes at the
cost of the highest inflation variance. Evidently, an active policy under
discretionary optimization performs much better than the Taylor rule. The
MSV solution under the peg leads to an even lower inflation variance, but a
slightly higher welfare loss caused by a less stabilized output gap. Notably,
the AR solution under the peg clearly leads to the lowest welfare loss,
which is mainly due to the smallest inflation variance. The latter property
is hardly surprising, since inflation under the AR solution exhibits inertia
that helps to smooth inflation fluctuations.2
Yet, this welfare ranking is by far not robust to changes of parameter
values, as can be seen in Table 2.2. Most of all, the degree of autocorrelation
of the exogenous state (i.e. the cost push shock) matters for the relative
welfare effects. As argued above, an additional state variable (πˆt−1) can
contribute to less volatile sequences of macroeconomic variables (here, in
particular, inflation). However, additional state variables extend the state
space and thus the support of the variables, which tends to raise uncondi-
tional variances. As long as the autocorrelation ρ of the exogenous state
is large, the latter effect will be less important. But, for smaller values of
ρ, here ρ ≤ 0.8 (see Table 2.2), the welfare loss can be higher for the AR
solution than for the active policy under discretion (wπ = ρ + (1 − ρ)σε
and wx = 0). For a high value of ρ (ρ = 0.95), both solutions under the
peg outperform both active policies. Finally, variations of the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution and of the degree of price stickiness show
that the relative performance of the solutions also depends on the relative
welfare cost of output and inflation fluctuations. Lowering the fraction of
non-price-adjusting firms (φ = 0.7) tends to lower the welfare loss in gen-
eral. Then, aggressive (active) responses to changes in inflation are less
desirable, such that even the MSV solution under the peg outperforms the
active discretionary policy for ρ = 0.9. If the private sector is less willing to
substitute consumption intertemporally (σ = 2), central bank passiveness
2Under both solutions to the peg, a cost push shock causes output and inflation
to decrease. This outcome can differ from the transmission of cost push shocks under
solutions with artificial state variables, where inflation rises and — due to a lower real
interest rate — output too. Such a solution is known to support self-fulfilling inflation
expectations.
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Peg (AR) Peg (MSV) Discretion Taylor
Welfare loss Welfare loss Welfare loss Welfare loss
Varπˆ Varxˆ Varπˆ Varxˆ Varπˆ Varxˆ Varπˆ Varxˆ
ρ = 0.75 -452.81 -4334.86 -279.91 -1276.50
2.36 75.86 34.47 310.25 1.38 49.64 12.41 12.41
ρ = 0.8 -464.98 -1767.35 -367.92 -1982.18
2.02 91.95 12.12 193.98 1.81 65.25 19.27 19.27
ρ = 0.85 -508.73 -1042.81 -517.89 -3400.34
1.66 119.85 5.43 174.52 2.55 91.84 33.06 33.06
ρ = 0.9 -629.45 -846.74 -823.56 -6872.52
1.24 176.64 2.55 206.74 4.06 146.05 66.81 66.81
ρ = 0.95 -1065.44 -1133.14 -1754.03 -19742.23
0.71 347.40 1.00 361.09 8.64 311.06 191.93 191.93
φ = 0.7∗ -392.31 -469.40 -476.43 -3967.05
0.59 75.92 1.03 83.52 1.85 66.51 38.00 38.00
σ = 2∗∗ -535.00 -892.69 -489.62 -4994.05
2.01 77.74 4.78 96.72 1.92 69.26 48.41 35.57
Notes: We set σ = 1, φ = 0.75, except for * and ** where ρ = 0.9.
Table 2.2: Unconditional variances and welfare for various parameter values
tends to lead to higher inflation and a higher welfare loss.3
2.3 Uniqueness under an interest rate peg
As argued above, the two solutions analyzed for the interest rate peg are
not the only possible solutions. In particular, non-fundamental solutions
(with artificial state variables) are possible that might lead to endogenous
fluctuations. A policy regime that facilitates the latter is evidently not
desirable. Thus, we aim at designing policy rules for the central bank that
implement a peg in a way that renders multiple solutions impossible. In
particular, we show that both solutions to the peg can be implemented by
an appropriately designed interest rate rule.
3The unconditional variances tend to rise with ρ under active policies, whereas ρ
exerts an ambiguous effect on the variances under the peg.
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2.3.1 Minimum state solution
The MSV solution under a peg, which is characterized by πˆt = apegu ut and
xˆt = b
peg
u ut, can be implemented by a rule of the form (2.2). To implement
a peg, Rˆt = 0, the coefficients have to satisfy wxwπ = −
πˆt
xˆt
. Using that the
MSV solution implies πˆt
xˆt
= a
peg
u
bpegu
, we get the following conditions for the
policy rule coefficients
wπ = α and wx = −α (apegu /b
peg
u ) ,
where α is an arbitrary constant. We can easily assess the equilibrium de-
terminacy conditions of the New Keynesian model closed with this interest
rate rule. The model in matrix form is given by
Etyt+1 = Ayt +But with yt = (xˆt, πˆt)
′ and A =
(
0 β
σ 1
)−1(
−κ 1
σ + wxwπ
)
.
To ensure determinacy, the matrix A must exhibit two unstable eigenvalues
which is guaranteed by the three following conditions
det(A)> 1⇔
σ + wx + κwπ
σβ
> 1,
det(A)− trace(A)>−1⇔ wπ + wx
1− β
κ
> 1,
det(A) + trace(A)>−1⇔ κ (1 + wπ) + (2σ + wx) (1 + β) > 0.
Under the benchmark calibration of Table 2.1 and, for instance, α = 1.5,
these conditions are fulfilled and the MSV solution is the unique solution.
The interest rate rule then reads Rˆt = 1.5πˆt− 0.1667xˆt. This rule uniquely
implements sequences
{
Rˆt, xˆt, πˆt
}∞
t=0
satisfying πˆt = apegu ut, xˆt = b
peg
u ut,
and Rˆt = 0.
2.3.2 Autoregressive solution
Similarly, the autoregressive solution can uniquely be implemented by an
interest rate rule of the form4
Rˆt = rxxˆt + rππˆt + rlπˆt−1. (2.7)
4Galí (2008) proceeds in a similar way to implement a peg in a unique way: He induces
equilibrium determinacy in a New Keynesian model by implementing a peg with a rule,
where the central bank reacts to inflation and current and lagged output.
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We set the parameters in (2.7) so as to implement the autoregressive so-
lution. Eliminating πˆt in (2.7) by πˆt = aππˆt−1 + apeg,ARu ut yields Rˆt =
rxxˆt+(rl + rπaπ) πˆt−1+ rπapeg,ARu ut, which further has to imply a sequence
of constant interest rates, Rˆt = 0. For this, we use the output solution,
xˆt = bππˆt−1 + b
peg,AR
u ut ⇔ α(−xˆt + bππˆt−1 + b
peg,AR
u ut) = 0 for an arbi-
trary α = 0, which implies Rˆt = rxxˆt+ (rl + rπaπ) πˆt−1 + rπapeg,ARu ut = 0 if
rx = −α; rl+rπaπ = αbπ; and rπapeg,ARu = αb
peg,AR
u . Thus, (2.7) implements
an interest rate peg if (but not only if) the policy rule coefficients satisfy
rx = −α, rl = α (bπ − aπ̟) , rπ = α̟, (2.8)
where ̟ = bpeg,ARu /a
peg,AR
u . Setting α = 0.25, for instance and applying
the parameter values in Table 2.1, leads to rx = −0.25, rl = −4.47, and
rπ = 7.22. Eliminating the interest rate in (2.1), by a policy rule satisfying
(2.7) and (2.8) leads to a 3×3 system in xˆt, πˆt, and πˆt−1. Since the latter is
relevant for monetary policy, the equilibrium solution takes the form (2.4).
Determinacy then requires that there are two eigenvalues outside the unit
circle and one stable eigenvalue. For α = 0.25 and the parameter values in
Table 2.1, the eigenvalues under (2.8) are given by λ1 = 0.665; λ2 = λ3 =
1.080 (modulus), ensuring that the AR solution is the unique solution.5
The single stable eigenvalue 0.665, resembles the autoregressive coefficient
in the inflation solution: πˆt = 0.665πˆt−1 − 0.182ut. Thus, the central bank
can construct an interest rate rule in a way, which implies 1) a constant
interest rate (i.e. Rˆt = 0) and 2) unique equilibrium sequences that are
identical to the equilibrium sequences under the autoregressive solution.
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter shows that a popular monetary policy device, namely, an
active interest rate policy (or a Taylor rule), can easily be outperformed by
an even simpler monetary policy strategy: an interest rate peg. While we
do not seek to identify optimal policies, we want to demonstrate that central
bankers should not apply recipes just because of their appealing simplicity.
Once a policy maker departs from a fully optimal (commitment) strategy,
it is ex-ante not clear which kind of simple rule most closely resembles the
outcome under the commitment plan. To our surprise, even an interest
5Further details on the determinacy conditions are available from the authors upon
request.
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rate peg can be more desirable (in welfare terms) than an active interest
rate policy consistent with an optimal plan under discretion. Finally, it is
shown that the common argument in favor of active interest rate policies,
i.e. the absence of endogenous fluctuations, is not incompatible with a
constant interest rate.
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Chapter 3
Should central banks care
about investment?
3.1 Introduction
A paradigm in the literature on optimal monetary policy in New Keyne-
sian models is the prescription of Taylor rules: Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007) argue that these simple policy rules, which require the central bank
to adjust the nominal interest rate more than one for one in response to
deviations in inflation from its target, resolve the central bank’s trade-off in
a near-optimal way. Intuitively, an increasing real interest rate in face of in-
flationary pressure will curb economic activity (and vice versa) and thereby
dampen fluctuations in inflation. The good performance of Taylor rules,
which are also known as active policy rules, is closely related to the fact
that most New Keynesian models imply that stabilizing inflation should be
given priority over the goal of output stabilization.6 Woodford (2004), in
his survey of the literature, finds that "it is not a bad first approximation
to say that the goal of monetary policy should be price stability". The
goal of this chapter is to analyze how the inclusion of endogenous capital
accumulation quantitatively affects interest rates, the central bank’s pol-
icy trade-off and the performance of simple policy rules. In particular, I
present the Ramsey optimal policy for a model with endogenous capital
formation and compare it to Ramsey optimal policy in the standard model
with an exogenous capital stock. I further ask to what extent simple rules
6See Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
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can mimic the allocation achieved by Ramsey optimal policy when capital
accumulation is endogenous.
In the canonical New Keynesian model, as presented for instance in
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), the capital stock is assumed to be fixed,
so that the central bank has an impact on aggregate activity exclusively
due to its influence on agents’ intertemporal consumption decision. This
implies that the interest rate set by monetary policy has no impact on the
intertemporal allocation of resources: The central bank can reduce aggre-
gate demand by increasing the interest rate without having an impact on
future allocations. With endogenous capital accumulation, an increase in
the real interest rate triggers a reduction of investment which affects future
marginal cost and production. Empirical evidence demonstrates that the
investment channel is quantitatively important. Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005) find that investment reacts to monetary policy shocks
in a hump-shaped way. In the peak, which occurs after around two years,
investment declines by one percent. Angeloni, Kashyap, Mojon, and Ter-
lizzese (2003) use vector autoregressions (VARs) to identify the relative
contribution of consumption and investment in the response of private sec-
tor domestic demand to monetary policy shocks. On a two-year horizon,
they estimate the contribution of investment to slightly below 50% for the
United States. In the Euro Area, the response of investment is quantita-
tively even more important than consumption movements, accounting for
a fraction of around 70%.
I present two main results in this chapter. First, I find that when capital
can be accumulated at no cost, optimal policy reacts to a cost push shock
by persistently reducing nominal and real interest rates. However, this does
not reflect a systematically changed trade-off: As in the model with fixed
capital, optimal policy allows for temporary inflation by persistently reduc-
ing the real interest rate below its natural rate in order to stabilize output.
Rather, it is the path of the natural rate of interest, i.e. the real interest
rate in absence of sticky prices, which is affected by capital accumulation:
The natural interest rate falls in response to a cost push shock. The reason
is that, due to the decline in the capital stock, scarcity of consumption
goods is highest around two years after the shock. Thus, households ce-
teris paribus increase borrowing, driving down the equilibrium real interest
rate. Second, I find that the performance of simple rules worsens with in-
creasing flexibility of the capital stock. When capital can be accumulated
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at no cost, the optimal simple rule induces a welfare loss exceeding that
under Ramsey policy by 9.2%. The reason is that the optimal simple rule
stabilizes inflation by strongly active policy. However, endogenous capital
accumulation magnifies the output cost of this policy: By stabilizing in-
flation, policy permits the decline in labor demand to lead to a decline in
investment, thus reducing future labor demand and output. Under positive
investment adjustment cost, the excess welfare cost of simple rules falls to
2.8%. The reason is that adjustment cost mitigate the output fluctuations
implied by endogenous capital accumulation.
McCallum and Nelson (1999) argue that fluctuations in the capital stock
over the business cycle can be neglected because capital and output move-
ments are not strongly correlated at cyclical frequencies. However, the
authors themselves name analytical simplicity as the main justification for
the fixed capital assumption. Many studies have analyzed New Keyne-
sian models with endogenous capital accumulation, but none has exposed
its impact on optimal monetary policy explicitly. The existing literature
generally considers two different assumptions. Under the rental market as-
sumption households accumulate capital and rent it to firms. Another
possibility is to assume firm-specific capital. As demonstrated by Galí,
Gertler, and López-Salido (2001), this implies that marginal cost differ
across firms. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) contribute to the discussion
on endogenous fluctuations generated by monetary policy. They find that
in a rental-market model, forward-looking interest rate rules are likely to
generate equilibrium indeterminacy. Sveen and Weinke (2005, 2007) fo-
cus on the determinacy properties of simple interest rate rules in a model
with firm-specific capital accumulation. They find that firm-specific cap-
ital generates endogenous price stickiness which implies that the Taylor
principle can be insufficient to guarantee equilibrium determinacy.7 Sveen
and Weinke (2006) analyze the welfare implications of optimized simple
interest rate rules in a model with sticky wages. They find that a central
bank which ignores the endogenous price stickiness implied by firm-specific
capital puts too less weight on price inflation and too much weight on wage
7Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005) show that the endogenous price
stickiness implied by models with firm-specific capital helps to reconcile the different
estimates of price stickiness from macro and micro models: To match the data, macro
models need large price stickiness implying that prices are adjusted on average every
six quarters. However, microeconomic estimations suggest much more frequent price
adjustment.
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inflation. However, Sveen and Weinke (2006) confine to analyzing simple
rules and do not compute Ramsey optimal policy. Further, the large-scale
models estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets
and Wouters (2007) include capital. However, analyzing optimal monetary
policy is outside the scope of these contributions.
In the literature on optimal monetary policy, the setup of Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2007) is closest to the present chapter. Following them,
I analyze Ramsey optimal policy in a sticky price economy where house-
holds invest into capital and rent it to firms. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
evaluate the welfare loss of different policies under shocks to government
expenditures and factor productivity, and generate a trade-off for monetary
policy by assuming a transaction friction which implies that positive inter-
est rates distort households’ cash holding decision. In contrast, the model
analyzed in this chapter is a cashless economy under cost push shocks.
These are modeled as wage markup shocks arising from imperfect substi-
tutability of different labor types. A rising markup implies an inefficient
increase in wages and a reduction of economic activity.8 Such shocks imply
that the central bank faces a different trade-off compared to the analysis
of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). Many empirical contributions to the
literature document variation in markups. Markup shocks play an impor-
tant role in estimated models, such as Smets and Wouters (2007). Further,
Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007) measure an inefficiency gap in the
labor market, which is defined as the gap between the marginal product of
labor and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consump-
tion. They find that this gap can be decomposed into a wage and a price
markup and find the wage markup to be the predominant source of fluctu-
ations in the gap. According to Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009), this
inefficiency gap, which they call the labor wedge, accounts for an important
share of business cycle fluctuations. I calibrate the wage markup shock to
the inefficiency gap measured by Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007).9
8The wage increase is inefficient in the sense that it does not reflect a change in the
social cost of labor, i.e. the wage rises while the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption is unchanged. Therefore, a social planner would not change the
allocation in response to such a shock, as will be made explicit in section 3.3.1.
9Note that there is debate on the microfoundation of these shocks and to what extent
they represent inefficient fluctuations: Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2009) argue that
New Keynesian models are not yet ready for policy analysis because there is no mi-
croeconomic evidence on the nature of many shocks required to generate quantitatively
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This chapter is structured as follows. I start by presenting the model
in section 3.2. Section 3.3 presents the first-best allocation, which provides
a useful benchmark and exposes distortions in the competitive equilibrium
of the model economy. In 3.3, I further derive the problem of the Ramsey
planner and present the welfare measure. Section 3.4 shows the impulse
responses to a wage markup shock under different policies in both the
model with fixed and variable capital. Moreover, I evaluate welfare un-
der alternative policies and characterize their stabilization properties with
reference to the distortions identified in the analysis of the first-best allo-
cation. Following Casares and McCallum (2006), who argue that a model
with frictionless capital accumulation yields an implausible variability of
investment, I introduce investment adjustment cost into the model in the
section 3.5. Further, I conduct a robustness check by assuming different
calibrations and specifications of adjustment cost. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model with Calvo-type sticky
prices, flexible wages and monopolistically competitive firms. I introduce a
cost push shock by allowing for imperfect substitutability of labor supply.
For purposes of illustration, I will here expose the model in absence of
adjustment cost. I introduce investment adjustment cost in section 3.5.1
and, for robustness, .
3.2.1 Households
There exists a continuum of households with total mass 1, indexed over j.
Households derive utility from consuming cj,t and enjoying leisure 1− nj,t,
with the utility function given by
u(cj,t, nj,t) =
c1−σj,t − 1
1− σ
− χ
n1+ηj,t
1 + η
. (3.1)
Future utility is discounted with a constant discount factor β. Households
further invest into capital kj,t, which firms rent at the (real) rental rate rkt .
In nominal terms, letting Pt denote the price level, their revenue is Ptrkt .
reasonable dynamics. Therefore, in principle, the observed inefficiency gap might for
instance be the result of a fluctuating utility value of leisure. Such a shock would imply
efficient fluctuations in the sense that a social planner would accommodate the shock.
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The capital stock evolves according to kj,t+1 = (1− δ) kj,t + ij,t, where ij,t
denotes investment and δ the depreciation rate. Households can buy both
investment and consumption goods from retailers at an identical price Pt,
so that a household’s expenditures for consumption and investment goods
amount to Ptcj,t+Ptij,t. Households further have access to nominally state-
contingent claims which deliver a certain payoff of one unit of currency in
a particular state. Let Dj,t denote the amount of claims purchased by
a household j in period t. ϕt,t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor,
i.e. the period t price of such a claim for a particular state divided by the
probability of occurrence of that state conditional on time t information, so
that Etϕt,t+1Dj,t are a household’s expenditures for acquiring claims. Note
that this setup implies incomplete markets because households do not have
access to real state-contingent claims. Further, households receive profits
earned by firms PtΨj,t and need to pay a lump sum tax Ptτ j,t. Households
further supply a differentiated type of labor nj,t for which they earn the
real wage wj,t. To eliminate the wage markup in the steady state, the wage
is subsidized by the factor νW . Thus, a household’s budget constraint is
given by
Dj,t−1+ν
WPtwj,tnj,t+kj,tPtr
k
t +PtΨj,t = Etϕt,t+1Dj,t+cj,tPt+Ptij,t+Ptτ j,t.
Defining dj,t =
Dj,t
Pt
, so that Etϕt,t+1dj,t denotes real expenditures on state-
contingent claims, the budget constraint can be expressed in real terms,
dj,t−1
πt
+νWwj,tnj,t+kj,t
(
rkt + 1− δ
)
+Ψj,t = Etϕt,t+1dj,t+cj,t+kj,t+1+τ j,t,
where πt = PtPt−1 denotes inflation and where I have used the law of motion
for the capital stock. Before describing optimal behavior, the structure of
the labor market, which resembles Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) and
Smets and Wouters (2007), will be explained. Households supply labor not
directly to firms but to labor packers who pay the real wage wj,t. Each
household supplies a differentiated type of labor which is aggregated to a
composite labor good by the labor packers using the production function
nt =
[∫ 1
0
nψtj,tdj
] 1
ψt
.
The labor packers sell the aggregate labor good nt to intermediate firms
at the real wage wt in a perfectly competitive market. Thus, the labor
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packers’ demand for the good nj,t is given by
nj,t =
(
wj,t
wt
)−ζt
nt,
where ζt =
1
1−ψt
. I assume that the log of the substitution elasticity ζ t
follows an AR(1) process with mean ζ¯ and autocorrelation ρζ . Because
labor packers are perfectly competitive, I can use the zero-profit condition
to obtain the aggregate wage as
wt =
[∫ 1
0
w
ψt
ψt−1
j,t dj
]ψt−1
ψt
.
I can now to derive the household’s optimal behavior. The first order
conditions for consumption, capital and state contingent claims read
λj,t= c
−σ
j,t , (3.2)
c−σj,t =βEt
[
c−σj,t+1(r
k
t+1 + 1− δ)
]
, (3.3)
ϕt,t+1=β
λj,t+1
λj,tπt+1
. (3.4)
The transversality conditions read lims→∞ Etϕt,t+skj,t+s+1 = 0 and lims→∞
Etϕt,t+sdj,t+s = 0, where ϕt,t+s =
∏s−1
i=0 ϕt+i,t+i+1. Further, optimal wage
setting requires
wj,t =
ζt
ζt − 1
1
νW
χnηj,tc
σ
j,t.
This implies that households charge a markup over their marginal rate of
substitution between leisure and consumption. The government subsidy νW
is set so that the steady state is efficient (see section 3.2.3).10 To simplify
notation, I denote the net wage markup as
µWt =
ζt
ζt − 1
1
νW
.
10With capital accumulation, a simpler setup with just one subsidy at the firm level
is not possible. The reason is that a firm subsidy affects firms’ demand for labor and
capital. Thus, by eliminating the long-run distortion in the labor market, a distortion
of capital accumulation would result.
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Note that the only reason for household heterogeneity is differentiated labor
supply. However, wages are perfectly flexible and households have identical
market power, so that all households will charge the same wage given that
their marginal rates of substitution do not differ. There is no reason for
such a difference and thus households will behave identically and I can work
with a representative household. This further implies that there is no dis-
persion across households’ labor supply. To summarize, the representative
household’s first order conditions are given by
wt=µ
W
t χn
η
t c
σ
t , (3.5)
c−σt =βEt
[
c−σt+1(r
k
t+1 + 1− δ)
]
, (3.6)
ϕt,t+1=β
λt+1
λtπt+1
. (3.7)
I can further use the asset pricing equation to construct a (nominally) risk-
free bond which pays an interest of Rt = 1Etϕt,t+1 . Using this, (3.7) implies
a standard Euler equation
c−σt = βEt
[
c−σt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
. (3.8)
I can use (3.8) to derive an arbitrage-freeness condition between investment
into state-contingent claims and capital, which reads
Etc
−σ
t+1
Rt
πt+1
= Et
[
c−σt+1(r
k
t+1 + 1− δ)
]
. (3.9)
This equation describes one of the central mechanisms considered in this
chapter. The central bank, who sets the nominal interest rate Rt, has an
impact on capital accumulation: An increase in the ex ante real interest
rate EtRt/πt+1 on nominally risk-free bonds leads households to adapt in-
vestment into capital until it promises an expected return equal to the
expected real return on bonds. This link is substantially weakened by the
introduction of investment adjustment cost in section 3.5.1. A second, im-
portant feature of the model is the time-varying markup of labor supply,
which generates cost push effects.
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3.2.2 Firms
There are two types of firms, producers and retailers. Monopolistically
competitive producers rent labor and capital to produce the final good
yit. Retailers assemble these goods to the final good yt according to the
production function
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yqitdi
]1/q
,
where 0 < q < 1 is a function of the elasticity of substitution ε between two
input goods, q = ε−1
ε
. In contrast to the labor sector, firms’ market power
is not time-varying.
Retailers
Retail firms operate in a perfectly competitive market and maximize profits
given a price level Pt and aggregate demand yt,
max
yit
Pt
[∫ 1
0
yqitdi
]1/q
−
∫ 1
0
Pityitdi.
Analogue to the labor sector, retailers demand the following quantity from
each individual producer
yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
yt.
With perfect competition in the retail sector, the retailers’ profits are zero
and the equilibrium price level is given by
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
) 1
1−ε
.
Producers
There are infinitely many producers indexed over i ∈ (0, 1). Producers
face two decisions: They minimize cost given a certain level of production.
Further, they choose optimal prices, which determine the demand for their
product.
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Cost minimization Producers minimize cost given demand yit, tak-
ing as given the factor prices wt and rkt . Their production function is
given by yit = nαitk
1−α
it . Note that the multiplier on the constraint equals
nominal marginal cost, MCit. Further, I denote real marginal cost by
mcit = MCit/Pt. Producers thus solve
min
n,k
Ptwtnit + Ptr
k
t kit +MCit(yit − n
α
itk
1−α
it ).
The producers’ first order conditions read
Ptwt=MCitfn,t ⇐⇒ wt = mcitα
(
kit
nit
)1−α
,
Ptr
k
t =MCitfk,t ⇐⇒ r
k
t = mcit(1− α)
(
nit
kit
)α
.
These equations can be combined to yield expressions for the optimal
capital-labor ratio and real marginal cost
wt
rkt
=
α
(1− α)
kit
nit
, (3.10)
mcit=
(
rkt
1− α
)1−α (wt
α
)α
. (3.11)
Note that the capital-labor ratio in equilibrium is identical across firms as
all have access to the same factor market. Thus, marginal cost are equal
across firms as well, mcit = mct.
Pricing decision I assume Calvo (1983) pricing where each producer
faces a constant probability φ that he cannot reset his price in a given
period. Thus, a fraction (1− φ) set its price according to PNAit = Pit−1.
Price adjusting producers maximize expected (nominal) profits subject to
Calvo pricing scheme. Producers receive a subsidy νP which is designed
to eliminate the steady state markup. Using that demand is given by
yit = (Pit/Pt)
−ε yt and that due to constant returns to scale, (3.10) and
(3.11) imply wtnit + rkt kit = mctyit, nominal profits are given by
PtΨit = ν
PPityit −mctPtyit = ν
P
(
Pit
Pt
)1−ε
ytPt −mctPt
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
yt.
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Thus, price adjusting producers solve
max
Zt
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+sφ
s
[
νP
(
Zt
Pt+s
)1−ε
Pt+syt+s −mct+s
(
Zt
Pt+s
)−ε
Pt+syt+s
]
.
With a nominal discount factor of Λt,t+s = β
s c
−σ
t+s
c−σt
Pt
Pt+s
, this gives forward-
looking price setting
Zt =
ε
ε− 1
1
νP
Et
∑
s (βφ)
s c−σt+syt+sP
ε
t+smct+s
Et
∑
s (βφ)
s c−σt+syt+sP
ε−1
t+s
.
Prices are thus set as a markup on a weighted sum of expected future
marginal cost, reflecting the positive probability of not being able to adjust
prices in future. The price level can be eliminated by rewriting forward-
looking price setting in terms of the real price Z˜t = Zt/Pt. I can then rewrite
the optimal pricing condition and obtain a system of three equations,
Z˜t=
Z1t
Z2t
,
Z1t = c
−σ
t ytmct + βφEtπ
ε
t+1Z
1
t+1, (3.12)
Z2t = c
−σ
t yt + βφEtπ
ε−1
t+1Z
2
t+1, (3.13)
using that the government subsidy is set to νP = ε
ε−1
. The aggregate price
level depends on the optimal price set by adjusters and non-adjusters, Pt =[∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
] 1
1−ε
. As is shown in Appendix B.1.1, the price index can be
rewritten in terms of the inflation rate πt = Pt/Pt−1 and the real price of
adjusters Z1t /Z
2
t
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1t
Z2t
)1−ε
+ φπε−1t . (3.14)
This equation, together with (3.12) and (3.13) summarize optimal price
setting. In linear terms, one gets the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Price dispersion and aggregate production In this chapter, I evalu-
ate welfare under alternative policies. Thus, it has to be taken into account
that the production of final goods is affected by price dispersion which im-
plies that capital and labor are inefficiently allocated across firms. To cap-
ture this effect, I define intermediate output IOt as the sum of produced
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intermediate goods,
IOt ≡
∫ 1
0
yitdi =
∫ 1
0
kit
(
nit
kit
)α
di = kt
(
nt
kt
)α
. (3.15)
where the last equality uses that the capital labor ratio is constant across
firms, as implied by (3.10). Further, demand for varieties is given by yit =
(Pit/Pt)
−ε yt and thus
IOt =
∫ 1
0
yitdi = yt
∫ 1
0
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
di. (3.16)
An inefficient distribution of production across firms implies IOt > yt.
Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b), a recursive representation of
st ≡
∫ 1
0
(Pit/Pt)
−ε di can be derived. I show in Appendix B.1.1 that st
evolves according to
st = (1− φ)Z˜
−ε
t + φst−1π
ε
t , (3.17)
with st ≥ 1. Combining (3.15) and (3.16), aggregate production is given by
yt =
k1−αt n
α
t
st
. (3.18)
Thus, price dispersion implies an inefficient allocation of resources.
3.2.3 Government
I assume that the government does not issue bonds, which implies that its
budget must be balanced in every period. The government collects lump
sum taxes τ t to finance the expenditures for the production subsidy to firms(
τPt
)
and the wage subsidy to workers
(
τWt
)
, so that its budget constraint
reads
τ t = τ
P
t + τ
W
t .
I assume the government to set the production subsidy to νP = ε
ε−1
which
implies that in the steady state, firms produce efficiently at real marginal
cost of unity, mc = 1.11 Similarly, the wage subsidy is set to νW = ζ
ζ−1
, so
11Note that the subsidies νW and νP are fixed but expenditures vary depending on
economic activity. For details, see Appendix B.1.1.
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that the labor supply decision is not distorted in steady state.12 Monetary
policy is given by the Ramsey optimal policy or in form of an interest rate
rule
Rt =
π
β
(πt
π
)wπ (yt
y
)wy
, (3.19)
where wy > 0, wπ > 1 and where π denotes steady state inflation. This
closes the description of the model.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium markets clear, i.e. nt =
∫ 1
0
nitdi, kt =
∫ 1
0
kitdi. Further,
because state contingent claims are traded only among households, in ag-
gregate, dt =
∫ 1
0
djtdj = 0. I show in Appendx B.1.2 that the aggregate
resource constraint is given by
k1−αt n
α
t = [ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt] st. (3.20)
A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences
{
ct, nt, kt, wt, r
k
t ,
Rt,mct, Z
1
t , Z
2
t , πt, st}
∞
t=0 satisfying the households’ and firms’ first order
conditions (3.5) - (3.7), (3.10) - (3.14) and the transversality conditions
as well as (3.17), (3.20) and a monetary policy, given an exogenous se-
quence for the wage markup µWt . For convenience, the model’s equilibrium
conditions are listed in Appendix B.1.3. Appendix B.3 further contains a
derivation of the steady state of this model.
3.3 Optimal monetary policy
As a benchmark, this section presents the first best allocation of the model
economy. This exposes the potential distortions in a competitive equilib-
rium and thus characterizes the trade-off faced by monetary policy. This
section thus provides a framework for the subsequent analysis of the second-
best Ramsey allocation.
3.3.1 The social planner allocation
The social planner maximizes household utility subject to the economy’s
technological restrictions. As the labor aggregator nt =
[∫ 1
0
nψtj,tdj
]1/ψt
is a
12For a full derivation of the steady state, see Appendix B.3.
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concave function, and all households’ preferences are identical, it is optimal
for each type of labor to be used to the same extent. Thus, for any pair of
households (j, k), optimality requires nj,t = nk,t. I now derive the remaining
optimality conditions. Because households’ preferences are identical, I can
work with a representative agent. Thus, the social planner’s problem reads
max
{c,n,ni,k,ki,y,yi}
G=E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{[
c1−σt
1− σ
− χ
n1+ηt
1 + η
]
+ λ1t
[
yt −
(∫ 1
0
yqitdi
)1/q]
+λ2t
[
nαitk
1−α
it − yit
]
+ λ3t [yt − ct − kt+1 + (1− δ)kt]
+λ4t
[
kt −
∫ 1
0
kitdi
]
+ λ5t
[
nt −
∫ 1
0
nit+1di
]}
.
Denoting the marginal products of labor and capital as mpnt and mpkt,
the first-order conditions to this problem are given by
uc,t=βEt [uc,t+1 (mpkt+1 + 1− δ)] , (3.21)
mpnt=−
un,t
uc,t
, (3.22)
yit= yt, (3.23)
kit
nit
=
kt
nt
, (3.24)
and the aggregate resource constraint yt = ct+ kt+1− (1− δ)kt. (3.21) and
(3.22) imply that the social planner employs both production factors up to
the point where their marginal products equal their social cost. (3.23) and
(3.24) combined require nit = nkt and yit = ykt for any two firms i, k. For a
detailed derivation, see Appendix B.2.1.
The nature of the wage markup shock
The social planner’s first order conditions imply that the wage markup
shock has no impact on the first-best equilibrium. Given that the wage
markup shock is the only shock, the social planner would thus choose con-
stant paths for all model’s variables. Further, as is evident from the house-
hold’s first order condition (3.5), a competitive equilibrium is in general
affected by the wage markup shock. Moreover, the shock also affects the
competitive equilibrium under flexible prices. Thus, it is not necessarily
optimal for the central bank to stabilize output at its natural rate, i.e. the
level of output that would prevail under flexible prices.
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3.3.2 Competitive equilibrium
The social planner’s optimality conditions allow identifying the potential
distortions in the competitive equilibrium of the sticky price economy.
These are used to illustrate the trade-off faced by monetary policy. To
be clear, I use the term "distortion" in the sense that, whenever an equa-
tion characterizing the first best allocation is violated, this constitutes a
distortion.13
Distortions in the competitive equilibrium
I now analyze the potential distortions in turn. As shown in section 3.2.2,
there is no dispersion in the capital labor ratio across firms in a competitive
equilibrium, so that (3.24) holds in all economies analyzed in this chapter.
Equation (3.23) refers to the well-known distortion caused by price disper-
sion: Individual firms’ demand is given by yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
yt so that (3.23) is
satisfied only if there is no price dispersion, i.e. if Pit = Pt ∀i. Thus, by the
definition of price dispersion, st =
∫ 1
0
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
di, the social planner’s opti-
mality condition (3.23) requires st = 1. It can be shown that this requires
zero inflation, πt = 1.14 The second well-established distortion concerns
deviations from the optimality condition (3.22). I here give this distor-
tion an interpretation in terms of the economy’s total markup, defined as
µTt =
mpnt
mrst
, wheremrst = −
un,t
uc,t
is the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption. (3.22) requires absence of markups, µTt = 1. As
in Galí (2008), define the firms’ price markup as µPt =
Pt
MCt
= 1
mct
. Further,
(3.5) implies that households’ wage markup can be written as µWt =
wt
mrst
.
Using that firms’ labor demand is governed by mct = mpnt/wt, the total
13Note that a distortion in this sense does not imply that the allocation in the com-
petitive equilibrium necessarily differs from the one a social planner would choose. The
reason is that the impact of a distortion on the competitive equilibrium can be counter-
acted by another distortion. Rather, my terminology implies that capital accumulation
is distorted whenever, all other things equal, the representative household accumulates
an amount of capital different from that implied by the social planner’s optimality con-
dition.
14As is common in the literature, the proof sketched here is based on the assumption
of zero initial price dispersion, st−1 = 1. (3.14) implies that
Z1
t
Z2
t
=
(
1−φπε−1
t
1−φ
) 1
1−ε
. From
(3.17), st = 1 requires 1− φπεt = (1− φ)
1
1−ε
(
1− φπε−1t
) −ε
1−ε , which is only satisfied by
πt = 1.
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markup can be written as
µTt =
mpnt
mrst
=
wt
mct
µWt
wt
= µWt µ
P
t .
Intuitively, whenever µTt > 1 labor at the aggregate level is inefficiently
low. Thus, this distortion calls for stabilizing labor demand at its efficient
level. Under a fixed capital stock, this is identical to stabilizing output at
its first-best level.
The two distortions described so far are also present in the standard
model with a fixed capital stock. In the model with endogenous capital
accumulation, (3.21) exposes a potential third distortion related to capital
accumulation. In the model economy, where intermediate firms’ capital
demand satisfies rkt = mctmpkt, the household’s first-order condition for
capital accumulation reads
uc,t = βEt
[
uc,t+1
(
mpkt+1
µPt+1
+ 1− δ
)]
. (3.25)
Firms apply a price markup and thus do not rent capital up to its marginal
product. This influences households’ capital accumulation: When house-
holds expect a decline in the price markup, EtµPt+1 < 1, the expected rental
rate on capital is above its expected marginal product. Thus, households
will, ceteris paribus, increase capital accumulation.15
The central bank’s trade-off
The distortions of the competitive equilibrium can be summarized by the
total markup µTt and inflation πt, as in the model with fixed capital. How-
ever, endogenous capital accumulation can have an impact on the central
bank’s trade-off by rendering stabilization of one variable relatively more
important. This is one of the main questions of this chapter. I develop an
intuition in the following.
In absence of wage markup shocks, the social planner allocation can be
implemented by completely stabilizing the total markup µTt and inflation
πt at their steady state values of unity.16 Achieving first best is not possible
15Note that µPt < 1 is possible in the present model without firms having an incentive
to close down. The reason is that the subsidy makes firms profitable as long as µPt >
ε−1
ε
.
16It is shown in Appendix B.3 that unity is the steady state value of both the total
markup and inflation if the central bank targets zero long run inflation, π = 1, so that
the first best allocation is achieved.
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when a wage markup shock hits the economy. In principle, the impact of
increases in the wage markup on the total markup can be eliminated by
a decline in the price markup. However, a decline in the price markup,
mct > 1, implies πt > 1 and thus leads to price dispersion, st > 1. Thus,
whenever µWt = 1, monetary policy cannot achieve πt = 1 and µ
T
t = 1
simultaneously. Intuitively, as a reaction to a positive wage markup shock,
the central bank can induce a decline in the price markup µPt < 1 by
reducing the real interest rate below its natural rate, which is defined as
the real interest rate under flexible prices. This stimulates consumption
demand, so that output exceeds its natural rate and marginal cost rise
above unity.17 Such a policy stabilizes output at the expense of increased
inflation. This is the familiar trade-off of a central bank in a sticky price
model with monopolistic competition.18
When the capital stock is variable, the central bank influences the econ-
omy also by its impact on capital accumulation. By generating a decline
in the price markup, EtµPt+1 < 1, it can stimulate capital accumulation
through (3.25). The intuition is that endogenous capital accumulation
changes the central bank’s trade-off due to the interactions between capi-
tal and labor, which are substitutes in the production function: When the
capital stock is variable, the wage markup shock leads to a decline in labor
demand, which reduces the marginal product of capital, so that investment
is reduced. This leads to a further decline in labor demand in subsequent
periods. Through this mechanism, capital accumulation can magnify the
fluctuations in labor demand and output caused by markup shocks. Be-
cause these fluctuations are inefficient, optimal monetary policy will aim
at eliminating them. This suggests that when the capital stock is vari-
able, optimal policy will shift emphasis toward stabilizing labor demand
and output at the cost of larger fluctuations in inflation.
17To be exact, it is the path of all future real interest rates that matters for consump-
tion demand.
18Note that under flexible prices, policy cannot influence aggregate demand because
the price markup is constant. Rather, as in Adao, Correia, and Teles (2003), sticky
prices equip the central bank with an additional instrument that can be used to improve
upon the flexible price allocation and stabilize output closer to its efficient steady state
level.
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3.3.3 The Ramsey problem
By analyzing Ramsey optimal policy, I assume that the central bank can
credibly commit to its monetary policy and thus influence agents’ ex-
pectations. I set up a Ramsey problem and derive its first-order condi-
tions.19 Due to the complexity of the model, it is not possible to con-
dense the model’s competitive equilibrium into a single implementability
constraint. Thus, a dual Ramsey approach is applied: I derive an intertem-
poral budget constraint by iterating forward the household’s budget con-
straint. This ensures that the transversality conditions for capital and
state-contingent bonds hold. Further, I eliminate as many variables as
possible in the model’s equilibrium conditions. The Ramsey planner then
maximizes household utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint
and the condensed version of the model’s equilibrium conditions.
Deriving the intertemporal budget constraint
I will here focus on the main steps while Appendix B.2.2 contains the
detailed derivation. The representative household’s budget constraint can
be written as
wtnt +
dt−1
πt
+ yt (1−mctst) + kt(r
k
t + 1− δ) = ct + kt+1 + Etr
d
t,t+1dt,
where I use that the government collects the subsidy to workers by raising
lump sum taxes, so that yt (1−mctst) is the residual left from firm profits
after paying the part of the lump-sum tax which finances the production
subsidy, τPt . Iterating forward and using the household’s first order con-
ditions, including the transversality conditions, the intertemporal budget
constraint in period t can be written as
c−σt
[
dt−1
πt
+ kt(r
k
t + 1− δ)
]
=Et
∞∑
s=0
βtc−σt+s (ct+s − wt+snt+s − yt+s (1−mct+sst+s)) ,
19The solution to the resulting system of optimality conditions will be solved by
second-order approximation methods using the software dynare. Appendix B.3 derives
the steady state analytically, where I use that in the long run, all policies analyzed in this
chapter implement first best by setting π = 1. The steady state values of the Ramsey
problem’s Lagrange multipliers are derived by numerical methods.
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Eliminating the wage and the capital rental rate, the intertemporal budget
constraint in period t becomes
At = Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
c1−σt+s +
(
1− α
α
)
χn1+ηt+sµ
W
t+s − c
−σ
t+s
IOt+s
st+s
]
, (3.26)
where At = c−σt
dt−1
πt
+ (1−α)χ
α
nη+1t µ
W
t + c
−σ
t kt (1− δ) .
Writing the intertemporal budget constraint recursively
The model presented in 3.2 implies incomplete markets because households
do not have access to a set of real state-contingent claims. Under incom-
plete markets, it is not possible to derive a single intertemporal budget
constraint, as in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a). Rather, the Ramsey
planner faces an intertemporal budget constraint every period. The rea-
son is that shocks affect the expected future surplus. Thus, an allocation
satisfying a time-zero intertemporal budget constraint must not necessar-
ily satisfy the transversality conditions at all dates under all contingencies.
Therefore, it has to be guaranteed in every period that the allocation sat-
isfies the intertemporal budget constraint. Complete markets would allow
reducing the set of intertemporal budget constraints to a single constraint.
The reason is that real state-contingent claims ensure that the intertem-
poral budget constraint holds independent of the realization of shocks, so
that if a period-zero intertemporal budget constraint holds, the transver-
sality conditions hold at all dates and across all possible states. However,
under the present incomplete markets setup, it is possible to simplify the
sequence of intertemporal budget constraints by writing them recursively,
as in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), yielding
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtθt
{
Et
∞∑
j=0
βt+j
[
c1−σt+j +
(
1− α
α
)
χn1+ηt+j µ
W
t+j − c
−σ
t+j
IOt+j
st+l
]
− At
}
=E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
Θt
[
c1−σt +
(
1− α
α
)
χn1+ηt µ
W
t − c
−σ
t
IOt
st
]
− (Θt −Θt−1)At
}
.
where θt denotes the multiplier on the intertemporal budget constraint and
Θt = Θt−1 + θt, with Θ−1 = 0.
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The Ramsey problem
The system of equilibrium conditions, which are summarized in Appen-
dix B.1.3 for convenience, can be reduced by eliminating wt, rkt , and mct,
yielding a system of 7 equations. The Ramsey planner maximizes household
utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint and the remaining
equilibrium conditions, so that the Ramsey planner’s problem reads
max
{c,n,k,R,s,π,Z˜,Z1,Z2}
J =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt
1− σ
− χ
n1+ηt
1 + η
]
(3.27)
+Θt
[
c1−σt +
1− α
α
χn1+ηt µ
W
t − c
−σ
t
k1−αt n
α
t
st
]
− (Θt −Θt−1)
[
(1− α)χ
α
nη+1t µ
W
t + ktc
−σ
t (1− δ)
]
+λ1t
[
c−σt − Etβc
−σ
t+1
Rt
πt+1
]
+λ2t
[
c−σt −Etβ(1− α)
χ
α
nη+1t+1
kt+1
µWt+1 − Etβ(1− δ)c
−σ
t+1
]
+λ3t
[
Z˜t −
Z1t
Z2t
]
+λ4t
πt −
(
1 + (φ− 1)Z˜1−εt
φ
) 1
ε−1

+λ5t
[
st − (1− φ)Z˜
−ε
t + φπ
ε
tst−1
]
+λ6t
[
Z1t −
n1+ηt
st
χ
α
µWt − φβEtπ
ε
t+1Z
1
t+1
]
+λ7t
[
Z2t − c
−σ
t
k1−αt n
α
t
st
− φβEtπ
ε−1
t+1Z
2
t+1
]
.
The first order conditions to this problem can be found in Appendix B.2.2.
These are not straightforward to interpret, so that I resort to numerical
methods to solve a calibrated version of the model. In the following, the
welfare measure is presented.
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3.3.4 Welfare measure
The welfare measure is based on the representative household’s expected
lifetime utility, W = E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tu (ct, nt) . Following Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2006), welfare is measured conditional on the initial state being the
deterministic steady state, which is identical across all policies I analyze,
as shown in Appendix B.3. The central idea of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2006) is to use the policy function of Vt = Et
∑∞
s=0 β
su (ct+s, nt+s) and to
evaluate it at the initial state.20 Let V (xt, ω) denote the policy function of
Vt, where xt denotes the vector of states and ω is a parameter scaling the
degree of uncertainty in the economy. With the deterministic steady state
being characterized by (xt, ω) = (x, 0), what we seek is V (x, 0). Because
the wage markup shock is the single shock considered here, ω equals its
standard deviation. As is common in the literature, welfare is measured
in percentage points of consumption that would leave the representative
household indifferent between the superior policy A and the inferior policy
B. Denoting this welfare measure with γ and letting superscripts refer to
a particular policy, γ is implicitly defined by
WB = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
(1− γ) cAt , n
A
t
)
.
Given that only the case of σ = 1 is analyzed in the calibrated model, the
utility function (3.1) collapses to u(ct, nt) = ln (ct)−χ
n1+ηt
1+η
. I use this in the
following. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) show that γ, which is a function
Λ(xt, ω) of states xt and uncertainty ω, can be computed accurately up to
second order from the second-order approximated policy functions for V
around the deterministic steady state,
γ ≈ Λ(x, 0) + Λω(x, 0)ω + Λωω(x, 0)
ω2
2
⇐⇒
γ ≈ (1− β)
[
V Aωω(x, 0)− V
B
ωω(x, 0)
] ω2
2
.
20If the welfare measure were based on the average value of Vt obtained from a sim-
ulation of the model, it would actually evaluate unconditional welfare and ignore the
transition path involved after a policy switch. Here, such transition paths are not caused
by different deterministic steady states but result from different stochastic steady states
around which the model’s variables fluctuate in a simulation. For a detailed description
of the welfare measure, see Appendix B.2.3.
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Here, V Aωω(x, 0) and V
B
ωω(x, 0) are steady state values of the second deriv-
atives of the policy function V under policy A (or B) in a second-order
approximation around the model’s deterministic steady state (x, 0),
V (xt, ω)≈V (x, 0) + Vx(x, 0)(xt − x) + Vω(x, 0)ω + Vωx(x, 0)ω(xt − x)
+
1
2
Vxx(x, 0)(xt − x)
2 +
1
2
Vωω(x, 0)ω
2.
In the following analysis, I evaluate the welfare loss of each policy relative
to the deterministic steady state, which is identical to the social planner
equilibrium. Moreover, I consider the excess welfare loss implied by simple
rules, expressed as percentages of the welfare loss under Ramsey optimal
policy, γexcess = γsimple/γRamsey − 1. For the purpose of comparing simple
rules to Ramsey optimal policy, I prefer using the latter, relative measure.
The reason is that it is independent of the level of welfare cost of business
cycle fluctuations implied by macroeconomic models, which are controver-
sially discussed since Lucas (1987). Moreover, it is independent of the
shock variance, which differs considerably across studies, as is discussed in
the following section.
3.4 Impulse responses to wage markup shocks
This section analyzes impulse response to wage markup shocks, focusing
on interest rate dynamics and the resolution of the central bank’s trade-
off under different monetary policies in models with fixed and variable
capital. Further, I quantify the welfare loss of simple rules relative to
those implied by Ramsey optimal policy. Because the complexity of the
model does not allow for analytical results, numerical methods are applied.
I calibrate the model’s parameters and solve the model using a second-order
approximation at the deterministic steady state. Before proceeding to the
results, the calibration is summarized.
3.4.1 Calibration
I here confine to a description of the single shock, the wage markup shock.
The estimated volatility of wage markup shocks differs considerably across
studies. Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007) measure an inefficiency gap,
defined as log mrs
mpn
, which they decompose into a price and a wage markup.
The wage markup they measure has a standard deviation of 5.4%, so that
39
a shock of one standard deviation increases the markup by 1.59%. In
contrast Smets and Wouters (2007), who estimate a large scale New Key-
nesian model, estimate this figure to 24%. I prefer to choose the volatility
of the shock in line with the estimates by Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido
(2007) because these authors define the marginal rate of substitution and
the marginal product of labor as in the model presented in this chapter,
whereas Smets and Wouters (2007) assume habit formation. The wage
markup shock is calibrated to match the standard deviation estimated by
Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007). In setting the autocorrelation to
ρς = 0.9, I deviate from the high estimate of 0.95 by Galí, Gertler, and
López-Salido (2007) in order not to obtain results particular to very per-
sistent shocks. The entire calibration can be found in Appendix B.4.
3.4.2 Ramsey optimal policy under fixed and variable
capital
I now compare Ramsey optimal policy in the model with variable capital to
the model with a fixed capital stock. The latter can be found for example
in Woodford (2003). Note that all variables are given in terms of percent-
age deviations from their steady state, with ẑt = 100 [log(zt)− log(z)] .21
Variables with superscript n denote a variable’s natural rate, i.e. its value
under flexible prices. Further, to simplify interpretation, I define the ex
ante real interest rate, rt = Rt/Etπt+1. It is compared to the natural rate
of interest rnt , which equals the real interest rate in the respective models
with flexible prices. Figure 3.1 shows the responses of both the model with
fixed and the one with variable capital to a wage markup shock under Ram-
sey optimal policy. In both models, the shock induces a rise in real wages
so that labor demand and production decline. Naturally, when capital is
variable, households reduce investment to smooth consumption. Thus, the
consumption decline is less strong on impact but more persistent in this
case.
Ramsey optimal policy in the model with fixed capital reduces the nom-
21All figures show deviations from steady state in percentage points, zˆt, except for
interest rates and markups which are given in terms of absolute deviations from steady
state, Rˆt = 100 ∗ (Rt −R) and can thus be interpreted as quarterly percentage points:
For instance Rˆt = −0.15 implies a 15 basis point decline in the (quarterly) interest rate,
and µˆTt = 1.5 implies that the total markup increases from its steady state of µ
T = 100%
to 101.5%.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse responses to a wage markup shock for fixed and variable
capital
inal interest rate on impact, so that the real interest rate falls below the
natural rate of interest. This policy generates an increase in output above
the natural rate, thus stabilizing output closer to its steady state level. The
cost of this is a temporary rise in inflation. In the terms introduced in sec-
tion 3.3.1, monetary policy reduces the total markup by inducing a decline
in the price markup, as shown in Figure 3.1. After two periods, mone-
tary policy focuses on curbing inflation, which is achieved by an increase
in the nominal interest rate. The reason why the central bank pursues
expansionary policy only for 1-2 periods is that inflation in later periods,
due to forward looking price setting, transmits to higher inflation in ear-
lier periods. Thus, the cost of stabilizing output is lowest just after the
shock hits the economy. This is the reason for the hump-shaped response
of consumption and output in the model with fixed capital.
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Volatility of markups
and inflation
sd(µT ) sd(µP ) sd(µW ) sd(πˆ)
Fixed capital stock 0.0456 0.0104 0.0510 0.0020
Variable capital stock 0.0477 0.0068 0.0510 0.0114
Note: Standard deviations refer to variables defined as µ˜t = log(µt/µ¯).
Table 3.1: Comparison of Ramsey allocations across models
Ramsey optimal policy in the model with variable capital resolves its trade-
off similarly, allowing a temporary rise in output above its natural rate at
the cost of temporary inflation. Table 3.1 demonstrates this: In both mod-
els, optimal policy generates a price markup which reduces the volatility of
the total markup below that of the exogenous wage markup. However, in
contrast to the model with fixed capital, monetary policy reduces the nom-
inal interest rate persistently below its steady state. This is surprising and
not in line with the intuition of central banks increasing interest rates in or-
der to curb inflation associated with a cost push shock. However, it can be
explained by the response of the natural interest rate. Given the decline in
the capital stock induced by consumption-smoothing households, scarcity
of consumption goods is highest ten quarters after the shock. This im-
plies that households on impact, ceteris paribus, increase savings so that in
equilibrium the natural interest rate falls.22 Further, observe that Ramsey
optimal policy implies that the real interest rate closely follows the natural
rate of interest, in contrast to the model with fixed capital. The reason is
that investment is more sensitive to changes in the real interest rate than
consumption. Thus, when households cannot smooth consumption by ad-
justing investment, the central bank has to reduce the real interest rate
rather extensively for households to increase consumption demand.
22To make the argument more explicit, first nominal and real interest rates follow each
other closely because monetary policy allows only moderate inflation. Second, Ramsey
optimal policy in the model with capital implies that the real interest rate is set close
to the natural rate of interest. This implies that the nominal interest rate has to follow
the natural interest rate.
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3.4.3 Ramsey policy versus simple rules
This section compares simple interest rate rules of the form (3.19) to Ram-
sey optimal policy in the model with variable capital. Taylor rules, which
are characterized by wπ > 1, are considered quasi-optimal, in the sense that
they mimic second-best Ramsey policy closely by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007). The reason is that the Taylor principle implies that the real interest
rate increases when inflation rises, so that inflation is stabilized. I consider
"optimal simple rules" by optimizing numerically for the inflation reaction
coefficients in the Taylor rule wπ and wy instead of using standard parame-
ter values.23 I first use the impulse responses to illustrate qualitatively how
Ramsey optimal policy improves upon simple rules. Second, I quantify the
welfare gains achieved by Ramsey optimal policy. Figure 3.2 shows the im-
pulse response to a wage markup shock under Ramsey optimal policy and
the optimal simple rule, which is characterized by an aggressive response
to inflation, wπ = 8 and no reaction to output fluctuations, wy = 0.24 The
optimal simple rule puts a strong emphasis on inflation stabilization and
thus achieves an allocation virtually identical to the flexible price economy.
Therefore, the output gap is close to zero at all times and the real interest
rate closely follows the natural interest rate. In other words, fluctuations
in the price markup are negligible so that the total markup approximately
equals the exogenous wage markup.
In contrast, as mentioned in the preceding section, Ramsey optimal
policy increases output above its natural rate at the cost of temporary in-
flation. The real interest rate is set close to its natural rate but is reduced
persistently from the third quarter after the shock, so that consumption
demand rises compared to the simple rule. With respect to capital ac-
cumulation, the decline in the price markup triggered by Ramsey policy
ceteris paribus increases the capital rental rate, so that investment rises
according to (3.25). Because the price markup only falls for two periods,
23Optimization is carried out over a grid ranging from wπ = 1.1 to wπ = 8 and
wy = −0.5 to wy = 4. At every grid point, I solve the model by using second-order
approximation methods in dynare. Then, the welfare measure is applied to find the
optimal simple rule.
24The optimal coefficient on output is virtually, but not exactly identical to zero.
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) also find that optimal simple rules do not react to
changes in output. Further, allowing for coefficients wπ > 8 does not improve welfare
substantially. For instance, at wπ = 60, welfare is improved by less than 0.001% relative
to wπ = 8.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to a wage markup shock
households increase investment above its counterpart under the simple rule
for two periods. This implies that the capital stock is better stabilized than
under the simple rule, allowing households to realize a higher consumption
path. Thus, by stimulating investment in the first periods, Ramsey optimal
policy leads to a smoother consumption profile.
Table 3.2 demonstrates the differences between both policies quantita-
tively. The table demonstrates that inflation fluctuations are almost absent
under the simple rule. In comparison, Ramsey policy allows higher infla-
tion fluctuations but induces a smaller welfare loss by stabilizing the total
markup, consumption, capital and output more successfully. The welfare
loss implied by the optimal simple rule exceeds that of the Ramsey policy
by 9.19%. This is called the excess welfare loss of the optimal simple rule.
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Welfare
loss γ
sd(µT ) sd(µP ) sd(π) sd(y) sd(k) sd(c)
Optimal
simple rule
0.0682 0.0511 0.0001 0.0085 0.0256 0.0234 0.0162
Ramsey
policy
0.0625 0.0477 0.0068 0.1142 0.0239 0.0223 0.0155
Excess
welfare loss
9.19%
Notes: The welfare loss is given in % of st.st. consumption relative to first best.
Standard deviations refer to variables defined as µ˜t = log(µt/µ¯).
The optimal simple rule is characterized by wπ = 8, wy=0.
Table 3.2: Welfare comparison of Ramsey policy to simple rules
3.5 Adjustment cost
Intuition suggests that capital accumulation is likely to entail adjustment
cost: When a firm wishes to increase its capital stock, there is a cost of in-
stalling the purchased investment goods. Such cost lead the capital stock to
behave in a more sluggish manner, which is considered empirically realistic.
For instance, Casares and McCallum (2006) argue that adjustment cost are
needed in order for models with endogenous capital accumulation to match
cyclical data. The literature distinguishes two types of adjustment cost,
capital adjustment cost as in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) and
investment adjustment cost, used by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005). Here, both versions are considered. First, I present impulse re-
sponses to a wage markup shock for a baseline calibration of investment
adjustment cost. Subsequently, I evaluate the performance of optimal sim-
ple rules relative to Ramsey policy across different calibrations for both
types of adjustment cost. In order to evaluate how capital accumulation
affects the trade-off of monetary policy quantitatively, the values obtained
in this analysis are compared to the excess welfare cost of optimal simple
rules in the model without adjustment cost.
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3.5.1 Investment adjustment cost
This section analyzes Ramsey optimal policy and the performance of simple
rules under investment adjustment cost. This specification is used in many
large-scale models such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005).25
Under investment adjustment cost, the law of motion of the capital stock
takes the following form
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + itS
(
it
it−1
)
, (3.28)
with S (it/it−1) = κ2 (it/it−1 − 1)
2 , where κ measures the degree of ad-
justment cost. Thus, households’ first order conditions with respect to
investment and capital read
qt= βEt
c−σt+1
c−σt
[
qt+1(1− δ) + r
k
t+1
]
, (3.29)
1= qt
[
St (◦) +
it
it−1
S ′t (◦)
]
− βEt
c−σt+1
c−σt
qt+1
[(
it+1
it
)2
S ′t+1 (◦)
]
(3.30)
where St (◦) = S (it/it−1) and S ′t (◦) =
∂S(it/it−1)
∂(it/it−1)
and qt is the value of capi-
tal.26 Analogue to (3.9), an arbitrage freeness equation can be constructed
by equating (3.29) and (3.8), which gives
Etc
−σ
t+1
[
(1− δ)qt+1/qt + r
k
t+1q
−1
t
]
= Etc
−σ
t+1Rtπ
−1
t+1.
Thus, in contrast to (3.9), the household has to take into account that
the market value of installed capital can fluctuate. With respect to the
calibration, there is considerable disagreement in the literature, which is
discussed further in the appendix. I here analyze as a baseline case the
value estimated by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), κ = 2.48,
which generates empirically reasonable impulse responses to a monetary
policy shock in their model.
25Beaudry and Portier (2006) and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) employ
this specification as well. For a survey of models assuming investment adjustment cost,
see Groth and Khan (2006).
26The equilibrium definition in section 3.2.4 is thus changed as follows: The two first
order conditions (3.29)-(3.30) replace (3.6). Further, the aggregate resource constraint
(3.20) is replaced by
(
nαt k
1−α
t
)
/st = ct + it and the new law of motion for capital,
kt+1 = (1− δ) kt + itS(it/it−1), is added to the set of equilibrium conditions. Further,
the variables qt and it become part of the equilibrium sequences defined in section 3.2.4.
46
0 10 20
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
yˆ
0 10 20
-1
-0.5
0
cˆ
0 10 20
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
iˆ
0 10 20
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
kˆ
0 10 20
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Rˆ
0 10 20
0
0.1
0.2
πˆ
 
 
Ramsey
Opt. simple
0 10 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
rˆ
0 10 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
rˆn
0 10 20
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
rˆ − rˆn
0 10 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
yˆ − yˆn
0 10 20
0
1
2
3
µˆT
0 10 20
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
µˆP
Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a wage markup shock with positive ad-
justment cost
Ramsey policy versus simple rules
Figure 3.3 shows the responses to a wage markup shock with positive in-
vestment adjustment cost, both for Ramsey policy and the optimal simple
rule. The wage markup shock increases the wage and thus temporarily re-
duces labor demand and production. Thus, households reduce investment
in order to smooth consumption. However, because adjusting investment
now entails cost, consumption cannot be perfectly smoothed and drops by
more than 0.5% on impact, more than twice the response in the preced-
ing analysis. Further, observe that the nominal interest rate is increased
under both the simple rule and Ramsey policy. As before, the behavior
of the nominal interest rate is linked to the natural rate of interest, which
increases because consumption goods are scarcest in the first period.
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Welfare
loss γ
sd(µT ) sd(µP ) sd(π) sd(y) sd(k) sd(c)
Optimal
simple rule
0.0581 0.0497 0.0015 0.0648 0.0213 0.0177 0.0162
Ramsey
policy
0.0565 0.0482 0.0057 0.0931 0.0210 0.0178 0.0156
Excess
welfare loss
2.83%
Notes: The welfare loss is given in % of st.st. consumption relative to first best.
Standard deviations refer to variables defined as µ˜t = log(µt/µ¯).
The optimal simple rule is characterized by wπ = 4, wy=0.
Table 3.3: Welfare comparison of Ramsey policy to simple rules under
investment adjustment cost
The optimal simple rule, which is characterized by wπ = 4 and wy = 0,
stabilizes output slightly above its natural level by reducing the real interest
rate below its natural rate. Ramsey optimal policy reduces the real interest
rate even more, inducing higher inflation and a larger output gap compared
to the simple rule. However, under investment adjustment cost households
use the additional output to increase consumption instead of investment.
The opposite was the case in section 3.4.3, where households used the
additional output to smooth consumption by increasing investment. Table
3.3 quantitatively compares the optimal simple rule to Ramsey optimal
policy. The familiar pattern of Ramsey policy stabilizing the total markup
by allowing a price markup re-emerges. The benefit of this policy are
reduced fluctuations in consumption, while the capital stock is even slightly
more volatile under Ramsey optimal policy. The excess welfare loss of the
optimal simple rule is 2.83%. Thus, active policy achieves an allocation
close to the Ramsey policy under positive investment adjustment cost.
With respect to the trade-off of monetary policy, the improved per-
formance of simple rules under adjustment cost suggests that stabilizing
inflation receives a higher weight in the central bank’s trade-off when ad-
justment cost are present.27 The reason is that investment adjustment cost
27In principle, the excess welfare cost of the optimal simple rule could also decline
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prevent the wage markup shock to lead to large reductions in investment,
so that optimal policy becomes less concerned with stabilizing investment
and focuses on inflation stabilization. However, when capital can be accu-
mulated at no cost, it becomes more important to stabilize labour demand
and output by stimulating investment. This view is also consistent with
the decline in the welfare loss of both second-best and simple rule policy
when adjustment cost are introduced. Notably, welfare improves although
adjustment cost are social costs. The reason was already given above: Ad-
justment cost mitigate the impact of the wage markup shock on investment
and thus prevent a reduction in investment to magnify the inefficient fluc-
tuations in labor demand caused by the shock. When adjustment cost
are absent, the central bank should prevent the decline in investment by
inducing a procyclical price markup.
3.5.2 Robustness
This section analyzes the robustness of the previous results regarding the
performance of simple policy rules with respect to the calibration and
specification of adjustment cost. I here additionally consider capital ad-
justment cost, which imply that the capital stock evolves according to
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it − F (it/kt) kt, where F (it/kt) =
ψ
2
(it/kt − δ)
2 and
ψ measures the extent of adjustment cost. Thus, changes in the level of
the capital stock are costly. Under this specification, the households’ first
order conditions are given by
qt= βEt
c−σt+1
c−σt
{
rkt+1 + qt+1
[
(1− δ)− Ft+1 (◦) +
it+1
kt+1
F
′
t+1 (◦)
]}
(3.31)
qt=
[
1− F
′
t (◦)
]−1
, (3.32)
where Ft (◦) = F (it/kt) and F
′
t (◦) =
∂F (it/kt)
∂(it/kt)
and qt represents the value
of capital relative to the consumption good, as before.28
Further, acknowledging that empirical estimates of adjustment cost are
very heterogeneous, I repeat the above welfare evaluation of simple rules
because the simple rule achieves a better stabilization of the total markup compared
to the model with zero adjustment cost. However, even the excess welfare loss of a
simple rule characterized by ωπ = 8 and wy = 0, which leads to near complete inflation
stabilization, amounts to 3.9% which is well below that welfare cost of an identically
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Excess welfare loss of the optimal simple rule
No adjustment cost 9.19%
Low capital adjustment cost (ψ = 6.7) 7.23%
High capital adjustment cost (ψ = 100) 5.57%
Low investment adjustment cost (κ = 0.17) 2.84%
High investment adjustment cost (κ = 2.48) 2.83%
Notes: The excess welfare loss is given by γsimple/γRamsey—1. The optimal
simple rules are characterized by wy = 0 for all cases and wπ = 8 under
both calibrations of capital adjustment cost and are given by wπ = 3
(wπ = 4) under low (high) investment adjustment cost.
Table 3.4: Welfare evaluation of simple policy rules for varying adjustment
cost
under two alternative calibrations, a scenario of high adjustment cost and
one implying low adjustment cost. Under both specifications of adjustment
cost, the high cost scenario is calibrated to an elasticity of investment with
respect to Tobin’s q of ηi,q = 0.4, which is the value estimated by Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) from aggregate data. This estimate
is also used in section 3.5.1. A second, low adjustment cost scenario is
calibrated to the results of Groth and Khan (2006), who estimate industry-
specific adjustment cost and show that these imply an elasticity of aggre-
gate investment with respect to the market value of capital amounting to
ηi,q = 6. More details on the calibration of adjustment cost can be found
aggressive rule when adjustment cost are absent (see Table 3.2).
28The equilibrium definition in (3.2.4) is thus changed as follows: (3.31) and
(3.32) replace (3.6). Further, the aggregate resource constraint (3.20) is replaced by(
nαt k
1−α
t
)
/st = ct + it and the new law of motion for capital, kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it −
F (it/kt) kt is added to the set of equilibrium conditions. Further, the variables qt and
it become part of the equilibrium sequences defined in (3.2.4).
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in Appendix B.4.
Table 3.4 shows the excess welfare loss of the optimal simple rule (relative
to Ramsey policy) for each scenario. In comparison to the case where ad-
justment cost are absent, introducing positive adjustment cost lowers the
excess welfare loss of the optimal simple rule across all specifications and
calibrations. Further, the performance of the optimal simple rule improves
with the degree of adjustment cost, although the effect is small in case of
investment adjustment cost. Both observations confirm the previous result
that it becomes the more desirable to deviate from simple rules and stabi-
lize output by allowing temporary inflation, the more flexible the capital
stock can be adjusted. Comparing the two specifications, the performance
of optimal simple rules worsens under capital adjustment cost relative to in-
vestment adjustment cost. In the scenario of low capital adjustment cost,
the excess welfare loss amounts to 7.2%, implying that second-best pol-
icy can improve considerably upon the optimal simple rule. Thus, simple
rules imitate optimal policy more closely under investment adjustment cost,
which is the preferred specification in quantitative macroeconomic models,
such as Smets and Wouters (2007).
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes how endogenous capital formation affects interest
rate dynamics, the central bank’s trade-off and the performance of simple
policy rules. I introduce a trade-off in form of a wage markup shock cal-
ibrated to match the volatility of the inefficiency gap measured by Galí,
Gertler, and López-Salido (2007). This shock represents a distortion of
the competitive equilibrium and is inefficient in the sense that it leaves the
first-best allocation unaffected.
I obtain two main results. First, introducing capital accumulation does
not change optimal monetary policy in the following sense: Independent of
whether the capital stock is fixed or variable, optimal policy induces similar
patterns of inflation and the output gap. In both cases, it is optimal to
allow temporary inflation. This creates a procyclical price markup which
stabilizes output and mitigates the impact of the wage markup shock on the
total markup. However, endogenous capital formation changes the instru-
ment path required to achieve this pattern. The reason is that, in absence
of adjustment cost, the natural rate of interest falls for ten quarters. Thus,
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in response to a wage markup shock, optimal policy reduces the nominal
interest rate for ten quarters so as to lift output above its inefficiently low
natural rate. The second result is that the excess welfare loss of simple rules
is the higher the more flexible the capital stock can be adjusted. When ad-
justment cost are absent, the welfare cost of the simple rule exceed those
of the Ramsey policy by 9.2%. With positive adjustment cost, these range
between 2.8% and 7.2%. The reason is that, by construction, Taylor rules
focus on stabilizing inflation. However, when capital can be accumulated at
no cost, the wage markup shock reduces labor demand, triggering a decline
in investment which amplifies reductions in worked hours and output in
subsequent periods. Monetary policy can and should prevent this by in-
ducing a decline in the price markup, which increases the capital rental
rate and thereby stimulates investment.
The analysis in this chapter implies that the degree of adjustment cost
contains important information for monetary policy. First, the specifica-
tion and calibration of adjustment cost have an influence on the trade-off
of monetary policy and the performance of simple policy rules. Second,
adjustment cost affect the behavior of the natural interest rate: In the po-
lar cases of a fixed (flexible) capital stock, the natural interest rate rises
(falls) in response to a cost push shock. Monetary policy decisions based
on an estimate of the natural rate of interest are thus not robust to large
variations in adjustment cost. This supports the results by Orphanides
and Williams (2002), who document that the welfare cost of ignoring un-
certainty in estimates of the natural rate of interest can be large, providing
an argument against the practical usefulness of such estimates in monetary
policy. Due to both the importance of adjustment cost for optimal policy
and the natural rate of interest, further research on the nature and degree
of adjustment cost, in particular in light of the diverging estimates implied
by the empirical literature, is warranted.
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Chapter 4
Macroeconomic Effects of
Unconventional Monetary
Policy
Coauthor: Prof. Dr. Andreas Schabert
4.1 Introduction
Central banks in many industrialized countries have responded to the re-
cent financial crisis with unconventional monetary policy measures. By
introducing various newly created lending facilities as well as direct asset
purchases, the Federal Reserve for instance doubled its balance sheet in the
three months after the climax of the crisis in September 2008. This policy
of monetary easing has been aimed at ensuring the functioning of the inter-
bank market and to stabilize stressed credit markets (see Yellen (2009)).29
However, unconventional monetary policies have been implemented with
only little theoretical guidance available. In addition to the open question
of the short-run effectiveness of these measures, their medium- and long-run
impact on inflation has been subject to debate. While many observers were
concerned with a debt-deflation spiral, others were more anxious about the
effects of a soaring monetary base on price stability. This chapter aims
29For instance, reacting to the markets’ flight to liquidity, the Federal Reserve set up
the Treasury Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), which provides Treasury securities in
exchange for other securities such as mortgage-backed securities and commercial paper.
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to contribute to these questions by analyzing the long- and short-run ef-
fects of unconventional monetary policy in a quantitative dynamic general
equilibrium model.
Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack (2004) summarize the literature on un-
conventional monetary policy and distinguish three types of policies avail-
able at the zero lower bound: shaping expectations, quantitative easing, and
qualitative easing. Shaping expectations implies reducing expected future
(short-term) nominal interest rates or increasing expected future inflation
with the goal of reducing current real interest rates and thereby stimulating
current spending. Quantitative easing (QnE) involves the purchase of secu-
rities such as (long-term) government bonds with central bank reserves. If
money and government bonds are imperfect substitutes, this should lead to
downward pressure on long-term interest rates. Qualitative easing (QlE)
refers to changes in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet
without creating additional reserves. The idea is that by purchasing and
selling assets with different characteristics or maturities, this policy should
influence asset prices.
The consensus view in macroeconomic theory is that the only reliable
monetary policy option at the zero lower bound is to shape the expecta-
tions, whereas the effects of quantitative or qualitative easing are until now
not well understood (see "related literature"). As emphasized by Walsh
(2009) there is no robust quantitative evidence on the effects of uncon-
ventional open market operations. This chapter aims to fill this gap by
providing an analysis of unconventional policy measures (apart from shap-
ing expectations) in a macroeconomic model. We explicitly account for
the collateral requirements in open market operations and the role of as-
sets’ liquidity, which distinguishing effects from quantitative and qualitative
easing. Thus, our analysis of unconventional monetary policy focuses on
the role of liquidity provision and liquidity premiums, which accords to
Buiter’s (2008) argument that central banks in crisis times should provide
the "public good of liquidity in the amounts required to eliminate (most
of) the liquidity risk premiums at the maturities that matter".
Our model is based on Reynard and Schabert (2009), where multiple
assets are considered that differ with regard to their ability to serve as col-
lateral in open market operations. Private agents rely on money for goods
market purchases, while money is supplied only in exchange for eligible se-
curities - in particular for short-term government bonds. This requirement
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creates an equilibrium spread between the interest rate on non-eligible and
eligible assets, i.e. a liquidity premium. It implies that interest rates on
non-eligible securities are positive, even if the policy rate is at the zero
lower bound. This property accords to the empirical observations that in-
terest rates on many assets, even those not associated with default risk, are
non-zero even if the policy rate hits the lower bound. It further facilitates
the analysis of monetary policy options at the lower bound, since the op-
portunity cost of money holdings remain positive, leading to a well-defined
money demand.30
We augment Reynard and Schabert’s (2009) model by inducing firms
to demand loans to finance production, via a working capital assumption.
Due to the associated borrowing cost, higher loan rates increase marginal
cost and thereby exert downward pressure on production. As long as loans,
which are supplied by private agents, are not eligible in open market oper-
ations, the loan rate exceed the interest rate on eligible government bonds
and the policy rate. By declaring loans as eligible for open market oper-
ations, the central bank can stimulate the economy via two effects: 1.) a
QnE-effect via an increase in the total amount of eligible securities, and
2.) a QlE-effect via a decrease in the liquidity premium and in the loan
rate. By increasing the fraction of liquid (eligible) assets the central bank
eases (the QnE-effects) the households’ access to cash and their willing-
ness to spend, which acts like a conventional money injection (above the
ZLB). Moreover, firms’ borrowing cost are reduced (the QlE-effects), which
stimulates the economy via a standard cost channel.31
Our main results can be summarized as follows. In the long-run, mon-
etary policy is non-neutral due to a standard inflation tax and due to its
impact on firms’ borrowing cost. In particular, the central bank can in-
30The model further avoids running into indeterminacy problems even when the policy
rate is pegged (see Reynard and Schabert, 2009), which simplifies the analysis at the
ZLB.
31Throughout the analysis, we disregard default risk and focus on liquidity premiums,
for which empirical evidence suggests a significant magnitude. The corporate bond credit
spread puzzle (see Christensen (2008)) refers to the empirical observation that interest
rate spreads between corporate and government bonds can only partly be attributed to
default risk. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), for example, attribute around half of
the 105 bp spread of AAA corporate bonds to default risk. The other half of the spread
is shown to be highly correlated to various indicators of market liquidity. Other studies
attribute even lower shares of this spread to default risk, see Collin-Dufresne (2001).
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crease output and consumption in the long-run if it reduces the long-run
loan rate by raising the share of eligible loans or by lowering the policy rate.
In the short-run, an unconventional monetary policy can exert substantial
QnE-effects, but only small QlE-effects. We further offer a tentative dis-
cussion of how our model could be applied to the recent financial crisis.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model. In
section 4.3, we examine the long-run implications of monetary policy. In
section 4.4, we present the short-run effects of conventional and unconven-
tional monetary policy measures both in a qualitative and a quantitative
way. Section 4.5 concludes.
Related literature
There is a large literature on monetary policy options at the zero lower
bound.32 Most of them advocate the possibility of providing monetary
stimulus at the zero lower bound through shaping interest-rate expectations.
The basic idea is that a monetary expansion, if perceived as permanent,
can stimulate the economy by creating expected inflation and reducing the
real rate of interest (see Krugman (1998)). Applying a microfounded macro
model, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003, 2004) show that a commitment to
keep nominal interest rates low in future can indeed provide an effective
way of escaping a liquidity trap. Jung, Teranishi, and Watanabe (2005) as
well as Eggertsson (2006) derive optimal policy under the non-negativity
constraint for the interest rate and obtain the same conclusion. Levin,
López-Salido, Nelson, and Yun (2010) examine large, persistent shocks and
find that a policy relying on shaping interest rate expectations might not
be sufficient to stabilize the economy. Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005) ana-
lyze open market purchases of government bonds and find that this policy
can exert beneficial effects by reducing government debt service and the
burden associated with distortionary taxes. Under sticky prices, higher in-
flation associated with the money injection further produces a temporary
boom, which lifts the economy out of the liquidity trap. Thus, this effect is
32A different strand of the literature not reviewed here examines how a liquidity
trap can be prevented. For example, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002) and
Evans, Guse, and Honkapohja (2008) demonstrate the possibility of deflationary equi-
libria caused by arbitrary changes in expectations, and consider monetary and fiscal
policies to prevent such equilibria. Earlier contributions by Fuhrer and Madigan (1997)
and Summers (1991) demonstrate that an increase in the central bank’s inflation target
can reduce the likelihood of being constrained by the ZLB. The possibility of negative
nominal interest rates is further discussed in Goodfriend (2000) and Bassetto (2004).
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rather caused by the credible commitment to a permanent increase in the
monetary base than by quantitative easing. Svensson (2001) and McCal-
lum (2000) recommend using the exchange rate channel of monetary policy
to deal with the liquidity trap. They argue that a currency devaluation
and the corresponding expectation of a real appreciation will reduce the
long-run real interest rate according to uncovered interest rate parity.
The common view on quantitative easing (QnE) is that lump-sum in-
jections of money such as helicopter drops are ineffective at the zero lower
bound (see Krugman (1998) and McCallum (2006)). The reason is that
these authors consider single interest rate frameworks. Therfore, house-
holds are fully satiated with money once the policy rate reaches the zero
lower bound. In case of a helicopter drop, and when Ricardian equiva-
lence applies, households will just hold the additional money injected to
pay for the associated future tax burden. Assuming positive population
growth (such that Ricardian equivalence fails), Ireland (2005) shows that
lump-sum money injections create a positive wealth effect for the current
population. Goodfriend (2000) describes how open market purchases of
long bonds could stimulate spending via the portfolio-balance and credit
channels. When assets cannot equally be converted into cash, and liquidity
services of assets depend negatively on the aggregate stock of monetary
assets, open market purchases of long-term bonds can cause households
to shift their portfolio toward less liquid assets such as durables or phys-
ical capital. This raises asset prices and lowers long-term interest rates,
providing stimulus to the economy. A rise in asset prices can have fur-
ther stimulating effects by reducing the external finance premium, thereby
causing lower borrowing rates. Coenen and Wieland (2003) consider a sim-
ilar portfolio-balance effect and assume that the supply of base money has
an impact on the exchange rate aside its effect on interest rates. Pur-
chasing foreign currency with domestic money then produces an exchange
rate depreciation, which will stimulate export demand and induce inflation,
thereby lowering the real interest rate.
Spurred by the recent events in financial markets, which have led in-
terest rate spreads of many kinds peak, a literature on qualitative easing
(QlE) is now developing. Freedman, Johnson, Kamenik, and Laxton (2009)
analyze the impact of reductions in risk premiums in the IMF model GPM,
where the volume of the central bank’s actions is related to the size of
changes in risk premiums. We are aware of three micro-founded studies on
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unconventional monetary policy, which mainly focus on credit frictions.33
The first study is Reis (2010), who analyzes various forms of credit policy
such as equity injections into banks and purchases of securities. He finds
that providing firms that trade asset-backed securities with loans is the
most effective way to intervene in financial markets. The second one is
Gertler and Karadi (2010), who analyze credit policies in a financial ac-
celerator model where financial intermediaries need collateral in order to
attract deposits. When financial institutions need to deleverage due to a
decline in asset prices, central bank interventions such as purchasing assets
− i.e. borrowing directly to firms − can be a powerful tool. Under mod-
erate efficiency cost of interventions, asset purchases can improve welfare
substantially. When efficiency cost are high, the central bank should rather
provide equity injections, exploiting the information advantage of financial
intermediaries, while bearing the cost implied by agency problems. Cúrdia
and Woodford (2010) analyze unconventional monetary policy in a model
with imperfect financial intermediation and find that credit policy (direct
central bank lending to private agents) can ease financial market distress.
However, neither the mere size of credit spread nor the fact that the pol-
icy rate has reached the lower bound are sufficient conditions for such a
policy to yield welfare gains. They further identify the conditions under
which unconventional monetary policy is effective and conclude that these
are not likely to hold.
The paper by Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010) is
most closely related to our setup. They extend the model by Kiyotaki
and Moore (2008) and assume that entrepreneurs are constrained by a re-
saleability constraint preventing them from selling their equity holdings.
Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010) embed this friction
into a model along the lines of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and show that a negative shock to
resaleability, calibrated to match the movement in the share of liquid as-
sets in the U.S. in late 2008, can generate a deep recession. When the
central bank intervenes by purchasing illiquid assets in exchange for liquid
Treasury bonds, this reduces entrepreneurs’ borrowing cost and stimulates
the economy. Given an intervention of 1 trillion USD, their model predicts
an output decline similar to the one observed in the United States. This
chapter differs from this setup in various respects. Most of all, we explic-
33Thus, our paper provides an analysis that is complementary to these studies.
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itly model the asset exchange in the form of open market operations, while
Del Negro, Eggertsson, Ferrero, and Kiyotaki (2010) assume that the cen-
tral bank intervention exchanges liquid for illiquid assets at market prices.
This chapter further addresses the effects of QnE beside those of QlE.
4.2 The model
The model is based on Reynard and Schabert (2009), where money is sup-
plied by the central bank in exchange for eligible securities. We augment
their setup by introducing a standard working capital constraint, which
induces identical and perfectly competitive intermediate goods producing
firms to demand loans. To keep the exposition simple, we assume that
these firms are owned by households and that their problem is static, such
that they borrow funds by issuing debt in form of intra-period loans.
Usually, the central bank only accepts government bonds in exchange
for money in open market operations. However, it might also declare other
assets, i.e. corporate debt, as eligible. To facilitate the analysis of such a
quantitative (and qualitative) easing policy, we assume that it randomly
selects a share κt of loans issued by identical firms to be eligible. This
selection is made not before the market for federal funds is opened, such
that at the time of lending all intra-period loans exhibit the same price.
4.2.1 Timing of events
Households enter the period with money, government bonds, and household
debt, MHi,t−1 + Bi,t−1 +Di,t−1, and with a time-invariant time endowment.
They supply labor to intermediate goods producing firms. These firms do
not hold any financial wealth. At the beginning of the period productiv-
ity shocks and shocks to the monetary policy rate are realized. Further,
monetary policy sets its policy instrument κt.
1. The labor market opens, where a perfectly competitive intermediate
goods producing firm j hires labor nj,t at the real wage rate wt. In
order to produce it has to pay workers a fraction θ of their payroll in
advance. Since it does not hold any financial wealth, it has to borrow
liquid funds. The firm j thus faces the liquidity constraint
Lj,t/R
L
t ≥ θPtwtnj,t, (4.1)
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where Lj,t/RLt denotes the amount received by the borrowing firm
and Lj,t the amount to be repaid at the end of the period. Hence, RLt
is the risk-free interest rate on intra-period loans. Further, Pt denotes
a price index of consumption goods, see section 4.2.2.
2. A households i can lend funds to the firms using money carried over
from the previous period MHi,t−1 ≥ Li,t/R
L
t , where
∫
Li,tdi =
∫
Lj,tdj.
The cash received by firms is used by intermediate goods producing
firms to pay out the fraction θ of the wage bill. Cash holdings of a
household i then equal MHi,t−1 −
(
Li,t/RLt
)
+ θPtwtni,t.
3. The money market opens and households can exchange short-term
government bonds for money at the discount rate Rmt . Usually, only
government bonds are eligible for open market operations. In addi-
tion, the central bank may decide to allow a fraction κt of corporate
debt to be eligible for open market trades. While bonds can be traded
in repurchase agreements and outright, intra-period loans can only be
used in repurchase agreements. The total amount of money Ii,t house-
hold i can get in open market operations is therefore constrained by
Ii,t ≤ (Bi,t−1/R
m
t ) + κt (Li,t/R
m
t ) . (4.2)
A household’s holdings of money, bonds and corporate debt are now
MHi,t−1+ Ii,t−Li,t/R
L
t + θPtwtni,t, Bi,t−1−B
CB
i,t , and Li,t−L
R
i,t, where
∆Bci,t are bonds received by the central bank and L
R
i,t are loans held
under repos, Ii,t =
(
∆Bci,t/R
m
t
)
+ κt
(
LRi,t/R
m
t
)
.34
4. Households enter the goods market where consumption goods ci,t can
be bought with money only. Thus, household i faces the cash-in-
advance constraint
Ptci,t ≤ Ii,t +M
H
i,t−1 −
(
Li,t/R
L
t
)
+ θPtwtni,t. (4.3)
After goods are sold, households receive dividends Ptδi,t and the re-
maining fraction of wage income (1− θ)Ptwtni,t in cash.
34In the analysis of qualitative easing, we introduce a factor κBt , so that the open
market constraint reads Ii,t ≤ (κBt Bi,t−1+κ
L
t Li,t)/R
m
t . This is necessary to conduct ex-
periments where the central bank holds constant the total volume of collateral eligible for
open market operations. Note that, apart from affecing the interest rate on government
bonds (and the monetary base), κBt does not affect the equilibrium allocation.
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5. Before the asset market opens, repurchase agreements are settled,
i.e. household i uses money to buy back government bonds BRi,t and
corporate debt LRi,t from the central bank. Then, loans are repaid such
that households’ money holdings before entering the asset market are
given by
M˜i,t=M
H
i,t−1 + Ii,t −
(
Li,t/R
L
t
)
+ Ptwtni,t − Ptci,t + Ptδi,t −M
R
i,t + Li,t,
B˜i,t=Bi,t−1 −∆B
c
i,t +B
R
i,t,
where MRi,t = B
R
i,t + L
R
i,t denotes a households’ total participation in
repurchase operations.
6. In the asset market, the government issues new bonds and households
receive payoffs from maturing assets as well as government transfers
τ i,t. They can carry wealth into the next period by purchasing gov-
ernment bonds, state-contingent claims or by holding money. Thus,
their asset market constraint reads
(Bi,t/Rt) + Et[ϕt,t+1Di,t] +M
H
i,t ≤ B˜i,t +Di,t−1 + M˜i,t + Ptτ i,t, (4.4)
where ϕt,t+1 denotes the stochastic discount factor and Rt the inter-
est rate on government bonds. Further, the central bank reinvests
its payoffs from maturing bonds in new bonds and does not change
money supply. Since money cannot be issued by the private sector,∫
M˜i,tdi =
∫
MHi,tdi holds.
4.2.2 Firms
There are intermediate firms who are perfectly competitive and sell their
goods yj,t to monopolistically competitive retailers. These sell a differen-
tiated good to bundlers who assemble final goods using a Dixit-Stiglitz
technology.
Intermediate Firms There is a continuum of intermediate goods pro-
ducing firms indexed with j ∈ [0, 1]. They are perfectly competitive and
owned by the households. In each period a firm j distributes its profits
to the owners and rents the production factors, specifically, it hires labor
nj,t. We assume that a fraction θ ≥ 1/2 of the wage has to be paid in
advance, i.e. before all its goods are sold. For this it borrows cash Lj,t from
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households at the price 1/RLt and repays the loan at the end of the period.
Hence, firm j faces the working capital constraint (4.1).
It then produces an intermediate good according to the production
function IOj,t = nαj,t and sells it to retailers who pay them in cash (after
these have received the households’ money for goods) the price. With these
revenues, it repays intra-period loans and finances the remaining wages
(1− θ)wtnj,t. The problem of the firm j then reads
max (Zt/Pt)n
α
j,t − wtnj,t − lj,t
(
RLt − 1
)
/RLt , s.t. (4.1),
where lj,t = Lj,t/Pt and Zt is the sales price of intermediate firms. The first
order conditions to this problem are given by
(Zt/Pt)αn
α−1
j,t = wt + µj,tθwt,
RLt − 1 = µj,t,
and µj,t[(lj,t/R
L
t ) − θwtnj,t] = 0 and µj,t ≥ 0. We restrict our attention
to the case, where intermediate goods producing firms borrow not more
then required to pay the fraction of wages θwtnj,t, which will be satisfied
throughout the analysis (see below): RLt > 1⇒ µj,t > 0. Ruling out R
L
t <
1, the following conditions determine intermediate firms’ labor demand as
well as the volume of debt they issue
(Zt/Pt)αn
α−1
j,t = wt
[
1 + θ
(
RLt − 1
)]
, (4.5)
lj,t/R
L
t = θwtnj,t. (4.6)
The first condition states that firms demand labor up to the point where
marginal revenues equal marginal cost. The working capital constraint
distorts labor demand since θ > 0.
Retailers Retail firms buy goods IOj,t from the intermediate firms at the
price Zt. Retailer k relabels this good to yk,t and sells it to bundlers at the
price Pk,t. With Dixit-Stiglitz technology the bundlers’ demand function
is given by yk,t = (Pk,t/Pt)
−ε yt. The retailer’s only problem is to set his
price subject to the Calvo constraint to maximize his profits, which yields
a standard Phillips curve. Under Calvo type sticky prices, the first order
condition for a retailer yields (where we use that Zt/Pt are real marginal
cost, mct):
Pk,t =
ε
ε− 1
∑
s (φβ)
s c−σt+syt+sP
ε
t+smct+s∑
s (φβ)
s c−σt+syt+sP
ε−1
t+s
.
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Defining Z˜t = Pk,t/Pt and writing both the denominator and numerator
in a recursive way, this can be expressed as Z˜t = εε−1Z
1
t /Z
2
t , where Z
1
t =
c−σt ytmct + φβEtπ
ε
t+1Z
1
t+1 and Z
2
t = c
−σ
t yt + φβEtπ
ε−1
t+1Z
2
t+1. We define the
price index as the household’s consumption expenditures for a particular
bundle at given prices, Ptyt =
∫ 1
0
Pktyktdk. Using the demand constraint
yk,t = (Pk,t/Pt)
−ε yt, we obtain a law of motion for inflation depending on
the firms’ pricing decision Z˜t, 1 = (1− φ) Z˜1−εt + φπ
ε−1
t .
Further, we have to track price dispersion and its impact on output.
Intermediate output is produced efficiently, leading to IOt = nαt as every
intermediate firm hires an identical amount of labor. However, there is a
production inefficiency due to price dispersion across retailers. The market
clearing condition in the intermediate goods market, IOt =
∫ 1
0
yk,tdk, gives
nαt =
∫ 1
0
(Pk,t/Pt)
−ε ytdk ⇔
yt = n
α
t /st,
where st ≡
∫ 1
0
(Pk,t/Pt)
−ε dk and st = (1 − φ)Z˜−εt + φst−1π
ε
t (see Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004b)) given s−1.
4.2.3 Households
There is a continuum of infinitely lived households indexed with j ∈ [0, 1].
Households have identical asset endowments and preferences. Household
j maximizes the expected sum of a discounted stream of instantaneous
utilities
E
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σi,t (1− σ)
−1 − χn 1+ηi,t (1 + η)
−1] , (4.7)
where E0 is the expectation operator conditional on the time 0 information
set, and β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor.
A household i is initially endowed with moneyMHi,−1, government bonds
Bi,−1, and privately issued debt Di,−1. In each period it supplies labor, con-
sumes a final good, lends out funds to intermediate goods producing firms,
trades assets with the central bank in open market operations, and can
reinvest in assets. At the beginning of the period it might lend out cash to
firms at the price 1/RLt , using money carried over from the previous period,
MHi,t−1 ≥ Li,t/R
L
t . Before it enters the goods market where it needs money
as the only accepted means of payment, it can get additional money in
open market operations in exchange for government bonds and, eventually,
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a fraction of intra-period loans. The decision whether and which loans are
eligible is made before the market for federal funds is opened. The house-
hold faces the open market constraint (4.2). Throughout this chapter, we
will restrict our attention to the case where money holdings will be large
enough to ensureMHi,t−1 > Li,t/R
L
t , while at the same time the central bank
will not withdraw money from the private sector Ii,t ≥ 0, by choosing a
suited relation between money supplied under repurchase agreements and
under outright sales/purchases (see Appendix C.2).
In the goods market, household i can use the fraction θ of its wage,
money holdings net of lending, and additional cash from current period
open market operations for its consumption expenditures (see 4.3). Before
the asset market opens it receives repayments from intra-period loans. In
the asset market, it further receives pay-offs from maturing assets, it can
buy bonds from the government and trade all assets with other households,
and it can borrow and lend using a full set of nominally state contingent
claims. Dividing the period t price of one unit of nominal wealth in a
particular state of period t + 1 by the period t probability of that state
gives the stochastic discount factor ϕt,t+1. The period t price of a payoff
Di,t in period t+1 is then given by Et[ϕt,t+1Di,t]. Substituting out the stock
of bonds and money held before the asset market opens, B˜i,t and M˜i,t, in
(4.4), the asset market constraint of household i can be written as
MHi,t−1 +Bi,t−1 +
Li,t
RLt
(
RLt − 1
)
+ Ptwtni,t +Di,t−1 + Ptδi,t + Ptτ i,t (4.8)
≤MHi,t +
Bi,t
Rt
+ Et[ϕt,t+1Di,t] + Ii,t (R
m
t − 1) + Ptci,t,
where household i′s borrowing is restricted by the following no-Ponzi game
condition
lim
s→∞
Etϕt,t+sDi,t+s ≥ 0, (4.9)
as well as MHi,t ≥ 0 and Bi,t ≥ 0. The term (R
m
t − 1) Ii,t measures the cost
of money acquired in open market operations: The households receive new
cash Ii,t in exchange for Rmt Ii,t bonds.
Maximizing the objective (4.7) subject to the open market constraint
(4.2), the goods market constraint (4.3), the asset market constraints (4.8)
and (4.9), for given initial values Mi,−1, Bi,−1, and Di,−1 leads to the fol-
lowing first order conditions for working time, consumption, federal funds
64
and loans
c−σi,t = λi,t + ψi,t, (4.10)
χnηi,t = wt
(
λi,t + θψi,t
)
, (4.11)
ψi,t = (R
m
t − 1)λi,t +R
m
t ηi,t, (4.12)
Rmt
(
λi,t + ηi,t
)
= RLt
(
λi,t + ηi,tκt
)
, (4.13)
as well as for holdings of contingent claims, government bonds and money
λi,t = βRtEt
λi,t+1 + ηi,t+1
πt+1
, (4.14)
λi,t = βEt
λi,t+1 + ψi,t+1
πt+1
, (4.15)
ϕt,t+1 =
β
πt+1
λi,t+1
λi,t
, (4.16)
the associated complementary slackness conditions and the transversality
conditions for money, bonds, and household debt. The debt rate is defined
as follows
Etϕt,t+1 = 1/R
D
t .
Further, ηt denotes the multiplier on the open market constraints, and ψt
is the multiplier on the cash-in-advance constraint for consumption. Com-
bining the optimality conditions for investment in money and government
bonds, we obtain
RtEt (λi,t+1/πt+1) = Et
[
Rmt+1 (λi,t+1/πt+1)
]
. (4.17)
Thus, the interest rate on government bonds closely follows next period’s
expected policy rate. This condition states that households are indifferent
between investing into money vs. investing into government bonds and
converting these into cash in the next period at the discount Rmt+1. Condi-
tion (4.13) shows that when the open market constraint is binding, ηt > 0,
which is the case we analyze, the loan rate depends on the fraction of firm
bonds eligible as collateral in open market operations, κt.35 When loans are
35As shown in the appendix, the cash-in-advance constraint as well as the open market
constraint bind in steady state when monetary policy sets its policy rate below the Euler
rate, Rm < RD = π/β .
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not eligible, κt = 0, there can be a spread between the policy rate and the
loan rate, which is a liquidity premium. When all intra-period loans are
eligible as collateral in open market operations κt = 1, the interest rate on
corporate debt compensates exactly for the discount, i.e. RLt = R
m
t .
Further, we observe that in the special case of θ = 1, there is no dis-
tortion of the households’ labor supply decision as the first orders in that
case imply uc,t = −un,t (see 4.10 and 4.11) The reason is that only the
fraction of wages obtained before goods market closure θ can be used for
contemporaneous consumption purchases.
4.2.4 Public sector
The central bank transfers seigniorage revenues Ptτmt to the Treasury, which
emits one-period bonds and pays a transfer Ptτ t to households. Govern-
ment bonds grow at a constant rate, BTt = ΓB
T
t−1. The Treasury’s budget
constraint reads
BTt /Rt + Ptτ
m
t = B
T
t−1 + Ptτ t, (4.18)
where government bonds BTt are either held by households, Bt, or the
central bank, BCBt : B
T
t = Bt + B
CB
t . This setup does not require B
T to
measure total public debt, rather it is a measure of short-term government
bonds which are eligible for open market operations.36 To avoid further
effects of fiscal policy, we assume that the government has access to lump-
sum taxes, which adjust to balance the budget. Thus, introducing long-
term government bonds as a means of financing government expenditures
would not have any consequences for the analysis conducted in this chapter.
The central bank invests its wealth exclusively into new government
bonds. It transfers interest earnings on government bonds to the Treasury
at the end of the period, Ptτmt = B
CB
t − B
CB
t /Rt. Its budget constraint
reads (
BCBt /Rt
)
+ Ptτ
m
t = B
CB
t−1 +R
m
t It −M
R
t ,
where the amount of money withdrawn by repos is given byMRt = B
R
t +L
R
t .
Substituting out transfers, the bond holdings of the central bank evolve
36Note that, because the central bank can decide on the eligibility of collateral, it can
choose a long-run inflation rate independent of the growth rate of government debt. To
implement such a policy in the current setup, it can adjust the fraction of government
debt eligible in open market operations, κBt .
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according to
BCBt = B
CB
t−1 + ItR
m
t −M
R
t . (4.19)
We assume that the central bank sets the repo rate either according to a
feedback rule (see section 4.4.1) or according to a peg at the zero lower
bound, Rmt = 1. Further, the central bank sets the inflation target π and
decides on eligible collateral for repos by setting κ ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, it
can control whether money is supplied in exchange for bonds in repos or
outright (while loans are only traded under repos). We assume that it
controls the total amount of money supplied under repos, defined as
MRt = ΩM
H
t + (κt − κ)Lt/R
m
t ,
by setting Ω ≥ 0. We assume that the central bank will reduce repos in
government bonds if it accepts corporate debt eligible as collateral in the
long-run equilibrium. Thus, it chooses to repurchase government bonds
according to BRt = ΩM
H
t − κtLt/R
m
t . Intra-period loans are used in repos
only, i.e. LRt = κtLt/R
m
t . Thus, the steady state ratio of outright purchases
to money holdings is constant and given by Ω (see Appendix C.2).
4.2.5 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, there will be no arbitrage opportunities and markets clear,
nt =
∫ 1
0
njtdj =
∫ 1
0
nitdi, yt =
∫ 1
0
yjtdj =
∫ 1
0
citdi = ct, and
∫ 1
0
Li,tdi =∫ 1
0
Lj,tdj. Households will not behave differently and aggregate asset hold-
ings satisfy ∀t ≥ 0 :
∫ 1
0
Di,tdi = 0,
∫ 1
0
MHi,tdi =
∫ 1
0
M˜i,tdi = MHt ,
∫ 1
0
MRi,tdi =
MRt ,
∫ 1
0
Bi,tdi = Bt,
∫ 1
0
Bci,tdi = B
c
t ,
∫ 1
0
Ii,tdi = It = MHt −M
H
t−1+M
R
t , and
BTt = Bt +B
c
t . Household bond holdings further satisfy
Bt −Bt−1 = (Γ− 1)B
T
t−1 −R
m
t
(
MHt −M
H
t−1 +M
R
t
)
+MRt . (4.20)
A rational expectations equilibrium is defined as follows: In a rational
expectations equilibrium the firms’ first order conditions and the produc-
tion technology, the households’ first order conditions, the goods market
constraint, the open market constraint, (4.20), Γ = BTt /B
T
t−1, and the
transversality conditions are satisfied, for a monetary policy and given ini-
tial asset endowments. The full set of equilibrium conditions can be found
in Appendix C.1.
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4.3 Long-run effects of monetary policy
This section intends to clarify the model’s mechanisms by exposing central
long-run properties of the economy as well as long-run effects of monetary
policy. A detailed analysis of the steady state can be found in Appendix
C.2. Here, we summarize the main steady state properties of the model.
In the steady state, the debt rate RD satisfies RD = π/β, and is thus
independent of the target policy rate Rm. The steady state interest rate
on government bonds is linked to the monetary policy rate, R = Rm (by
4.17). The reason is arbitrage between investment into money (which gives
a safe payoff of one unit of currency tomorrow per unit of currency invested
today) vs. investment into government bonds and trading them for money
in open market operations. The latter option pays off a return R but
implies a cost reducing the yield by 1/Rm. As shown in Appendix C.2,
the goods market constraint (4.3) will be binding in a steady state if the
inflation target exceeds β, such that RD = π/β > 1. Then, households can
earn interest by investing in other stores of value (here household debt),
such that they economize on money holdings and use money only for goods
market expenditures. Notably, this result holds even if the policy rate is at
the zero lower bound, Rm = 1. Further, the open market constraint (4.2)
will be binding in a steady state if the policy rate target of the central bank
satisfies 1 ≤ Rm < RD, where Rm = R and RD = π/β. Thus, when interest
paid on bonds is smaller than on debt, R < RD, households economize
on bond holdings and use bonds only to obtain money in open market
operations. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 The steady state interest rates are characterized by RD =
π/β and R = Rm. In the steady state, the goods market constraint is
binding if the inflation target satisfies π > β. The working capital constraint
and the open market constraint are binding, even if the policy rate is at
the zero lower bound Rm = 1, as long as the policy rate target satisfies
Rm < π/β and κ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix C.2
In contrast to the model of Reynard and Schabert (2009), steady state
consumption can be affected by the collateral requirements in open market
operations, i.e. by the share of loans eligible in open market operations κ.
The reason is that, first, the loan rate raises the firms’ marginal cost and,
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second, the level of the loan rate is affected by the central bank decision to
accept loans in exchange for money. The latter property is highlighted by
the steady state property
RL =
[
κ
1
Rm
+ (1− κ)
1
RD
]−1
, (4.21)
see Appendix C.2. As long as loans are not eligible, κ = 0, (4.21) implies
the loan rate to equal the debt rate RL = RD. For the case where the
open market constraint is binding, Rm < RD, this result does not hold for
κ > 0. By increasing the fraction of eligible loans κ (for a given policy rate)
or lowering the policy rate (for a given κ) the central bank can induce RL
to fall in the steady state. Condition (4.21) further reveals that RL > 1,
if Rm < RD, given that Rm ≥ 1. It is further shown in Appendix C.2
that steady state output and thus consumption decrease with the loan
rate (via reduced real marginal cost) and with the inflation target (via the
inflation tax induced by the cash-in-advance constraint): ∂c/∂RL < 0 and
∂c/∂π < 0. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 If the central bank sets its targets according to π < β
and Rm ∈ [1, π/β), it can choose the inflation target π independently of
the share of loans eligible for open market operations κ and the policy rate
target Rm. Steady state consumption then increases with κ and decreases
with Rm as well as with π, while the steady state price level sequence shifts
upward for a higher κ.
Proof. See Appendix C.2
Hence, monetary policy can affect consumption and thus welfare in the long
run via the inflation target π, the share of eligible loans κ, and the policy
rate Rm, where the latter two alter the loan rate (see 4.21). It should be
noted that the inflation target π and the share of eligible loans κ can be
chosen independently. Put differently, a change in κ (e.g. an increase) will
not affect the long-run inflation rate. However, the steady state price level
sequence shifts upward for a higher κ, which is associated with a decline in
the real value of bonds.
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4.4 Numerical results
In this section we examine the short-run dynamics of the model. In partic-
ular, we analyze the impact of monetary policy on macroeconomic aggre-
gates. The model will be solved by applying local approximation methods.
The percent deviation of a generic variable zt from its steady state value z
is then denoted by ẑt : ẑt = 100 [log(zt)− log(z)] .
Throughout the analysis we assume that the central bank sets its targets
according to π > β and 1 ≤ Rm < π/β, which implies that the open mar-
ket constraint and the goods market constraint are binding in the steady
state (see Proposition 4.1). We further assume that shocks are sufficiently
small for the economy to remain in the neighborhood of this steady state.
Due to the binding open market constraint, private sector holdings of real
government bonds will be relevant for the allocation and act as a relevant
state. The central bank can - by lowering the policy rate Rm (a conven-
tional monetary policy measure) or by raising the share of eligible loans κt
(an unconventional monetary policy measure) - ease households’ access to
money in open market operations. Given that the goods market constraint,
MRt +M
H
t = Ptct, is also binding, nominal consumption is then stimulated.
4.4.1 Calibration
For the quantitative analysis of the macroeconomic effects of monetary
policy we calibrate the model, using standard parameter values as far as
possible. The parameters of the utility function equal σ = 1 and η = 0, the
labor share equals α = 0.66, the steady state markup 1/mc = 11% (ε = 10),
steady state working time n = 1/3 (implying a value of 1.77 for utility func-
tion parameter χ), and the fraction of non-optimally price adjusting firms
φ = 0.75. For the fraction θ of pre-paid loans, we follow Rabanal (2007),
who estimates that around half of the wage sum has been pre-financed in
the period 1983-2004, and set θ = 0.5.37 The target inflation rate is set to
π = 1.00575, which equals the average of U.S. inflation in the last 20 years.
We further set the steady state share of repurchase operations to outright
purchases to Ω = 1.5, which accords to the value in Reynard and Schabert
37His point estimate is θ = 0.56. Note that in our setup, θ determines only the
"location" of the distortion between labor supply and labor demand. When θ = 1, only
the firms’ decision to hire labor is distorted, while a value of θ = 0 implies that only the
households’ labor supply decision is distorted.
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(2009) based on data of Federal Reserve open market operations. For the
benchmark case, the policy rate target Rm is set equal to its 20-year average
Rm = 1.0105 (or 4.28% in terms of annualized rates), while the policy rate
is set according to Rmt =
(
Rmt−1
)ρ
R1−ρm (πt/π)
wπ(1−ρ) (yt/y)
wy(1−ρ) exp εt,
where wπ = 1.92, wy = 0.1, and ρ = 0.8 (see Justiniano and Primiceri
(2008)). Alternatively, we will consider a peg at the zero lower bound
Rm = 1 (see section 4.4.3). For the numerical analysis, we further restrict
our attention of the case where the central bank does not trade corporate
bonds in open market operations in the steady state, i.e. κ = 0.
The spread between the policy rate and the loan rate (which equals
RD = π/β in a steady state with κ = 0, see 4.21) crucially affects the size
of monetary policy effects. To calibrate this spread, we account for the fact
that our model does not imply any kind of default risk and focus on the
part of the spread that can be attributed to a liquidity premium. Accord-
ing to the the "corporate bond credit spread puzzle", only a small share
of the yield spread between Treasury securities and corporate bonds can
actually be explained by default risk. Collin-Dufresne (2001), for exam-
ple, can explain only 25% of the variation in credit spread changes across
688 corporate bonds. Huang and Huang (2002) report that around 20%
of corporate credit spreads can be explained through default risk. For our
calibration of the spread between corporate bonds and Treasury securities,
we apply the results by Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), which lead to
more conservative estimates of the liquidity premium. Specifically, they
report that, for AAA rated corporate bonds, 51% of the credit spread can
be explained by default risk.38 Given that the average short-term spread
among AAA corporate bonds equals 104 basis points at annualized rates
(see Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005)), we consider a liquidity premium
of (1 + 49% · 0.0104)1/4 = 13 basis points (in terms of quarterly rates), for
which we choose the discount factor to equal β = π
Rm+13·10−4
= 0.9940.
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Figure 4.1: Responses to a policy rate shock
4.4.2 Effects of conventional monetary policy
We use the calibrated version of our model to analyze the effects of mon-
etary policy in normal times, when Rmt > 1. Figure 4.1 shows responses
to a decline the policy instrument Rmt by 12.5 basis points, i.e. 50 basis
points in terms of annualized rates.39 A decline in the policy rate raises
output (and thus consumption and real balances). The output response
displays a hump-shape, which is induced by endogenous changes in the dis-
tribution of government bonds between the central bank and households,
as shown in Reynard and Schabert (2009). Inflation also increases and
returns monotonically to steady state. The bond rate closely follows the
38To be more precise, they consider two competing explanations of a non-default
component in credit spreads: Differential tax treatment and liquidity considerations.
They find both that the cross-sectional and the longitudinal variation in the non-default
component are strongly correlated to measures of market liquidity while the differential
tax treatment does not have an impact.
39All figures show deviations from steady state in percentage points, zˆt, except for
interest rates which are given in terms of absolute deviations from steady state, R˜t =
100 ∗ (Rt −R) and can thus be interpreted as quarterly percentage points: For instance
R˜mt = −0.12 implies a 12 basis point decline in the (quarterly) policy rate.
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policy rate (see 4.17), while the liquidity premium between non-eligible as-
sets and eligible bonds increases. The reason is that bonds become more
liquid (i.e. closer substitutes for money) when the policy rate falls. Hence,
a monetary easing leads to an increase in the cost of external funds, which
tends to amplify the inflation response. Figure 4.1 shows that the output
response depends on the share of repurchase operations in money holdings,
Ω. A higher repo share increases the output effect because it implies that a
larger share of households’ money holdings is affected by the shock to the
policy rate. Thus, in accordance with the conventional view on monetary
policy effects, a decline in the policy rate is able to stimulate the economy,
i.e. to lead to an increase in consumption and employment, at the cost of
increasing the inflation rate. This policy option is evidently only available
if the policy rate exceeds the zero lower bound, Rmt > 1.
4.4.3 Effects of unconventional monetary policy
When the policy rate reaches the zero lower bound, a conventional way
of stimulating the economy is evidently not possible. However, Japan’s
liquidity trap and the measures taken by the Federal Reserve to mitigate the
recent financial crisis show that central banks do not consider themselves
disarmed but resort to unconventional policies. In contrast to standard
models, where money is supplied in an unrestricted way, our model allows
an analysis of such policy actions. In particular, we assume that the central
bank raises the share κt of loans that are eligible in open market operations
above its zero steady state value, κ = 0. This policy will affect the economy
through two effects:
1. a quantitative easing (QnE) effect, i.e. an increase in the amount of
eligible securities allowing households to acquire more money,
2. a qualitative easing (QlE) effect, i.e. a decrease in the liquidity pre-
mium and thus in the loan rate, which reduces firms’ borrowing cost.
In the first part of the analysis, we consider a temporary rise of κt and
examine the joint impact of both effects on macroeconomic variables. In
the second part of the analysis, an increase of κt will be associated with a
decline in the share of government bonds that are accepted in open market
operations, which allows to keep the total amount of eligible securities
constant and thus to isolate the QlE effect.
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Figure 4.2: Responses to an increase in κ (QlE +QnE) at the ZLB
As mentioned in Proposition 4.1, a policy rate at the zero lower bound
does not imply money demand to be unbounded. Moreover, we can even
implement an interest rate peg without running into local indeterminacy
problems, as pointed out by Reynard and Schabert (2009). To simplify the
analysis of monetary policy at the zero lower bound, we assume that the
central bank sets Rmt = 1. Due to the (il-)liquidity premium on non-eligible
assets, the debt rate and the loan rate will then be strictly positive, which
has also been empirically observed during Japan’s liquidity trap period and
since the Fed lowered the federal funds rate (almost) to zero in the recent
past. By increasing the share of eligible loans κt, the loan rate will decline
due to a fall in the liquidity premium. Only if the share were set to equal
one, κt = 1, the loan rate would be identical to the policy rate (see 4.13).
74
0 20 40
0
0.1
0.2
yˆ
 
 
θ=0.5
θ=0.75
0 20 40
-0.1
0
0.1
πˆ
0 20 40
0
20
40
60
κˆ
0 20 40
0
0.2
0.4
R˜
0 20 40
-1
-0.5
0
R˜L
0 20 40
-0.4
-0.2
0
R˜D − R˜
0 20 40
-0.5
0
0.5
mˆc
0 20 40
0
10
20
mˆR
0 20 40
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
lˆ
Figure 4.3: Responses to a neutralized increase in κ (QlE) at the ZLB
Figure 4.2 shows the impulse response to a shock raising κt from 0 to
1% (with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.85). By increasing the amount
of collateral available in open market operations, households can acquire
additional money which they use to increase consumption spending, given
that the goods market constraint is binding. In our benchmark calibration
(η = 0), output increases by 0.25%. Similar to a conventional monetary
expansion, inflation increases. This effect is only moderate with inflation
rising by around five basis points. Figure 4.2 further reveals that the loan
rate falls, since loans are now partially eligible in open market operations.
This QlE effect is considerably small for the current change in κ. Fur-
ther, Figure 4.2 demonstrates that the output effect declines when labor
is inelastically supplied (η = 1). In that case, increasing labor demand by
75
firms puts further upward pressure on wages, so that the inflation increase
is larger. This reduces the real value of the additional injections and thus
reduces the output effect.40
To examine the effectiveness of QlE, we further increase κt from 0 to
50%. In order to isolate the QlE effect from the effects from the expansion
in the amount of collateral (QnE), we reduce the fraction of eligible bonds
accordingly, κBt Bt−1, such that total injections, κtLt+κ
B
t Bt−1, remain con-
stant. In particular, we set κBt = κ
B − (l/bπ)(κt − κ), where κB = 1 and
κ = 0. Figure 4.3 shows the impulse response to a shock which raises κt
from zero to 0.5 (with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.85). As revealed
by the output response, this policy has a stimulating impact on the econ-
omy, though the central bank has not increased the amount of collateral.
However, the impact on output and consumption is small, i.e. a maximum
deviation of 0.07% from the steady state value in the benchmark calibration
(θ = 0.5). As explained above, these effects are due to the reduction of the
loan rate, which declines by around 60 basis points (in terms of quarterly
rates), thereby reducing production cost. At the same time the bonds rate
increases, since less bonds are now eligible, thus lowering the liquidity pre-
mium RDt −Rt. Figure 4.3 further shows that the effectiveness of qualitative
easing increases with the degree of the working capital friction. When the
fraction of loans paid in advance rises from θ = 0.5 to θ = 0.75, both the
output and inflation effects increase (in absolute value), despite an identical
decline in the loan rate. The reason is that a larger share of labor cost is
now affected by the decline in the loan rate.
4.4.4 Effectiveness of monetary easing
This section compares conventional and unconventional policies quantita-
tively with respect to their output and inflation effects. In addition to the
policies analyzed above, we consider a policy of pure quantitative easing
("QnE"), which consists of an increase in κBt only. We further consider the
interventions analyzed above, where "QnE & QlE" describes an increase in
κt and "QlE" an increase in κt neutralized by a decline in κBt . To facilitate
comparability between the different policy experiments, we calibrate the
interventions "QnE" and "QnE & QlE" such that they lead to a change in
40Note that the liquidity premium in both cases evolves identically because it measures
the value of a nominal unit of currency.
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the monetary base that equals the impact of a policy rate shock on the mon-
etary base. In particular, we consider an increase in the policy rate by 12.5
basis points (△Rmt = 0.00125), which leads to a 7.5 basis point decline in
the monetary base. Table 4.1 presents the impact and cumulative effects of
different monetary policies on output and inflation at the zero lower bound,
where the elasticities are multiplied with changes in the policy instrument
that lead to identical monetary base effects. QlE does not imply a change
in the monetary base so that we scale our QlE intervention differently (see
below). All policy interventions are assumed to have an identical autocor-
relation, ρ = 0.85. We report the negative effects of a positive shock to an
exogenously set policy rate, and the effects of expansionary unconventional
monetary policy.41
Table 4.1 shows that the policy rate shock has a small positive impact
on output and inflation. The reason is that our model implies a relatively
weak monetary transmission channel.42 Comparing conventional monetary
policy to QnE, we observe that the output effect of conventional policy is
smaller on impact, while its cumulative output effect is larger. However, the
cumulative output effect of a policy rate shock in the first three years is only
0.18%, compared to 0.20% under QnE. Figure 4.4 compares the response
of key variables under both a policy rate shock and QnE. In explaining
the different transmission, the response of households’ bond holdings is
central: When the policy rate declines, seigniorage revenues fall, so that
households’ bond holdings increase (see 4.20). This increases collateral
available for future open market operations and thus magnifies the positive
output effect of the initial shock. In contrast, under quantitative easing,
households transfer more bonds to the central bank, so that their bond
holdings decline. This mitigates the expansionary impact of the shock in
future periods, so that the expansion is less persistent.
41The monetary base is defined asMBt =MHt−1+It =M
H
t−1+κ
B
t Bt−1/R
m
t +κtLt/R
m
t .
We assume a steady state characterized by κ = 0 and κB = 0.99, and where the policy
rate is fixed at Rm = 1. The "QnE" and "QnE & QlE" interventions are thus scaled as
follows △κBt = κ
B/Rm △ Rmt and △κt = △R
m
t
κBb
Rmπl
. We compute the semielasticities
∂yˆt/∂R
m
t , ∂πˆt/∂R
m
t and ∂yˆt/∂κ
B
t , ∂πˆt/∂κ
B
t as well as ∂yˆt/∂κt, ∂πˆt/∂κt (the latter is
computed twice, one for each of the policy experiments "QnE & QlE" and "QlE") both
as an impact effect and a cumulative effect, ∂yˆcumt /∂R
m
t where yˆ
cum
t = liml→∞Et
∑l
s=0
yˆt+l, from a numerical simulation using the software dynare.
42For comparison, the output effects of a one s.d. shock to labor productivity are
around ten times larger. For details on this, see Reynard and Schabert (2009).
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Output effects Inflation effects
Policy
experiment
Impact Cumulative Impact Cumulative
Policy rate shock
(negative effects)
0.011% 0.928% 0.065% 0.000%
QnE & QlE
0.063% 0.206% 0.012% 0.000%
QnE
0.063% 0.201% 0.012% 0.000%
QlE
0.017% 0.434% -0.017% 0.000%
Note: The intervention sizes are given by△Rmt = 12.5b.p.,
△κt = 0.0025 (QnE&QlE), △κ
B
t = 0.0012 (QnE) and
△κt = 0.25,△κ
B
t = —0.12 (QlE), respectively.
Table 4.1: Output and inflation effects of conventional and unconventional
monetary policy
This difference in transmission between conventional monetary policy
and QnE has further implications for the responses of output and inflation.
The inflation effect under QnE is smaller than that of the policy rate shock
for more than the first five years. With forward-looking price setting, this
implies that the impact effect on inflation is significantly lower under QnE.
Given an equivalent increase in the (nominal) monetary base, this leads
the impact effect of QnE on output to be more than five times larger than
that implied by conventional policy.43 Moreover, Figure 4.4 demonstrates
that the expansionary impact of QnE does not arise from a commitment
to raise future inflation: The largest increase in inflation occurs on impact
and thus unexpectedly. After that, the cumulative inflation effect is neg-
43Note that the persistence of the effects of a policy rate shock depends on the form of
the interest rate rule. If we replace the exogeneity assumption and instead use a Taylor
rule, the effects described here are mitigated. However, the impact output response is
still larger under QnE and the inflation effects of conventional policy in this case exceed
those of QnE for 4 years.
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Figure 4.4: Comparing transmission of conventional and unconventional
monetary policy
ative, amounting to —0.063%.44 Further, output is stimulated even in the
fourth quarter after the shock, although inflation falls below steady state
in all periods thereafter. This result is in contrast to the existing litera-
ture on quantitative easing, which finds that QnE can only be effective by
"committing to being irresponsible", as argued by Eggertsson (2006).
Further, comparing "QnE" and "Qne & QlE" in Table 4.1 shows that
conducting quantitative easing by accepting bonds or loans leads to quan-
titatively similar results. However, the small size of the intervention hides
the impact of qualitative easing: We isolate the impact of QlE on out-
put and inflation by analyzing the case of a neutralized intervention of the
size △κt = 0.25. The scale of this intervention is such that the increase
in central bank lending against firm loans exceeds that of the "QnE &
QlE" experiment by factor 100. Still, QlE leads to a smaller impact effect
on output. As mentioned in section 4.4.3, qualitative easing allows for an
increase in real activity despite constant injections by reducing firms’ pro-
duction cost. This leads to a decline in inflation, which increases the real
value of money and bonds held by households. As in the case of the policy
44This can be easily calculated because cumulative inflation is zero across all policies
we analyze. The reason for this is that, in the long run, eligible collateral and the policy
rate are not changed by either of the policies we analyze. Thus, the price level has to
return to its previous steady state path for real bond holdings, and thus consumption,
to return to steady state as well.
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rate shock, the increase in households’ bond holdings eases access to future
liquidity. Therefore, the cumulative output effect of qualitative easing is
large relative to its impact effect, amounting to 0.33% after three years.
To conclude, quantitative easing has positive output effects that can
be large in case of a sizable intervention. In comparison to conventional
monetary policy, QnE more quickly develops its positive output effect. At
the same time, inflationary pressure is lower than under conventional policy.
Qualitative easing can lead to non-negligible output effects if conducted on
a large scale, and at the same time reduces inflation.
4.4.5 Further applications
This section relates the unconventional monetary policies analyzed above
to disruptions in financial markets, such as those observed during 2007-08.
Especially in late 2008, there was considerable uncertainty about banks’
creditworthiness, so that banks mistrusted each other. This led to a collapse
of interbank lending. To insure themselves from increasing illiquidity risks
associated with the disruptions in interbank lending, banks started to hoard
liquid assets, triggering a decline in the money multiplier. In our model,
we do not distinguish between high-powered money and broader monetary
aggregates. However, one might think of modeling such financial market
disruptions by allowing for a money multiplier in equation (4.3). Our model
implies that quantitative easing is a powerful instrument to counter the
effects of a decline in the multiplier: By increasing injections contingent
on the decline in the multiplier, the central bank could mitigate or even
prevent the recession triggered by such a shock.
Another important element in the financial crisis of 2007-08 was increas-
ing credit risk. In our model, an increase in credit risk premiums would
have contractionary effects by increasing firms’ borrowing cost. Preventing
such an increase was one of the aims of the Federal Reserve in setting up
liquidity facilities such as the Commercial Paper Funding Facility. In our
model, monetary policy disposes of an instrument capable of influencing
firms’ borrowing cost without causing inflationary pressure: By implement-
ing a policy of qualitative easing, the central bank can counter the effects
of credit risk shocks. It is outside the scope of this chapter to analyze these
issues in more detail. However, we think that an application of our model
to the recent financial crisis should proceed along these lines.
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4.5 Conclusion
We develop a model which can readily be used to analyze the impact of
unconventional monetary policy tools, such as those introduced by the Fed-
eral Reserve and other central banks around the globe in late 2008. Mod-
eling open market operations explicitly allows an analysis of policy at the
zero-lower bound as well as an assessment of the impact of qualitative and
quantitative easing. We find that quantitative easing, i.e. an expansion of
the monetary base against conventional collateral, is an effective policy tool
that can stimulate consumption. The reason for a positive output effect
of quantitative easing is that we take into account that households’ goods
demand can be cash constrained even when the policy rate has reached
the zero lower bound: When interest rates on illiquid assets are positive,
the opportunity cost of money holdings is positive and households are not
satiated with money.
We further analyze the effects of qual itative easing, i.e. changes in the
composition of the central bank’s assets. We find that qualitative easing
has a stimulating impact on the economy, even absent any changes in the
monetary base. This effect operates through a reduction in the loan rate,
which arises due to the liquidity services provided by loans when these are
eligible in open market operations. This lowers firms’ cost of production and
stimulates the economy through the supply side. Although the reduction
in the loan rate is sizable, the output effect is found to be relatively small.
Comparing the effectiveness of policies quantitatively, we find that con-
ventional monetary easing (via lower policy rates) and a policy of quantita-
tive easing - designed to generate an identical increase in the monetary base
- have different output and inflation effects. Conventional monetary policy
has a more than five times lower impact output effect and triggers higher
inflation. This is mainly due to a difference in monetary transmission which
implies that conventional monetary policy has more persistent output and
inflation effects. Further, in contrast to the existing literature, we find that
the stimulus of quantitative easing does not rely on a commitment to raise
future inflation.
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Chapter 5
Key currency pricing, liquidity
and exchange rates
5.1 Introduction
Empirical studies reject uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), which states
that a currency is expected to depreciate relative to another country’s cur-
rency when the interest rate difference to that country is positive. One
aspect of empirical failure of UIP is that exchange rates do not react to
interest rate shocks as predicted by Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting but
are characterized by delayed overshooting, as documented by Eichenbaum
and Evans (1995). This chapter takes the evidence against UIP as a start-
ing point and develops a model in which there is a spread between interest
rates paid on assets eligible for central bank’s open market operations and
those paid on ineligible assets, i.e. a liquidity premium. The model further
allows for a key currency which is required to participate in international
trade. Therefore, assets allowing access to key currency liquidity are held
by agents around the globe. This chapter shows that the liquidity premiums
implied by this setup generate deviations from UIP and offer an explana-
tion for delayed overshooting. Moreover, it analyzes how the international
transmission of shocks is affected by modeling key currency liquidity.
Empirical failure of UIP is documented by various types of evidence
including forward premium regressions, vector autoregressions (VARs) and
model estimations. Testing UIP by applying regression analysis is diffi-
cult because expectations cannot be measured. However, as pointed out
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by Chinn (2006), UIP can be tested jointly with the assumption of ra-
tional expectations. In the forward premium regression, empirical studies
regress realized exchange rate changes on the interest rate difference (the
forward premium) between two countries. Under rational expectations and
risk neutrality, UIP predicts this regression to yield a positive coefficient of
unity. Froot (1990) finds that the average estimate of this coefficient across
75 published studies is -0.88 with only a few estimates above zero and none
greater than unity. The finding of a negative coefficient in the forward
premium regression has become known as the forward premium puzzle. It
implies that the forward premium predicts exchange rate movements in-
consistent with theory not only in magnitude, but also in terms of the
direction of the movement.45 When investors are risk averse, the UIP con-
dition allows for risk premiums, which are positive when an asset’s domestic
currency return is positively correlated to consumption growth. However,
it is consensus in the literature that risk premiums cannot explain the neg-
ative coefficient in the forward premium regression, so that empirical UIP
failure has become a stylized fact (see Backus, Foresi, and Telmer (2001)).
Recent improvements in data availability have spurred a re-evaluation of
these results with respect to maturities and countries. Chinn (2006) and
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) confirm the forward premium puzzle for short
maturities in developed economies, but find evidence supportive of UIP
with respect to long horizons and for emerging economies.
A second type of evidence documents the empirical failure of uncov-
ered interest rate parity: Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) estimate a VAR
to analyze the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates. Their
conclusion is known as the delayed overshooting puzzle: In contrast to
Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting, which is based on UIP, they find that a
contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock leads the dollar to appreciate
continuously until it peaks after around three years. Some studies question
the identification assumptions made by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and
find evidence in line with Dornbusch’s overshooting (see Kim and Roubini
(2000) and Faust and Rogers (2003)). However, Scholl and Uhlig (2008)
reconfirm the delayed overshooting result and find that the exchange rate
peaks around one or two years after a monetary shock.
A third type of evidence stems from estimations of small open econ-
45Surveys of this literature include Froot and Thaler (1984), Engel (1996) and Taylor
(1995).
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omy models, which commonly include a UIP condition. Justiniano and
Preston (2010) find that their model cannot account for the observed co-
movement of Canadian and U.S. business cycles. Further, volatility in the
real exchange rate is virtually entirely caused by shocks to an ad-hoc risk
premium, so that the authors find an extreme version of exchange rate
disconnect.46 Justiniano and Preston (2010) suggest that the failure of
the model to associate movements of exchange rates with fundamentals is
related to its poor performance. Thus, improving the exchange rate predic-
tions of economic models is a promising avenue to enhance the quantitative
performance of open economy models.
The literature has analyzed various possibilities to reconcile theory and
evidence, with a focus on risk premiums. Fama (1984) shows that a neg-
ative coefficient in the forward premium regression implies that the risk
premium would have to be negatively correlated to, and more volatile than,
the expected exchange rate change. There is consensus that the volatility
of the risk premium implied by Fama’s conditions is too high for any rea-
sonable risk premium (see Froot and Thaler (1984) and Backus, Foresi, and
Telmer (2001)). Some authors challenge this view: Lustig and Verdelhan
(2007) find that high-interest rate currencies depreciate on average when
consumption growth is low, so that a consumption based risk premium
can explain excess returns if one is willing to assume large coefficients of
risk aversion. Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2009) build a model where
asset markets are segmented, so that the investor’s marginal utility varies
more than indicated by fluctuations in aggregate consumption. This can
increase the fluctuations of the risk premium. Other studies that aim to
explain the forward premium puzzle follow the research agenda set out by
Fama (1984) and construct volatile risk premiums by assuming changes
in preferences such as habits (Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Verdel-
han (2010)), deviations from rationality (Gourinchas and Tornell (2004))
or multiple equilibria (Sarantis (2006)).
This chapter does not deal with risk premiums but combines two fea-
tures, liquidity and key currency pricing: First, as is conveyed in anecdotal
evidence - for instance about recurring flight to quality and flight to liq-
uidity episodes - and in empirical studies, interest rates on assets vary not
only according to their risk but also as a function of their liquidity. For
46Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) obtain a qualitatively identical result.
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instance, Longstaff (2004) shows that U.S. Treasury bonds pay lower in-
terest rates than Refcorp bonds, which are backed by the Treasury, and
finds that the premium is related to indicators of liquidity preferences.47
In a closed economy, Reynard and Schabert (2009) show that taking into
account liquidity premiums by modeling open market operations can align
observed interest rates and their theoretical counterparts. Further, they
demonstrate that monetary transmission is fundamentally affected. This
suggests that the international transmission of shocks can be improved by
a model analyzing the impact of liquidity on interest and exchange rates.
The second observation relates to the leading role of the U.S. dollar in the
international monetary system. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) coin
the term key currency pricing, which states that a large share of inter-
national trade is conducted in dollars. Key currency pricing implies that
importers and exporters find it convenient to hold dollar assets to facilitate
their transactions. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) argue that such liq-
uidity services provided by key currency bonds are the driving force behind
relatively low U.S. interest rates, which imply an "exorbitant privilege" for
the United States.48
This chapter combines these two observations and analyzes the impact
of key currency pricing and liquidity on exchange rate dynamics. I develop a
two-country open economy model which explicitly models open market op-
erations in the foreign country, i.e. the key currency country, as in Reynard
and Schabert (2009): The foreign central bank supplies cash in exchange for
foreign government bonds, so that these pay lower interest rates compared
to assets not eligible for open market operations. Liquidity demand is mo-
tivated from households’ demand for goods purchases, which require cash.
Due to the assumption of key currency pricing, households in the home
economy require foreign currency to purchase import goods and hold for-
eign government bonds despite their low interest rates. I analyze how this
setup affects uncovered interest rate parity and exchange rate movements,
in particular in response to monetary policy shocks. The goal is to answer
47Further evidence documenting liquidity premiums is given by Longstaff, Mithal, and
Neis (2005) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2007) who find that the supply of
Treasury debt (relative to GDP) is negatively correlated to the spread between corporate
and Treasury bond yields, even when controlling for default risk.
48This quote is attributed to Charles de Gaulle but stems from Valery Giscard
d’Estaing, who was French finance minister at the time of the statement. See Can-
zoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007).
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the following questions: Can liquidity premiums generate deviations from
uncovered interest rate parity? Can key currency effects reconcile theory
and empirical evidence, for instance with respect to delayed overshooting?
Does modeling key currency liquidity affect the international transmission
of shocks in a fundamental way?
In the literature, the present work is most closely related to Canzoneri,
Cumby, and Diba (2007). Like them, this chapter stresses the importance of
the U.S. dollar in international trade and models liquidity services provided
by government bonds. However, both the setup and goal of this chapter
are different. The model in this chapter builds on Reynard and Schabert
(2009), so that liquidity premiums in the model analyzed in this chapter
are microfounded and endogenously derived from households’ demand for
cash. In contrast, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) employ an ad hoc
specification for the liquidity services provided by government bonds. Fur-
ther, these authors analyze the implications of their setup for a variety
of macroeconomic issues and focus on asymmetries in fiscal and monetary
policy transmission between countries. Further, Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2007) analyze the quantitative implications of the UIP deviations
implied by their setup by evaluating the correlation of expected exchange
rate changes and the interest rate difference. They find that the liquidity
premiums implied by their setup reduce this correlation. However, the cor-
relation remains positive so that they cannot resolve the forward premium
puzzle. In contrast, this chapter conducts a more detailed analysis of the
impact of monetary policy on exchange rates using a microfounded model.
The results of this analysis are the following. I show that modeling key
currency liquidity generates deviations from UIP and demonstrate that the
key currency model predicts delayed overshooting of the nominal exchange
rate, as in Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). The reason is that a rising
foreign monetary policy rate increases the interest rate on foreign gov-
ernment bonds but reduces liquidity premiums overproportionately. This
reduces the marginal benefit of investing in foreign government bonds, so
that the foreign currency is expected to appreciate. I find an exchange rate
peak after seven quarters, in line with the empirical evidence. Moreover, I
demonstrate that the international transmission of shocks is fundamentally
affected by considering key currency effects. For instance, when the home
country pegs its exchange rate to the foreign currency, a demand shock
in the foreign economy induces upward pressure on home country interest
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rates even absent any change in the foreign monetary policy rate, triggering
a recession in the home economy. The reason is that liquidity premiums on
foreign assets increase due to rising foreign goods demand, which increases
demand for the key currency.
This chapter is structured as follows. The model is presented in section
5.2. It gives rise to a modified uncovered interest parity condition which
contains a liquidity premium. This is demonstrated in section 5.3. Building
on these results, section 5.4 analyzes the response of interest and exchange
rates to monetary policy shocks. Further, section 5.4 analyzes the trans-
mission of a foreign demand shock when the home country pegs implements
an exchange rate peg. Section 5.5 concludes
5.2 The model
5.2.1 Setup and timing of events
I model a small open economy (SOE) and its interactions to a large foreign
economy, say the United States, which is explicitly modeled so that the
impact of shocks to the foreign economy on the small home country can
be analyzed. In the domestic and foreign economies, there is a continuum
of infinitely lived households. I assume that households in both economies
have identical asset endowments and preferences, so that I can consider a
representative household in each country. As in Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2007), I assume key currency pricing: International goods trade is
carried out in terms of the foreign economy’s currency, while domestic goods
are purchased with local currency. This is equivalent to assuming producer
currency pricing for large economy exports and local currency pricing for
small economy exports. Moreover, it is assumed that the law of one price
holds, so that exchange rate pass-through is perfect. Further, I analyze a
foreign economy which is relatively large compared to the home economy, so
that the home economy does not influence the foreign allocation of resources
and prices. However, I take into account the impact of home holdings of
foreign assets on asset stocks in the foreign economy.
In the following, the timing of events is described. The representative
household in the home economy enters the period with holdings of foreign
currency MF,t−1, domestic and foreign private debt Dt−1, DF,t−1 and for-
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eign government bonds BF,t−1.49 Foreign households enter the period with
holdings of foreign currency M∗F,t−1, foreign government bonds B
∗
F,t−1 and
foreign private debt D∗F,t−1. For simplicity, I neglect domestic government
bonds and assume that domestic households hold currency only within pe-
riods. Further, it is assumed that firms in each country are owned by local
households.
1. At the beginning of the period, shocks realize, households supply
labor nt and n∗t and firms produce goods.
2. The foreign money market opens and both domestic and foreign
households can exchange foreign government bonds BF,t−1 and B∗F,t−1
for money at the policy rate Rm∗t . The amounts IF,t and I
∗
F,t of for-
eign currency which home and foreign households can obtain in open
market operations are therefore constrained by
IF,t≤
BF,t−1
Rm∗t
, (5.1)
I∗F,t≤
B∗F,t−1
Rm∗t
. (5.2)
With respect to the home money market, I assume abundant supply
of collateral, so that home households can obtain cash Mt at the op-
portunity cost Rt−1. More explicitly, at the beginning of the period,
households in the small open economy can exchange their holdings of
private debt against cash at a discount identical to the interest rate
on private debt, Rt. As private debt can be created by households at
no cost, this constraint does not bind in equilibrium. I further assume
that home households can engage in repurchase operations only, so
that they will not hold domestic money across periods. Seigniorage
is transferred back to households via a lump sum transfer.
3. Households in both countries enter the goods markets, where goods
can be bought with currency only. Key currency pricing requires
49Throughout the paper, the subscripts H and F refer to home and foreign origin
of goods and assets. An asterisk denotes variables decided upon by foreign agents.
Verbally, I distinguish between both economies by using the terms "foreign" or "large"
economy versus "home" or "small" economy. The terms "local" and "domestic" can
refer to either economy, depending on the context. Further, upper case letters refer to
nominal variables while lower case letters denominate real variables.
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import goods in both countries to be purchased with foreign currency
only. Further, households in both economies purchase domestic goods
with their domestic currencies. Thus, households in the small open
economy are constrained by
P ∗F,tcF,t≤ IF,t +MF,t−1, (5.3)
PH,tcH,t≤Mt, (5.4)
where cF,t and cH,t denote home consumption of foreign and, respec-
tively, domestic goods and where PH,t is the price of home goods in
home currency and P ∗F,t is the price of foreign goods in terms of foreign
currency. Households in the large economy require foreign currency
for their entire goods purchases and are thus constrained by
P ∗F,tc
∗
t ≤ I
∗
F,t +M
∗
F,t−1. (5.5)
4. Before the asset markets open, households in both countries receive
dividends Ptδt and wages Ptwtnt as well as government transfers τ t
and τ ∗t . Further, repurchase agreements are settled. I assume that the
foreign central bank conducts repo operations amounting to MR∗F,t +
MRF,t = Ω
(
M∗F,t +MF,t
)
, whereMR∗F,t andM
R
F,t is the amount of money
repurchased from foreign and, respectively, home households.
5. The asset markets open. Home households can carry wealth into the
next period by purchasing domestic private debt Dt, foreign govern-
ment bonds BF,t and foreign currencyMF,t. Foreign households invest
into foreign assets only and acquire government bonds B∗F,t, money
M∗F,t as well as private debt D
∗
F,t. The interest rates on domestic
private debt, foreign government bonds and foreign private debt are
given by Rt, R∗t and R
D∗
t .
5.2.2 The home economy
Households
Households maximize the expected sum of the discounted stream of instan-
taneous utilities
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u (ct, nt)] , (5.6)
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where u is separable in its arguments, increasing, twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions, β is the
households’ discount factor and nt is the share of his time endowment a
household spends working. Home households’ consumption is a composite
good of foreign and domestic goods
ct = γc
1−η
H,t c
η
F,t, (5.7)
where γ−1 = ηn (1− η)1−η and η provides an openness measure of the
home country. Households maximize utility subject to the asset market
constraint,
St
[
MF,t −MF,t−1 +
BF,t
R∗t
−BF,t−1 +
DF,t
RD∗t
−DF,t−1 + P
∗
t IF,t (R
m∗
t − 1)
]
≤Ptwtnt + Ptδt + Ptτ t −Mt (Rt − 1)−
Dt
Rt
+Dt−1 − PH,tcH,t − StP
∗
F,tcF,t,
where St refers to the nominal exchange rate, i.e. the price of a unit of
foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, the cash in advance con-
straints for imported and domestic goods, (5.3)-(5.4), the open market
constraint (5.1) and the non-negativity constraints MF,t,Mt, BF,t ≥ 0 as
well as the no-Ponzi game condition lims→∞Et
s∏
i=0
DF,t+s/Rt+i ≥ 0. The
first order conditions for working time nt, domestic and foreign consump-
tion cH,t and cF,t, open market operations IF,t, holdings of domestic and
foreign money, and investment into home and foreign private debt as well
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as foreign government bonds are given by
λtwt=−un,t, (5.8)(
λt + ψH,t
) PH,t
Pt
=uc,tγ (1− η)
(
cF,t
cH,t
)η
, (5.9)
(
ψF,t + λt
)
qt=uc,tγη
(
cF,t
cH,t
)η−1
, (5.10)(
ψF,t + λt
)
qt=(λt + µt)R
m
t qt, (5.11)
ψH,t=λt (Rt − 1) , (5.12)
λtqt=βEtqt+1
λt+1 + ψF,t+1
π∗t+1
, (5.13)
λt=βEt
λt+1Rt
πt+1
, (5.14)
λtqt=βEtqt+1
λt+1R
D∗
t
π∗t+1
, (5.15)
λtqt=βEtqt+1
λt+1 + µt+1
π∗t+1
R∗t , (5.16)
where ψH,t, ψF,t, µt and λt are the respective Lagrange multipliers on the
cash, open market, and asset market constraints, qt = StP ∗t /Pt is the real
exchange rate and π∗t = P
∗
t /P
∗
t−1 and πt = Pt/Pt−1 are foreign and domes-
tic (CPI) inflation. The budget constraint binds in equilibrium, λt > 0,
because the disutility of working is strictly negative, un,t < 0. The comple-
mentary slackness conditions are given by
ψH,t ≥ 0, Mt − PH,tcH,t ≥ 0, ψH,t (Mt − PH,tcH,t) = 0,
ψF,t ≥ 0, MF,t + IF,t − P
∗
F,tcF,t ≥ 0, ψF,t
(
MF,t + IF,t − P ∗F,tcF,t
)
= 0,
µt ≥ 0, IF,t −BF,t−1/R
m∗
t ≥ 0, µt ( IF,t −BF,t−1/R
m∗
t ) = 0,
and the transversality condition requires lims→∞Et
s∏
i=0
DF,t+s/Rt+i = 0.
From (5.9) and (5.10), I observe that both imported and domestically pro-
duced goods are subject to a cash credit friction. This implies that house-
holds’ optimal allocation of consumption good spending depends not only
on the relative prices of foreign and domestic goods, but also on foreign
and domestic interest rates. Using (5.9)-(5.11) and (5.7), I demonstrate in
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Appendix D.1.1 that demand for foreign and domestic goods is given by
cF,t=
ηuc,t
(λt + µt)R
m∗
t
q−1t ct, (5.17)
cH,t=
(1− η) uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
) (PH,t
Pt
)−1
ct. (5.18)
Further, (5.15) and (5.16) show that households are willing to hold foreign
government bonds at an interest rate below that on foreign private debt
whenever the open market constraint (5.1) is binding. Further, as shown
in Appendix D.1.1, the consumer price index Pt is given by
Pt =
[(λt + µt)R
m
t ]
η (λt + ψH,t)1−η
c−σt
P ηF,tP
1−η
H,t , (5.19)
where PF,t is the price of foreign goods in terms of the domestic currency.
This implies that the cash distortion influences the price index. The reason
is that the households take into account the cash credit friction into their
optimal choice of consumption goods.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed with
j ∈ [0, 1]. Firms rent labor at the nominal wage Ptwt and produce a
differentiated good using a linear technology,
yH,t (j) = nt (j) .
Cost minimization implies that marginal cost in real (PPI) terms, mct, are
constant across firms and given by
mct = wt
Pt
PH,t
. (5.20)
Firms produce varieties which are aggregated to a final good by competitive
retailers according to
yH,t =
[∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
H,t (j)dj
] ε
ε−1
,
so that firms face the demand constraint yH,t (j) = (PH,t(j)/PH,t)
−ε yH,t.
Following Calvo (1983), every firm reoptimizes its price in a given period
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with probability φ. Firms who do not reoptimize prices are assumed to
increase prices with the steady state PPI inflation rate πH , as in Ascari
(2004). Denoting with Zt the price of firms which reoptimize their price in
period t, optimal forward looking price setting is given by
Zt =
ε
ε− 1
∑
s (φβ)
s uc,t+syH,t+sP εH,t+smct+s∑
s (φβ)
s uc,t+syH,t+sP
ε−1
H,t+s
. (5.21)
The optimal price setting condition can be rewritten recursively as
Z1t = ε/ (ε− 1)uc,tyH,tmct + φβπ
−ε
H Etπ
ε
H,t+1Z
1
t+1, (5.22)
Z1t =uc,tyH,t + φβπ
1−ε
H Etπ
ε−1
H,t+1Z
2
t+1, (5.23)
where Z˜t = Zt/PH,t = Z1t /Z
2
t .To determine the PPI inflation rate πH,t, I use
that the price index for home goods satisfies PH,tyH,t =
∫ 1
0
PH,t (j) yH,t (j) dj.
Using the firms’ demand constraint, yH,t (j) = (PH,t(j)/PH,t)
−ε yH,t, this
yields
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)1−ε
+ φπ1−εH π
ε−1
H,t . (5.24)
Further, the impact of price dispersion on output is given by
yH,t =
nt
st
, (5.25)
where st =
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj captures price dispersion and evolves according
to
st = (1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)−ε
+ φπ−εH π
ε
H,tst−1. (5.26)
For derivations of (5.20)-(5.26), see Appendix D.1.2.
Public sector
The public sector in the home economy has a balanced budget. Thus,
seigniorage earnings on domestic cash holdings are redistributed as a lump
sum transfer Ptτ t to domestic households, so that the public budget con-
straint reads
Ptτ t = Mt (Rt − 1) .
Further, monetary policy is either given by an exchange rate peg, St = St−1
or by the interest rate rule
Rt = R
(1−ρR)R
ρR
t−1 (πH,t/πH)
wπ(1−ρR) (yH,t/yH)
wy(1−ρR) , (5.27)
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where ρR governs interest rate inertia and wπ (wy) describes the central
bank’s reaction to deviations of producer price inflation (domestic output)
from steady state. This rule is a simplified version of Justiniano and Preston
(2010).
5.2.3 The foreign economy
In modeling the foreign economy, I closely follow Reynard and Schabert
(2009). The only difference is that households import goods from the small
economy. However, it is assumed that the foreign economy is large com-
pared to the home economy, so that neither the allocation nor the price
system in the small open economy influences the foreign economy. How-
ever, the impact of changes in domestic holdings of foreign government
bonds on asset stocks in the foreign economy is taken into account.
Households
Foreign households consume an aggregate of foreign and home goods, c∗t =
γ∗
(
c∗F,t
)1−η∗ (
c∗H,t
)η∗
where γ∗ =
[
η∗n
∗
(1− η∗)1−η
∗
]−1
. As is standard in
the literature, the large open economy is treated as approximately closed,
i.e. I analyze the case of η∗ → 0 so that foreign consumption and the price
index are approximately given by c∗t = c
∗
F,t and P
∗
t = P
∗
F,t. However, the
demand function for import goods is relevant for the small open economy
and given by c∗H,t = η
∗
(
PH,t/St
P ∗t
)−1
c∗t . I assume that foreign households’ dis-
count factor is identical to that applied by households in the small economy.
Foreign households maximize the expected sum of a discounted stream of
instantaneous utilities which are separable in consumption and labor,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (c∗t , n
∗
t ) .
subject to the asset market constraint
M∗F,t−1 +B
∗
F,t−1 + P
∗
t w
∗
tn
∗
t +D
∗
F,t−1 + P
∗
t δ
∗
t + P
∗
t τ
∗
t
≤M∗F,t +
B∗F,t
R∗t
+
D∗F,t
RD∗t
+ P ∗t c
∗
t + (R
m∗
t − 1) I
∗
F,t, (5.28)
the open market constraint
I∗F,tR
m∗
t ≤ B
∗
F,t−1, (5.29)
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the cash in advance constraint
P ∗t c
∗
t ≤ I
∗
F,t +M
∗
t−1, (5.30)
and non-negativity conditionsM∗F,t ≥ 0 and B
∗
F,t ≥ 0 as well as the no Ponzi
game condition lims→∞ Et
s∏
i=0
D∗F,t+s/R
D∗
t+i ≥ 0. The first order conditions
with respect to working time, consumption, open market operations and
holdings of private as well as government debt and money are given by
−
u∗n,t
w∗t
=λ∗t , (5.31)
u∗c,t=λ
∗
t + ψ
∗
t , (5.32)
Rm∗t (λ
∗
t + µ
∗
t )=λ
∗
t + ψ
∗
t , (5.33)
λ∗t =β
∗Et
λ∗t+1
π∗t+1
RD∗t , (5.34)
λ∗t =β
∗Et
λ∗t+1 + µ
∗
t+1
π∗t+1
R∗t , (5.35)
λ∗t =β
∗Et
λ∗t+1 + ψ
∗
t+1
π∗t+1
, (5.36)
where λ∗t , µ
∗
t and ψ
∗
t are the Lagrange multipliers on the budget, open
market and cash in advance constraints. The complementary slackness
conditions are given by
ψ∗t ≥ 0, M
∗
t + I
∗
F,t − P
∗
t c
∗
t ≥ 0, ψ
∗
t
(
M∗t + I
∗
F,t − P
∗
t c
∗
t
)
= 0,
µ∗t ≥ 0, I
∗
F,t −B
∗
F,t−1/R
m∗
t ≥ 0, µ
∗
t
(
I∗F,t −B
∗
F,t−1/R
m∗
t
)
= 0.
Further, the transversality condition, lims→∞ Et
s∏
i=0
D∗F,t+s/R
D∗
t+i = 0 has to
be satisfied.
Firms
The setup of the firm sector is identical to the home economy: A continuum
of firms indexed over k rents labor and produces intermediate goods with
a linear technology, given exogenous and constant total factor productivity
A∗. Intermediate goods are aggregated like in the home economy,
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y∗t =
[∫ 1
0
(y∗t (k))
ε−1
ε dk
] ε
ε−1
, where I assume an identical elasticity of sub-
stitution, ε∗ = ε. This yields the following equilibrium conditions
w∗t = mc
∗
tA
∗, (5.37)
Z1∗t = ε/ (ε− 1)u
∗
c,ty
∗
tmc
∗
t + φ
∗βπ∗−εEtπ
∗ε
t+1Z
1∗
t+1, (5.38)
Z2∗t = u
∗
c,ty
∗
t + φ
∗βπ∗1−εEtπ
∗ε−1
t+1 Z
2∗
t+1, (5.39)
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1∗t /Z
2∗
t
)1−ε
+ φπ∗1−επ∗ε−1t . (5.40)
As in the home economy, price dispersion is defined as s∗t =
∫ 1
0
(
P∗t (k)
P∗t
)−ε
dk,
so that aggregate resources are inefficiently employed whenever s∗t > 1.
Aggregate production and price dispersion are given by
y∗t = A
∗n∗t/s
∗
t , (5.41)
s∗t = (1− φ)
(
Z1∗t /Z
2∗
t
)−ε
+ φs∗t−1π
∗ε
t . (5.42)
Public sector
The public sector is identical to that in Reynard and Schabert (2009) with
the exception that I take into account the impact of holdings of foreign
government bonds in the home economy on asset stocks in the foreign
economy. Given a constant growth rate of the volume of Treasury bonds,
which evolve according to
BT∗t = ΓB
T∗
t−1, (5.43)
the Treasury’s budget constraint is given by
BT ∗t
R∗t
+ P ∗t τ
m∗
t = B
T ∗
t−1 + P
∗
t τ
∗
t , (5.44)
where P ∗t τ
m∗
t are seigniorage revenues and P
∗
t τ
∗
t lump-sum transfers to
households. The central bank’s bond holdings thus evolve according to
BCB∗t
R∗t
+ P ∗t τ
m∗
t = B
CB∗
t−1 +R
m∗
t I
∗
t −M
R∗
F,t , (5.45)
where I∗t = I
∗
F,t + IF,t denotes total injections and M
R∗
F,t + M
R
F,t are repo
operations in both countries. Seigniorage is defined as interest earnings on
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government bonds held at period end, P ∗t τ
m∗
t =
BCB∗t
R∗t
− BCB∗t . Thus, the
central bank’s bond holdings evolve according to
BCB∗t −B
CB∗
t−1 = R
m
t I
∗
t −M
R∗
F,t −M
R
F,t.
Foreign households’ bond holdings can now be derived residually from
B∗F,t = B
T
t −BF,t −B
CB
t , which in differences reads
B∗F,t −B
∗
F,t−1 = B
T∗
t −B
T∗
t−1 − (BF,t −BF,t−1)−
(
BCB∗t −B
CB∗
t−1
)
.
Plugging in central bank bond holdings (5.45) yields
B∗F,t −B
∗
F,t−1 = (Γ− 1)B
T ∗
t−1 − (BF,t −BF,t−1)−
(
Rmt I
∗
t −M
R∗
F,t −M
R
F,t
)
.
(5.46)
Monetary policy is assumed to conduct repurchase operations amounting
to, MR∗F,t +M
R
F,t = Ω
(
M∗F,t +MF,t
)
. Further, the foreign policy rate follows
an interest rate rule similar to that in the home economy
Rm∗t = R
m∗(1−ρ)
(
Rm∗t−1
)ρ(π∗t
π∗
)w∗π(1−ρ)(y∗t
y∗
)wy(1−ρR)
exp(ε∗t )
ρ, (5.47)
where ε∗t is independently identically distributed. This closes the descrip-
tion of the foreign economy.
5.2.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium markets clear, i.e. nt =
∫ 1
0
nt(j)dj, yH,t = cH,t + c∗H,t, and
for the foreign economy n∗t =
∫ 1
0
n∗t (k)dk and y
∗
t = c
∗
F,t = c
∗
t because the
home economy’s imports cF,t are considered quantitatively negligible for
the foreign economy. Further, private debt in both economies is in zero
net supply, so that DF,t = −D∗F,t and Dt = 0, because foreign households
do not invest into home private debt. Throughout, I assume that the
central banks in both countries set their instruments so that the cash in
advance constraints (5.3), (5.4) and (5.30) bind (ψH,t, ψF,t, ψ
∗
t > 0). I
further assume that the share of repurchase agreements in money holdings
is identical in both economies, so that the amounts of bonds repurchased by
home and foreign households are given byMRF,t = ΩMF,t andM
R∗
F,t = ΩM
∗
F,t.
Therefore, home households’ holdings of foreign money are given by
MF,t=MF,t−1 + IF,t − P
∗
F,tcF,t + PH,tc
∗
H,t/St −M
R
F,t
=PH,tc
∗
H,t/St −M
R
F,t, (5.48)
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where the second equality uses the binding cash in advance constraint for
the home economy’s imports.50 Further, when (5.4) binds, households in
the small economy hold domestic currency amounting to
Mt = PH,tcH,t. (5.49)
Foreign households’ currency holdings are given by M ∗F,t = M
∗
F,t−1 + I
∗
F,t −
P ∗F,tc
∗
F,t + P
∗
t w
∗
tn
∗
t + P
∗
t δ
∗
t −M
R∗
F,t . Using that foreign firms distribute their
revenues entirely to foreign households, this simplifies to
M ∗F,t = M
∗
F,t−1 + I
∗
F,t − ΩM
∗
F,t. (5.50)
Capital account, trade balance and the real exchange rate The
evolution of net foreign asset holdings can be determined by using the home
household’s budget constraint, which reads
Mt (Rt − 1) + St
BF,t
R∗t
+ St
DF,t
RD∗t
+ PH,tcH,t + StP
∗
F,tcF,t + StIF,t (R
m∗
t − 1)
=StMF,t−1 + StBF,t−1 + StDF,t−1 + Ptwtnt + Ptδt + Ptτ t − StMF,t,
using that home private debt is in zero net supply. Further, home firms
distribute all revenues as dividends and wages to home households, leading
to Ptwtnt+Ptδt = PH,tyH,t = PH,tcH,t+PH,tc∗H,t. Using this and the public
sector’s budget constraint (5.44) yields
St
BF,t
R∗t
− StBF,t−1 + St
DF,t
RD∗t
− StDF,t−1 + StMF,t − StMF,t−1 (5.51)
=PH,tc
∗
H,t − StP
∗
F,tcF,t − StIF,t (R
m∗
t − 1) .
Thus, the foreign country receives interest payments from home house-
holds’ participation in open market operations. Except for this, the capital
account is standard: The change in net foreign asset holdings of domes-
tic households equals the current account, which consists of interest rate
payments and the trade balance. The trade balance in terms of the home
consumption basket is given by
tbt =
PH,t
Pt
c∗H,t −
StP ∗F,tcF,t
Pt
= qt (η
∗c∗t − cF,t) . (5.52)
50The reason why exports appear is that they are paid for in foreign currency. Thus,
households in the small open economy receive a share of dividends and wages in foreign
currency. This share is given by PH,tc∗H,t/St. The remaining amount Ptwtnt + Ptδt −
PH,tc∗H,t is received in domestic currency.
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Further, (5.19) can be rewritten by using the law of one price and the
assumption of a large foreign economy, which implies that PF,t = StP ∗F,t =
StP ∗t . Using the definition of the real exchange rate,
qt =
StP ∗t
Pt
=
PF,t
Pt
. (5.53)
Thus, (5.19) can be rewritten as PH,t
Pt
= Φ
1
η−1
t q
η
η−1
t , which in differences reads
πt = πH,t
(
Φt
Φt−1
) 1
1−η
(
qt
qt−1
) η
1−η
, (5.54)
where Φt =
[(λt+µt)R
m
t ]
η(λt+ψH,t)
1−η
c−σt
.
Binding cash and open market constraints With the exception of
section 5.3.1, I only consider equilibria where the open market constraints
in both economies bind. In steady state, this is guaranteed by Rm∗ < π
∗
β∗
.51
This implies that money injections are given by households’ holdings of
foreign government bonds,
IF,t=
BF,t−1
Rm∗t
, (5.55)
I∗F,t=
B∗F,t−1
Rm∗t
. (5.56)
Further, binding open market constraints in both economies imply that
total injections are given by I∗t =
B∗F,t−1+BF,t−1
Rm∗t
, so that foreign households’
bond holdings evolve according to
B∗F,t = (Γ− 1)B
T ∗
t−1 −BF,t +ΩM
∗
F,t +ΩMF,t. (5.57)
A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct, cF,t, cH,t, nt,
PH,t, Pt,Mt, St, qt,MF,t, IF,t,DF,t, BF,t, wt, λt, ψH,t, ψF,t, µt, yH,t,mct, Z
1
t , Z
2
t ,
st, Rt, c∗t , c
∗
H,t, n
∗
t , P
∗
t , λ
∗
t , ψ
∗
t , µ
∗
t ,M
∗
F,t, I
∗
F,t,B
∗
F,t, B
T∗
t , R
m∗
t , R
D∗
t , R
∗
t , w
∗
t ,mc
∗
t ,
y∗t , Z
1∗
t , Z
2∗
t , s
∗
t}
∞
t=0 satisfying the households’ and firms’ first order condi-
tions including the transversality conditions, the open market constraints
(5.1) and (5.2), binding cash in advance constraints (5.3), (5.4) and (5.5),
51For a derivation of this property, see Appendix D.3.
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the households’ holdings of foreign and home currency and foreign bonds,
(5.48), (5.50) and (5.46), the capital account (5.51), the definition of the
real exchange rate (5.53) and the home CPI (5.54) and PPI (5.24), aggre-
gate production yH,t = cH,t + c∗H,t = nt/st and y
∗
t = c
∗
t = A
∗n∗t/s
∗
t with
price dispersion (5.26) and (5.42), export demand c∗H,t = η
∗P ∗t St/PH,tc
∗
t
and monetary policy rules (5.27) and (5.47) as well as the supply of foreign
government bonds (5.43) for given A∗ and initial values MF,−1,M∗F,−1 ≥ 0,
BF,−1, B∗F,−1, B
T∗
−1 > 0 and DF,−1 = −D
∗
F,−1, and P−1, PH,−1, P
∗
−1, S−1 > 0.
A summary of equilibrium conditions for the case of binding open market
constraints is given in Appendix D.2.
5.3 Uncovered interest rate parity
In this section, I derive the uncovered interest rate parity conditions implied
by the model economy. When open market constraints bind, the model
gives rise to a modified UIP condition, which contains a liquidity premium.
This condition collapses to the standard UIP condition when open market
constraints do not bind.
5.3.1 A standard UIP condition
Assume that µt = µ
∗
t = 0 so that the open market constraints in both
economies, (5.1) and (5.2), do not bind. In steady state, this is the case
if foreign monetary policy sets the long-run policy rate to Rm∗ = π∗/β∗.
The foreign households’ first order conditions (5.34)-(5.35) imply that in
this case, there is no spread between interest rates on private and govern-
ment debt, which must then equal the policy rate, RD∗t = R
∗
t = R
m∗
t . Thus,
there are no liquidity premiums when open market constraints do not bind.
Consider the home households’ first order conditions for investment in do-
mestic private debt and foreign government bonds, (5.14) and (5.16) which
are repeated here for convenience
λt=βEt
λt+1Rt
πt+1
,
λt=βEt
St+1
St
λt+1
πt+1
R∗t ,
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and where I have used the definition of the real exchange rate (5.53). Com-
bining the two equations yields
Rt
[
Etλt+1Etπ
−1
t+1 + Cov
(
λt+1, π
−1
t+1
)]
=
R∗t
St
{
Cov
(
λt+1St+1, π
−1
t+1
)
+ Etπ
−1
t+1 [Cov (λt+1, St+1) + EtSt+1Etλt+1]
}
.
This can be rewritten as
Et
St+1
St
=
Rt
R∗t
+Υt, (5.58)
using that the Inada conditions imply λt > 0 ∀t and where terms of order
higher than one are summarized in Υt = 1R∗tEtλt+1Etπ−1t+1
{
RtCov
(
λt+1, π
−1
t+1
)
−R
∗
t
St
Cov
(
λt+1St+1, π
−1
t+1
)
− R
∗
t
St
Etλt+1Cov (λt+1, St+1)
}
. I am not interested
in effects of order two and above and thus ignore covariance terms in the
analysis in this and the following sections. Equation (5.58) is a standard
uncovered interest rate parity condition, which can be found in many small
open economy models, such as Galí and Monacelli (2005). It requires the
expected nominal depreciation to be equal to the interest difference between
the home and foreign economies.
5.3.2 A modified UIP condition
When open market constraints bind, µt, µ
∗
t > 0, foreign government bonds
will pay a lower interest rate compared to foreign private debt. The reason is
that foreign government bonds can be exchanged into cash, which domestic
households need to purchase internationally traded goods. Consider the
domestic households’ optimality conditions for investment into domestic
and foreign private debt (5.14) and (5.15)
λt=βEt
λt+1Rt
πt+1
,
λt=βEt
St+1
St
λt+1
πt+1
RD∗t , (5.59)
where I have used the definition of the real exchange rate. Combining
these two equations, summarizing terms of higher order in Υ′t and using
that λt > 0 yields
Et
St+1
St
=
Rt
RD∗t
+Υ′t, (5.60)
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whereΥ′t =
1
RD∗t Etλt+1Etπ
−1
t+1
{
RtCov
(
λt+1, π
−1
t+1
)
− R
D∗
t
St
[
Cov
(
λt+1St+1, π
−1
t+1
)
+Etπ
−1
t+1Cov (λt+1, St+1)
]}
. Thus, a standard UIP condition holds with re-
spect to the interest rate difference in terms of the foreign debt rate RD∗t .
This rate is usually not observable. To obtain a UIP condition in the ob-
servable interest rate difference of home to foreign government bonds, I use
the domestic households’ optimality condition for investment into foreign
government bonds, λt = βEt
St+1
St
λt+1+µt+1
πt+1
R∗t . Combining this with (5.59)
gives
RtEt
λt+1
πt+1
=
R∗t
St
EtSt+1
θt+1
πt+1
,
which can be written as
Rt
[
Etλt+1Etπ
−1
t+1 + Cov
(
λt+1, π
−1
t+1
)]
=
R∗t
St
{
Cov
(
π−1t+1, St+1θt+1
)
+ Etπ
−1
t+1 [Cov (St+1, θt+1) + EtSt+1Etθt+1]
}
.
This yields a modified UIP condition,
Et
St+1
St
=
Rt
R∗t θt
+Υ′′t , (5.61)
where θt =
(
1 + Et
µt+1
λt+1
)
and with terms of higher order summarized in
Υ′′t =
1
R∗t θtEtλt+1Etπ
−1
t+1
{
RtCov
(
λt+1, π
−1
t+1
)
− R
∗
t
St
Cov
(
π−1t+1, St+1θt+1
)
−R
∗
t
St
Etπ
−1
t+1Cov (St+1, θt+1)
}
. Thus, the interest rate difference between
home and foreign government bonds is not the only determinant of ex-
change rate behavior. When the open market constraint in the home econ-
omy binds, µt > 0, the term θt exceeds unity, reflecting the liquidity value
of foreign government bonds. (5.60) and (5.61) imply that
θt =
RD∗t
R∗t
(1 + Υ′′′t ) , (5.62)
where Υ′′′t = (Υ
′
t −Υ
′′
t ) summarizes higher order terms. The interest rate
spread RD∗t /R
∗
t represents the opportunity cost of holding foreign govern-
ment bonds, which in equilibrium, up to first order, will be equal to the
premium θt. This premium captures the marginal liquidity value of holding
foreign government bonds and will thus be called a liquidity premium.
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5.4 Monetary policy and exchange rates
The goal of this section is to analyze the response of the exchange rate
to a foreign monetary policy shock when open market constraints bind, so
that a non-standard UIP condition holds. Further, I analyze a log-linear
approximation to the equilibrium conditions around the model’s steady
state, which is derived in Appendix B.3. Let xˆt = 100 log(xt/x) denote the
percentage deviation of xt from its steady state x. The linearized version
of (5.61) then reads
EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt = Rˆt − Rˆ
∗
t − θˆt, (5.63)
where θˆt = RˆD∗t − Rˆ
∗
t . The liquidity premium can be reexpressed as a
function of the policy rate using that (5.35) and (5.36) imply Rˆ∗t = EtRˆ
m∗
t+1,
so that
θˆt = Rˆ
D∗
t − EtRˆ
m∗
t+1. (5.64)
Because a closed form solution for the general model version cannot be
derived, I analyze a simplified model version.
5.4.1 Flexible prices
Assume flexible prices in the foreign economy, so that (5.37) becomes w∗t =
A∗ and (5.38)-(5.40) become redundant. Further, assume a utility function
of the form u (c∗t , n
∗
t ) = log c
∗
t − χ
∗n∗t and an exogenous instrument rule
for the foreign policy rate, Rm∗t = (R
m∗)1−ρ
∗ (
Rm∗t−1
)ρ∗
exp ε∗t .
52 Moreover,
nominal growth of foreign government debt is given by Γ∗ = 1, and the
central bank targets zero steady state inflation, π∗ = 1.53 Further, I assume
52Note that the model does not imply equilibrium indeterminacy under an interest
rate peg, which would be the case in a standard small open economy model. The reason
is that the supply of collateral determines the price level path in the long run and thus
prevents indeterminacy.
53Existence of a steady state then requires a long-run policy rate of Rm∗ = 1 because
a positive policy rate in the steady state would imply that the central bank in every
period acquires a share of households’ bond holdings. With a constant supply of bonds,
this would imply that foreign households’ holdings of foreign government bonds, and
thus foreign consumption, would converge to zero. Note that in principle, the central
bank could also target an inflation rate different from zero, as long as π > β∗ so that
the cash constraints in both economies continue to bind. For a steady state to exist,
the policy rate then must satisfy Rm∗ = (Ω/(Ωπ∗ + π∗ − 1)). For details, see Appendix
D.3.2.
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that the impact of home households’ holdings of foreign government bonds
on foreign households’ holdings B∗F,t is negligible, so that (5.57) collapses
to B∗F,t = ΩM
∗
F,t. This implies that the foreign allocation and price system
are independent from the home economy.
It can be shown that a shock to the foreign policy rate Rm∗t leads to an
increase in the interest rate on foreign government debt which is more than
compensated by a decline in the liquidity premium. Intuitively, the rising
foreign policy rate makes it more costly to exchange government bonds for
cash, so that the marginal liquidity value of holding foreign government
bonds declines. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1 Consider the simplified model version. A foreign mon-
etary policy shock then leads to a decline in the liquidity premium which
is larger than the rise in the interest rate on foreign government bonds,
θˆt > Rˆ∗t .
Proof. See Appendix D.4.
I now turn to exchange rate dynamics. Proposition 5.1 shows that in
response to a contractionary foreign policy shock, the liquidity premium
declines and overcompensates the rise in the government bond interest rate.
Thus, at a constant home interest rate, the expected rate of depreciation
EtSˆt+1− Sˆt increases in order to compensate for the lower marginal benefit
of investing into foreign government bonds. This result is in stark contrast
to standard UIP conditions, which predict that a rise in the foreign interest
rate (which in a standard model is identical to the foreign policy rate) leads
to a decline in the expected rate of depreciation. This result is summarized
in the following:
Corollary 5.2 Consider the effect of a rise in the foreign policy rate on
exchange rates given a constant home interest rate in the simplified model
version. When the open market constraints do not bind, a rise in R∗t leads to
a decline in the expected rate of appreciation of the home currency, EtSˆt+1−
Sˆt < 0. Under binding open market constraints, a positive shock to the
foreign policy rate implies that the expected rate of depreciation is positive,
EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt > 0.
To summarize, the liquidity premium leads to a modified UIP condition.
Using a simplified version of the model presented in 5.2, I have shown that
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endogenous movements in the liquidity premium can alter exchange rate
dynamics to an extent that the sign of the exchange rate change can switch.
This is in line with the empirical evidence by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995)
and Scholl and Uhlig (2008), who find that a foreign monetary shock lets
the home currency depreciate for several quarters. Because it is difficult
to derive analytical results for the full version of the model, I analyze a
calibrated version in the next section.
5.4.2 Sticky prices
This section analyzes a calibrated version of the model economy with sticky
prices in both economies, using a first-order approximation of the model’s
equilibrium conditions around the steady state.54 Foreign monetary policy
is assumed to set the long-run policy rate according to Rm∗ < π
∗
β
and
targets long-run inflation π∗ > β∗ , so that the the open market and cash
constraints in the home and the foreign economy bind in steady state (see
Appendix D.3). I analyze the model in a local neighborhood of the steady
state where shocks are sufficiently small so that open market and cash
constraints continue to bind. Households in both economies are assumed
to maximize utility functions of the form
u (ct, nt) =
c1−σt − 1
1− σ
− χ
n1+ωt
1 + ω
, (5.65)
u (c∗t , n
∗
t ) = υ
c∗
t
c∗1−σ
∗
t − 1
1− σ∗
− χ∗
n∗1+ω
∗
t
1 + ω∗
, (5.66)
where υc∗t is a shock to the marginal utility of consumption with a steady
state value of unity.
Calibration
Table 5.1 summarizes the calibration. With respect to the intertemporal
substitution elasticity of consumption goods and the Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, I choose σ = σ∗ = 1.5 and ω = ω∗ = 1, which I consider a
reasonable trade-off between diverging estimates resulting from microeco-
nomic and macroeconomic data: Card (1994) suggests a range of 0.2 to
0.5 for the Frisch elasticity while Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate it to
54The full set of (non-linearised) equilibrium conditions can be found in Appendix
D.2.
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Discount Factor β = β∗ = 0.9889
Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity σ = σ∗ = 1.5
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply ω = ω∗ = 1
Openness home economy η = 0.27
Openness foreign economy η∗ = 0.01
Subst. elasticity home and foreign varieties ε = ε∗ = 10
Calvo price stickiness φ = 0.85; φ∗ = 0.75
Taylor rule coefficients - Inflation wπ = w∗π = 2
Taylor rule coefficients - Output wy = 0.2, w∗y = 0.1
Interest rate inertia ρ = 0.88; ρ∗ = 0.80
Share of repos to outright purchases Ω = 1.5
Steady state inflation Γ = 1.00575 = π∗ = π
Steady state foreign policy rate Rm∗ = 1.0105
Steady state labor supply n = n∗ = 0.33
Foreign labor productivity A∗ = 10
Home net foreign asset position relative
to imports (steady steady)
bF+dF+mF
cF
= −1
Table 5.1: Paramater calibration
ω = 1.92. With respect to the intertemporal substitutability of consump-
tion, Barsky, Kimball, Juster, and Shapiro (1997) estimate an elasticity of
0.18 using micro data, implying a value of around 5 for σ. Macroeonomic
data generally implies lower estimates, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007) esti-
mate σ = 1.39. I further choose χ and χ∗ to calibrate working time in both
economies to n = n∗ = 0.33. Foreign labor productivity is set to A∗ = 10,
so that the relative size of the economies matches the ratio of Canadian to
U.S. gross domestic product. I follow Justiniano and Preston’s (2010) esti-
mate of openness and price stickiness for Canada, η = 0.27 and φ = 0.85.
With respect to the foreign economy, I choose φ∗ = 0.75 as a compromise
between the estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano and Prim-
iceri (2008) and Justiniano and Preston (2010) for the United States, which
range between 0.65 and 0.90. Monetary policy in both countries sets the
interest rate according to a Taylor rule, where home policy is calibrated to
wπ = 2, wy = 0.2 and ρ = 0.88, as estimated by Justiniano and Preston
(2010) for the Canadian economy. In the foreign economy, monetary pol-
icy is characterized by w∗π = 2, w
∗
y = 0.1 and ρ
∗ = 0.80, which is in line
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with Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), who
estimate models with Bayesian techniques using U.S. data. The parameter
Ω is chosen to match the observed share of reserves supplied in repurchase
operations to total reserves, as in Reynard and Schabert (2009). The long-
run inflation rate and the policy rate in the foreign economy are set to the
20-year averages of U.S. consumer price inflation and, respectively, the Fed-
eral Funds rate, π∗ = 1.00575 and Rm∗ = 1.0105. The home central bank
is assumed to adopt an identical long-run inflation target, π = π∗. The
discount factor is assumed to be equal across both countries and calibrated
to the liquidity premium, i.e. the spread between the debt rate RD∗ and the
rate on foreign government bonds R∗. The debt rate is the interest rate on
a safe but illiquid bond. I follow Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2007) and
calibrate the spread to 65 basis points, which equals the difference between
the interest rate faced by high-quality (AAA) borrowers and the interest
rate on 3 months Treasury bills. Because there is no asset without any
liquidity value, it is likely that this figure underestimates the true liquidity
premium. Thus, the discount factor is set to β = π
Rm+65·10−4
= 0.9889.
Further, the home economy is assumed to be a net debtor in steady state,
with debt equivalent to 100% of the home country’s quarterly imports,
bF+dF+mF
cF
= −1. This is in line with the ratio of Canadian foreign debt
to average imports over the past 20 years and leads to a ratio of debt to
domestic absorption of 9%, as in Bouakez and Rebei (2008).55
Responses to a shock to the foreign policy rate
This section analyzes the impact of a foreign monetary policy shock. Figure
5.1 shows the impact of a 12.5 basis point innovation to Rm∗t on the foreign
economy. All variables are in per cent deviations from steady state, ẑt =
100 [log(zt)− log(z)] , except for interest rates and inflation, which are given
in absolute deviations, Rˆ∗t = 100 ∗ (R
∗
t −R
∗) . The increase in the foreign
policy rate induces a decline in foreign consumption and a reduction in
inflation in the foreign economy. Consumption responds in a hump-shaped
way because a rising policy rate increases seigniorage and thus reduces
households’ bond holdings, which implies that consumption declines with
a lag. Further, the increase in the policy rate reduces the liquidity value
of government bonds, so that the interest rate on these rises. The nominal
55Data on imports and net foreign debt were taken from Statistics Canada, Publica-
tions 67-202-X and 13-019-X.
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Figure 5.1: Responses to a foreign monetary policy shock in the foreign
economy
interest rate on private debt declines because inflation falls.
Figure 5.2 shows the responses of the home economy. The foreign inter-
est rate shock affects the home economy through different channels. First,
it renders imports more expensive because foreign currency becomes more
costly. Further, the decline in foreign consumption reduces export demand
and implies that the home currency devalues both in nominal and real
terms. This makes imports even more expensive for domestic households,
who reduce consumption and increase worked hours, so that production
rises. Turning attention to the exchange rate, a pattern different from that
implied by standard models is observed: The nominal exchange rate depre-
ciates on impact, and continues to depreciate until it peaks in the seventh
quarter, consistent with Corollary 5.2. Thus, the model predicts delayed
overshooting in line with the analysis by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and
Scholl and Uhlig (2008). The driving force behind delayed overshooting is
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Figure 5.2: Responses to a foreign monetary policy shock in the home
economy
the liquidity premium. A rising foreign policy rate implies that govern-
ment bonds become less liquid, so that the liquidity premium declines. As
in Proposition 5.1, the decline in the liquidity premium exceeds the increase
in the foreign government bond interest rate.
With respect to the real exchange rate, the model does not predict
delayed overshooting: In real terms, the domestic currency depreciates on
impact, peaks in the shock period and then appreciates gradually back to-
ward its steady state. The reason for the divergence between nominal and
real exchange rates is the persistent decline in foreign inflation, which im-
plies that the real rate of depreciation is negative while the rate of nominal
depreciation is positive in the shock period. In line with the high observed
correlation between real and nominal exchange rates, the VAR evidence
quoted above predicts delayed overshooting for both the nominal and the
real exchange rate. Although the key currency model does not predict
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delayed overshooting for the real exchange rate, the liquidity premium in-
creases the rate of real appreciation, so that real exchange rate movements
are closer to the pattern observed by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and
Scholl and Uhlig (2008), as predicted by standard UIP.
Comparing exchange rate dynamics to standard UIP
This section compares exchange rate dynamics to those predicted by a stan-
dard UIP condition. In principle, the model without binding open market
constraints is characterized by such a standard UIP. However, analyzing
the impact of a shock to the foreign policy rate within the model without
binding open market constraints would imply that, apart from the differ-
ent UIP condition, general equilibrium effects would affect exchange rate
movements. For instance, the reaction of inflation in the foreign economy
would be different due to differences in monetary transmission. Thus, I
construct a counterfactual scenario which shows how exchange rates would
behave under a standard UIP condition, all other things equal.56 Denoting
ex ante real interest rates as rˆt = Rˆt − Etπˆt+1 and rˆ∗t = Rˆ
∗
t − Etπˆ
∗
t+1, time
series for the expected nominal and real exchange rates are constructed
from standard UIP conditions
EtSˆt+1 − Sˆt= Rˆt − Rˆ
∗
t ,
Etqˆt+1 − qˆt= rˆt − rˆ
∗
t ,
where the series for Rˆt − Rˆ∗t and rˆt − rˆ
∗
t are given by the responses to a
foreign policy rate shock in the model with liquidity premiums. These are
compared to the exchange rate movements which result when taking into
account the liquidity premium, which are identical to those presented in
Figure 5.2. Figure 5.3 shows the results of this analysis.
Under a conventional UIP, a rise in the foreign interest rate leads to an
impact nominal depreciation, followed by a persistent appreciation. This is
Dornbusch’s (1976) famous "overshooting" result: The nominal exchange
rate jumps on impact after a monetary shock and overshoots its new long-
run equilibrium value. Given that the decline in the nominal interest rate
56"All other things" also refers to the long-run equilibrium values for the nominal and
real exchange rates. In other words, I assume that in the counterfactual scenario, the
nominal and real exchange rates converge to long-run equilibrium values identical to
those in the model with liquidity premiums. This assumption is required to compute
the impact response of the exchange rates in the counterfactual scenario.
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of exchange rate dynamics under standard and
modified UIP
on foreign government bonds under sticky prices implies a decline in the
real interest rate, the standard UIP condition predicts overshooting for the
real exchange rate as well.
Taking into account movements of the liquidity premium fundamentally
affects exchange rate dynamics: An increase in the foreign policy rate re-
duces the liquidity premium and leads to an impact depreciation of the
domestic currency, as before. However, because the liquidity premium falls
more strongly than the interest rate difference for the first seven quarters,
in nominal terms the domestic currency continues to depreciate for seven
quarters. Thus, the liquidity premium reverses the sign of the expected
rate of nominal depreciation, compared to a standard UIP. Apart from the
pattern of the response, also the timing of the peak, which occurs in the
seventh quarter is in line with the estimates by Scholl and Uhlig (2008),
who find that the median of the peak in the exchange rates of the U.S. dol-
lar to the currencies of Germany, the U.K., Japan and a G7 basket occurs
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after 17-36 months.
The response of the real exchange rate under the modified UIP condition
depends on real interest rates in both countries and the liquidity premium.
The foreign monetary policy shock leads to a persistent decline in foreign
inflation, which implies that the foreign real interest rate (on government
bonds) increases more strongly than its nominal counterpart. Figure 4
shows that this leads to a decline in the real interest rate difference which
slightly exceeds the decline in the liquidity premium, so that the real ex-
change rate will appreciate and return toward its steady state after its peak
in the first period. Thus, the pattern of the real exchange rate’s response to
a foreign monetary policy shock under the modified UIP condition is similar
to standard UIP. However, the decline in the liquidity premium moderates
the appreciation after the peak, so that the predictions of the modified
UIP condition become closer to the empirical evidence, which finds delayed
overshooting for nominal and real exchange rates. To summarize, the nom-
inal exchange rate predictions of the key currency model are in line with
the empirical evidence. However, with respect to the real exchange rate, it
cannot reconcile theory and evidence.
5.4.3 An exchange rate peg
This section asks how the modified UIP condition derived in this chapter
affects the international transmission of foreign shocks when monetary pol-
icy in the small home economy is characterized by an exchange rate peg.
This implies that the home interest rate follows
Rˆt = Rˆ
∗
t + θˆt, (5.67)
which characterizes arbitrage freeness between investment into home and
foreign assets. (5.67) implies that the interest rate on foreign government
bonds is not a sufficient indicator for the stance of monetary policy imposed
upon the peg country. Rather, apart from the foreign interest rate, move-
ments in the liquidity premium have an impact on home interest rates as
well. The implications of this setup are examined more closely by analyzing
the response of the home economy to a foreign demand shock. To examine
how modeling key currency liquidity affects the international transmission
of shocks, I compare these results to the impact of an increase in foreign
consumption in a simplified version of the small open economy model by
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Galí and Monacelli (2005). I rely on linear approximations of both models
around the steady state.
Appendix D.5 shows that, in a simplified two-country version of Galí
and Monacelli (2005), denoted GM in the following, a shock to foreign con-
sumption leads to a real appreciation of the home currency, an increase in
home consumption and a decline in production and producer price inflation
in the home country. Rising foreign consumption increases export demand
in the small open economy, triggering a real appreciation of the home cur-
rency. This leads to an expenditure switching effect, which implies that
home households raise imports and reduce consumption of domestically
produced goods. In the home economy, the decline in domestic demand
outweighs the increase in export demand, so that production falls. How-
ever, the increase in imports due to the real appreciation permits households
in the small open economy to increase total consumption.
Now, I turn to the impact of a shock to foreign households’ valuation of
consumption in the key currency model. I assume that υc∗t is given by the
exogenous process υc∗t =
(
υc∗t−1
)ρc exp (εct) with an autocorrelation of ρc =
0.75 and where εct is i.i.d. withEt−1εt = 0 and a constant standard deviation
σc = 0.083, as estimated by Christensen and Dib (2008) for the United
States.57 It is further assumed that foreign monetary policy is given by an
interest rate peg, Rm∗t = R
m∗. Figure 5.4 shows the impulse responses to a
foreign demand shock which increases the marginal utility of consumption.
In response to the shock, foreign households increase labor supply, so that
wages and inflation decline. In the home country, the exchange rate peg
leads to an increase in the interest rate. The reason is that rising demand
in the foreign economy increases demand for foreign currency, so that the
liquidity premium rises. Thus, despite a constant interest rate on foreign
government bonds, which follows the pegged policy rate, monetary policy
in the home economy is tightened to prevent a nominal depreciation of
the home currency. This policy induces a decline in domestic demand
57Note that this shock conceptually differs from the shock to foreign consumption
analyzed above. The latter represents an exogenous increase in consumption, whose
origin is not explained. In contrast, the shock to the foreign valuation of consumption is
a change in preferences, which in equilibrium leads to an increase in foreign consumption.
This shock also affects other variables in the foreign economy. However, the solution
of the GM model derived in the appendix does not require any restrictions on foreign
variables except for the foreign nominal interest rate, which is assumed to be constant
in line with the pegged policy rate in the key currency model.
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Figure 5.4: Impulse responses to a foreign demand shock
with the result that both production and consumption in the small open
economy fall. This causes a decline in PPI and CPI inflation which is more
pronounced than the decline in foreign inflation. Thus, the home currency
devalues in real terms.
This result is in stark contrast to the GM model. The main differences
lie in the exchange rate dynamics implied by both models and in the ex-
tent of expenditure switching they permit. In the GM model, increased
export demand leads to a real appreciation, which induces domestic house-
holds to substitute toward foreign goods, triggering an increase in imports.
However, when the supply of key currency is collateral constrained, home
consumption of foreign goods cannot increase at the same time that foreign
consumption rises. Increased scarcity of the key currency is reflected in a
rising liquidity premium, which leads to a real depreciation of the home
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currency. This mechanism prevents the expenditure switching observed in
the GM model, so that imports decline. This effect, combined with tight
domestic monetary policy implies that in the key currency model, domes-
tic demand for both foreign and home goods, and thus aggregate domestic
consumption, decline.
To summarize, key currency pricing and liquidity premiums can fun-
damentally affect the international transmission of shocks. This is most
obvious under an exchange rate peg, where movements in the liquidity pre-
mium are transmitted directly to the home interest rate. However, this
influence is also present under a flexible exchange rate regime, where the
liquidity premium influences exchange rate dynamics and thus the relative
price of international goods according to the modified UIP condition (5.61).
In both cases, the international transmission of shocks is changed. In par-
ticular, the responses of interest rates and exchange rates are affected.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter asks if the leading role of the U.S. dollar in international
trade can explain observed deviations from uncovered interest rate parity,
focusing on the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates. The
model implies that U.S. government bonds trade at a premium because
they serve as collateral in the Federal Reserve’s open market operations.
I augment the setup of Reynard and Schabert (2009) and show that U.S.
government bonds are held by agents outside the United States despite
lower interest rates because they facilitate access to liquid dollar funds,
which are required to carry out purchases of internationally traded goods.
This chapter shows that key currency effects give rise to liquidity pre-
miums which imply deviations from uncovered interest rate parity. In line
with the empirical evidence by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Scholl
and Uhlig (2008), the model predicts delayed overshooting of the exchange
rate in response to a monetary policy shock: When the Federal Reserve
increases its policy rate, the interest rate on U.S. government bonds rises.
However, the liquidity value of U.S. government bonds declines because it
becomes more costly to obtain liquidity in exchange for these bonds. It is
shown both analytically and in a calibrated version of the model economy
that this decline in the liquidity value more than compensates the increase
in the government bond interest rate, so that the marginal value of invest-
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ing into U.S. government bonds falls. This implies that the expected rate
of appreciation of the dollar increases. The calibrated model predicts an
exchange rate peak after 7 quarters, which is in line with the findings of
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) and Scholl and Uhlig (2008). With respect
to the real exchange rate, the model does not predict delayed overshooting.
The reason is that inflation in the United States declines in response to
the contractionary monetary policy, which turns the expected real rate of
appreciation of the dollar negative. Features that reduce the speed of price
adjustment, such as sticky import prices in the home economy, might con-
tribute to further align evidence and theory with respect to real exchange
rates.
This chapter further demonstrates the implications of modeling key cur-
rency liquidity for the transmission of international shocks, assuming for
purposes of illustration that the central bank in the small open economy
implements an exchange rate peg. A demand shock in the foreign econ-
omy then induces upward pressure on interest rates in the home country,
even absent any change in the foreign policy rate, triggering a recession
in the home economy. The reason is that increasing foreign demand leads
to increased scarcity of key currency liquidity, implying rising liquidity
premiums. This implies that the setup considered in this chapter funda-
mentally changes the international transmission of shocks. In particular,
interest rates and exchange rates are affected by key currency effects. This
is important because Justiniano and Preston (2010) attribute deficits of
estimated New Keynesian models in explaining the international transmis-
sion of shocks to their problems in capturing exchange rate movements. It
is outside the scope of this chapter to answer the question if estimating a
model along the lines of this chapter can remove this deficit. However, I con-
sider research into this direction promising because the liquidity premium
considered in the present chapter has interesting quantitative properties:
It fundamentally changes the predictions of standard uncovered interest
rate parity in response to a monetary policy shock and can account for a
hump-shaped response of consumption, as demonstrated by Reynard and
Schabert (2009).
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation consists of applications and extensions of New Keyne-
sian models which address a variety of research questions, proceeding from
normative analysis of monetary policy in the second and third chapters to
positive analysis in the latter chapters. Broadly understood, chapters 2 and
3 can be considered as a statement of caution toward policy makers and
researchers which take the current consensus regarding the performance of
Taylor rules as an irrevocable truth. Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate the
potential of the new neoclassical synthesis. Drawing on the basic idea of
Reynard and Schabert (2009), they present applications of New Keynesian
models which model monetary policy more carefully. The wide applicabil-
ity of the framework by Reynard and Schabert (2009) is illustrated by this
research, which covers topics ranging from unconventional monetary policy
to the impact of monetary policy shocks on exchange rates. Apart from
such positive analyses, research on the optimality of using the additional
instruments available in this setup is promising. Its strict microfoundation
makes a thorough welfare evaluation of monetary and fiscal policy in this
model possible.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Discretionary policy
Under discretion, the CB minimizes its loss function w.r.t. πˆt and xˆt,
treating expectations as given: min
πˆt,xˆt
1
2
Et
∑∞
i=0 β
i
{
πˆ2t+i + λxˆ
2
t+i
}
, subject to
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1+κxˆt+ut. It is well established that the first order conditions
for πˆt and xˆt under discretion lead to the targeting rule πˆt = −λκ xˆt (see
Woodford (2003)). Using the generic solution form πˆt = auut and xˆt = buut
and plugging it into the Euler equation leads to Rˆt = [buσ(ρ− 1) + ρau] ut.
Further using ut = πˆtau and that the target rule implies
au
bu
= −λ
κ
yields
Rˆt =
(
κ
λ
σ(1− ρ) + ρ
)
πˆt, which with κλ = ǫ leads to Rˆt = [ǫσ(1− ρ) + ρ] πˆt
which is the policy used in section 2.2.1.
A.2 Unconditional moments
Given the state space form for πˆt in (2.4), the unconditional variance of πˆt,
V arπˆt, can be computed by
V arπˆt = a
2
πV arπˆt−1 + a
2
uV ar ut + 2aπauCov(ut,πˆt−1).
We use that the unconditional expectation of ut satisfies E(ut) = 0, so that
Cov(ut,πˆt−1) = E(utπˆt−1). We thus need to derive E(utπˆt−1). First iterate
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ut and πˆt−1 backwards to obtain
ut= ρ
tu0 +
t−1∑
s=0
ρsεt−s,
πˆt−1= a
t
ππˆ−1 + a
t−1
π auu0 +
t−2∑
s=0
asπau
(
ρt−1−su0 +
t−2−s∑
j=0
ρjεt−1−s−j
)
.
Computing E(utπˆt−1) from these expressions and using E(εnεm) = 0 ∀
n = m yields
E(utπˆt−1) = ρ
tatπE(u0πˆ−1) + ρ
tat−1π auE
(
u20
)
+ ρ2t−1au
1− (aπ/ρ)
t−1
1− (aπ/ρ)
E
(
u20
)
+E
t−2∑
s=0
asπau
t−2−s∑
j=0
ε2t−1−s−jρ
s+1+2j. (A.1)
We now simplify the last term in (A.1) by applying the formula for finite
geometric sums. This yields
t−2∑
s=0
asπau
t−2−s∑
j=0
ε2t−1−s−jρ
s+1+2j =
(
auρ
t−2∑
s=0
(aπρ)
s
t−2−s∑
j=0
ρ2j
)
σ2ε
= σ2εauρ
t−2∑
s=0
(aπρ)
s 1− ρ
2(t−1−s)
1− ρ2
= σ2ε
auρ
1− ρ2
1− (aπρ)t−1
1− aπρ
− ρ2t−2
1−
(
aπ
ρ
)t−1
1− aπ
ρ
 .
where we used that the unconditional expectation E (ε2t ) = V ar ε = σ
2
ε.
Substituting out the sums in (A.1) and using that stationarity of u and πˆ
implies E(u0πˆ−1) = E(utπˆt−1), we obtain
E(utπˆt−1) =
1
1− ρtatπ

ρtat−1π au
1− ρ2
σ2ε +
ρ2t−1au
1− ρ2
1−
(
aπ
ρ
)t−1
1−
(
aπ
ρ
) σ2ε

+
σ2ε auρ1− ρ2
1− (aπρ)t−1
1− aπρ
− ρ2t−2
1−
(
aπ
ρ
)t−1
1− aπ
ρ


 ,
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where we used E (u20) = V ar u =
σ2ε
1−ρ2
. Cancelling identical terms and
expanding the first term by (1− aπρ) produces
E(utπˆt−1)=
auρ
1− ρtatπ
[
(ρaπ)
t−1 − (ρaπ)
t
1− ρ2
1
1− aπρ
+
1
1− ρ2
1− (aπρ)
t−1
1− aπρ
]
σ2ε
=
1
1− ρtatπ
auρ
(1− ρ2) (1− aπρ)
{[
1− ρtatπ
]
σ2ε
}
.
This expression can be simplified to yield
Cov(u, πˆ) = au
ρ
(1− ρ2) (1− aπρ)
σ2ε, where Cov(u, πˆ) = E(utπˆt−1).
Using this and that stationarity of πˆ implies V ar πˆt = V ar πˆt−1 = V ar
πˆ, we can compute the unconditional variance of inflation as V ar πˆ =
1
1−a2π
[a2uV ar u+ 2aπauCov(u, πˆ)].
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Equilibrium conditions
This section contains derivations of the model’s equilibrium conditions con-
cerning inflation and price dispersion. It further presents the model’s fiscal
policy, derives the aggregate resource constraint and closes with a summary
of the model.
B.1.1 Inflation, price dispersion and fiscal policy
Inflation
Inflation can be derived from the definition of the price index, which is
given by P 1−εt =
∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di. To show this, use that reoptimizing firms all
set identical prices Zt. Further, the share of firms which were allowed to
reoptimize k periods ago is φk(1− φ) which allows to write the price index
as
P 1−εt =
∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
=(1− φ)
[
Z1−εt + φZ
1−ε
t−1 + φ
2Z1−εt−2 + ...
]
.
Lagging this expression by one period and pre-multiplying with φ gives
φP 1−εt−1 = (1− φ)
[
φZ1−εt−1 + φ
2Z1−εt−2 + φ
3Z1−εt−3 + ...
]
,
so that the price index follows
P 1−εt = (1− φ)Z
1−ε
t + φP
1−ε
t−1 .
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Dividing by P 1−εt , this implies
1 = (1− φ)Z˜1−εt + φπ
ε−1
t .
Price dispersion
It is possible to derive a recursive representation of price dispersion st so
that it is not necessary to track individual prices of firms (following Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004b)). I again use that Zt is identical across all firms
which set a new price:
st≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
di
= (1− φ)
(
Zt
Pt
)−ε
+ (1− φ)φ
(
Zt−1
Pt
)−ε
+ (1− φ)φ2
(
Zt−2
Pt
)−ε
+ ...
= (1− φ)Z˜−εt + (1− φ)φZ˜
−ε
t−1π
ε
t + (1− φ)φ
2Z˜−εt−2π
ε
tπ
ε
t−1 + ...
= (1− φ)
∞∑
j=0
φjZ˜−εt−j
j∏
s=1
πεt+1−s.
Lagging this expression by one period gives
st−1=(1− φ)
∞∑
j=0
φjZ˜−εt−1−j
j∏
s=1
πεt−s
=(1− φ)Z˜−εt−1 + (1− φ)φZ˜
−ε
t−2π
ε
t−1 + (1− φ)φ
2Z˜−εt−3π
ε
t−1π
ε
t−2 + ...
Multiplying this by πεtφ yields
st−1π
ε
tφ=(1− φ)φZ˜
−ε
t−1π
ε
t + (1− φ)φ
2Z˜−εt−2π
ε
tπ
ε
t−1 + (1− φ)φ
3Z˜−εt−3π
ε
tπ
ε
t−1π
ε
t−2
=(1− φ)
∞∑
j=0
φj+1Z˜−εt−1−j
j∏
s=0
πεt−s
=(1− φ)
∞∑
j=1
φjZ˜−εt−j
j∏
s=1
πεt+1−s.
Thus, I can eliminate all lagged Z terms by taking the difference
st − φst−1π
ε
t = (1− φ)Z˜
−ε
t
⇐⇒
st = (1− φ)Z˜
−ε
t + φst−1π
ε
t ,
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which is the equation used in chapter 3, (3.17). Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2004b) show that st is limited below by 1: Define ξit =
(
Pit
Pt
)1−ε
. From the
definition of the price index,
(∫ 1
0
ξitdi
) ε
ε−1
= 1. Given that ε/ (ε− 1) > 1,
Jensen’s inequality implies that st =
∫ 1
0
ξ
ε
ε−1
it di ≥
(∫ 1
0
ξitdi
) ε
ε−1
= 1.
Fiscal policy
Expenditures for the production subsidy νP = ε
ε−1
amount to
τPt =
∫ 1
0
(
νP − 1
) Pit
Pt
yitdi
=
(
νP − 1
) ∫ 1
0
(
Pit
Pt
)1−ε
ytdi
=
(
νP − 1
)
yt,
where I used the demand condition of firms, yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
yt and the defi-
nition of the price index,
∫ 1
0
(
Pit
Pt
)1−ε
= 1. Expenditures for the subsidy to
workers are given by
τWt =
(
νW − 1
)
wtnt.
Using constant returns to scale, the sum of firm profits Ψt is given by
Ψt=
∫ 1
0
νP
Pit
Pt
yit −mctyitdi
= yt
[
νP
∫ 1
0
(
Pit
Pt
)1−ε
di−mct
∫ 1
0
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
di
]
= yt
(
νP −mctst
)
.
Therefore, the difference of firm profits minus lump sum taxes (in real
terms) equals
Ψt − τ
W
t − τ
P
t = yt
(
νP −mctst
)
−
(
νP − 1
)
yt −
(
νW − 1
)
wtnt
= yt (1−mctst)−
(
νW − 1
)
wtnt.
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B.1.2 Aggregate resources
In the following the aggregate resource constraint is derived from the rep-
resentative household’s budget constraint, which reads
wtnt +
dt−1
πt
+ yt (1−mctst) + kt(r
k
t + 1− δ) = ct + kt+1 + Etr
d
t,t+1dj,t,
where I have used that νWwtnt+Ψt− τ t = wtnt + yt (1−mctst) . In other
words, because the government collects lump-sum taxes to finance the sub-
sidy to firms and workers, the net revenue the household gains from re-
ceiving firm profits and the labor subsidy after paying the lump-sum tax
equals yt (1−mctst) . Because the representative household cannot hold
state-contingent claims which are traded only among households, in aggre-
gate dt = 0 ∀ t. Thus, the constraint simplifies to
yt (1−mctst) + wtnt + ktr
k
t = ct + kt+1 − kt(1− δ).
Using that the producers’ first order conditions are given by wt = mctmpnt
and rkt = mctmpkt, which implies that wtnt+ktr
k
t = mctIOt, this simplifies
to
yt (1−mctst) +mctIOt = ct + kt+1 − kt(1− δ).
With yt = IOtst , this becomes
IOt
st
= ct + kt+1 − kt(1− δ),
which by using the definition of intermediate output IOt is equivalent to
k1−αt n
α
t = [ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt] st.
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B.1.3 Summary of equilibrium conditions
This section summarizes the equilibrium conditions for the case of zero
adjustment cost. They are given by the behavior of households,
wt=χn
η
t c
σ
t µ
W
t , (B.1)
c−σt =βEt
[
c−σt+1
Rt
πt+1
]
, (B.2)
c−σt =βEt
[
c−σt+1(r
k
t+1 + 1− δ)
]
, (B.3)
firms,
rkt =
(1− α)
α
wtnt
kt
, (B.4)
mct=
(
rkt
1− α
)1−α (wt
α
)α
, (B.5)
Z1t = c
−σ
t ytmct + βφEtπ
ε
t+1Z
1
t+1, (B.6)
Z2t = c
−σ
t yt + βφEtπ
ε−1
t+1Z
2
t+1, (B.7)
1= (1− φ)
(
Z1t
Z2t
)1−ε
+ φπε−1t , (B.8)
and aggregate resources including price dispersion,
k1−αt n
α
t = [ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt] st, (B.9)
st=(1− φ)
(
Z1t
Z2t
)−ε
+ φπεtst−1. (B.10)
To close the model, monetary policy is specified either by a Taylor rule or
by Ramsey optimal policy.
B.2 Optimal policy
B.2.1 The social planner
The social planner maximizes household utility subject to the economy’s
technological restrictions. Because households’ preferences are identical,
the social planner will choose identical levels for consumption and working
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time for every household, i.e. nit = nt and cit = ct ∀i. He thus solves
max
{c,n,ni,k,ki,y}
G=E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{[
c1−σt
1− σ
−
χn1+ηt
1 + η
]
+λ1t
[
yt −
(∫ 1
0
[
nαitk
1−α
it
]q
di
)1/q]
+λ3t [yt − ct − kt+1 + (1− δ)kt]
+λ4t
[
kt −
∫ 1
0
kitdi
]
+λ5t
[
nt −
∫ 1
0
nit+1di
]}
.
The first order conditions are given by
uc,t= λ
3
t , (B.11)
un,t=−λ
5
t , (B.12)
λ5t =−λ
1
t
(
yt
yit
)1−q
α
(
kit
nit
)1−α
, (B.13)
−λ1t = λ
3
t , (B.14)
λ3t = βEt
[
(1− δ)λ3t+1 + λ
4
t+1
]
, (B.15)
λ4t =−λ
1
t
(
yt
yit
)1−q
(1− α)
(
nit
kit
)α
. (B.16)
(B.11)-(B.14) imply
−un,t = uc,t
(
yt
yit
)1−q
α
(
kit
nit
)1−α
. (B.17)
Combining (B.13) and (B.16) yields
α
(
kit
nit
)1−α (
λ5t
)−1
= (1− α)
(
nit
kit
)α (
λ4t
)−1
⇐⇒
kit
nit
=
1− α
α
λ5t
λ4t
.
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so that the capital labor ratio of firms is constant. This implies with (B.13)
that the Lagrange multiplier on the labor market equilibrium condition is
given by
λ5t = −λ
1
t
(
yt
yit
)1−q
α
[
1− α
α
λ5t
λ4t
]1−α
,
which requires yit = yt. Using this in (B.17) implies that the marginal rate
of substitution must equal the marginal productivity of labor,
α
(
kit
nit
)1−α
= −
un,t
uc,t
.
Further, using (B.16) to replace λ4t in (B.15) implies
uc,t = βEtuc,t+1
[
(1− δ) + (1− α)
(
nit
kit
)α]
.
B.2.2 The Ramsey problem
This section derives the first order conditions to the Ramsey problem for
the model with zero adjustment cost. The first order conditions for the
Ramsey problem for the variants including adjustment cost are obtained in
a similar way.
Deriving the intertemporal budget constraint
Writing states explicitly with zt denoting the history of states up to period
t and denoting the price of a state-contingent claim to a unit of currency
with Qt,t+1(zt+1), the representative household’s budget constraint can be
written as
wt(z
t)nt(z
t) +
dt−1(z
t)
πt(zt)
+ yt(z
t)
(
1−mct(z
t)st(z
t)
)
= ct(z
t) + kt+1(z
t)− kt(z
t−1)(rkt (z
t) + 1− δ) +
∑
zt+1
Qt,t+1(z
t+1)dt(z
t+1),
which uses νWwtnt + Ψt − τ t = wtnt + yt (1−mctst) , as was derived in
section 3.2.3. The intertemporal budget constraint is derived by iterating
the households’ budget constraint forward for d. It will be useful to define
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q0,t(z
t) as the "real" price of state contingent claims,
q0,t(z
t)= pr(zt|z0)ϕ0,t(z
t)
∏t−1
i=0 πi+1(z
i+1)
=βtpr(zt|z0)
λt(zt)
λ0(z0)
,
where ϕ0,t(z
t) = βt λt(z
t)/λ0(z0)∏t−1
i=0
πk+1(zi+1)
is the stochastic discount factor and
pr(zt|z0) is the conditional probability of state history zt. Using the first or-
der condition for state contingent claimsQt,t+1(zt+1) = β
pr(zt+1)
pr(zt)
λt+1(zt+1)
λt(zt)πt+1(zt+1)
,
I can express q0,t(zt) as
q0,t(z
t) =
t−1∏
i=0
Qi,i+1(z
i+1)πi+1(z
i+1).
Rearranging the budget constraint yields
d−1(z
0) = π0(z
0)Ω0(z
0) + π0(z
0)
∑
z1
Q0,1(z
1)d0(z
1)
⇐⇒
d−1(z
0) = π0 (Ω0) + π0
∑
z1
q0,1(z
1)
π1(z1)
d0(z
1). (B.18)
where Ωt(zt) = ct(zt)−wt(zt)nt(zt)−yt(zt) (1−mct(zt)st(zt))+kt+1(zt)−
kt(st−1)(rkt (z
t) + 1− δ). Further, use
d0(z
1) = π1(z
1)Ω1(z
1) + π1
∑
z2
q1,2(z2)
π2(z2)
d1(z
2)
to iterate (B.18) forward for d,
d−1(z
0)=π0(z
0)Ω0(z
0) + π0(z
0)
∑
z1
q0,1(z
1)
(
Ω1(z
1) +
q1,2(z2)
π2(z2)
d1(z
2)
)
=π0(z
0)Ω0(z
0) + π0(z
0)
∑
z1
q0,1(z
1)Ω1(z
1)
+π0
∑
z1
q0,1(z
1)q1,2(z
2)Ω2(z
2) + ...,
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so that
d−1(z
0)/π0(z
0) = Ω0(z
0) +
∑
z1
q0,1(z
1)Ω1(z
1) +
∑
z2
q0,2(z
2)Ω2(z
2) + ...
Now I can obtain an arbitrage freeness equation by first rewriting the capital
Euler equation and then using 1
β
Qt,t+1(zt+1)
p(zt+1|zt)
c−σt (z
t)πt+1(z
t+1) = c−σt+1(z
t+1),
c−σt (z
t)=βEt
[
c−σt+1(q
k
t+1 + 1− δ)
]
c−σt (z
t)=β
∑
zt+1
pr(zt+1|zt)c−σt+1(z
t+1)(rkt+1(z
t+1) + 1− δ)
1=
∑
zt+1
Qt,t+1(z
t+1)πt+1(z
t+1)(rkt+1(z
t+1) + 1− δ)
1=
∑
zt+1
qt,t+1(z
t+1)(rkt+1(z
t+1) + 1− δ).
This arbitrage freeness condition can be used to eliminate capital in the
intertemporal budget constraint whose capital terms are
k1(z
0)− k0(z
−1)(rk0(z
0) + 1− δ)
+
∑
z1
q0,1(z
1)
[
k2(z
1)− k1(z
0)(rk1(z
1) + 1− δ)
]
+
∑
z2
q0,2(z
2)
[
k3(z
2)− k2(z
2)(rk2(z
2) + 1− δ)
]
+ ...
=−k0(z
−1)(rk0(z
0) + 1− δ) + lim
t−→∞
∑
zt
q0,t(z
t)kt+1(z
t),
where I have used that k1(z0) is independent of z1. The intertemporal
budget constraint in period zero thus reads
d−1(z
0)
π0(z0)
+ k0(z
−1)(rk0(z
0) + 1− δ)
=E0
∞∑
t=0
∑
zt
q0,t(z
t)
(
ct(z
t)− wt(z
t)nt(z
t)− yt(z
t)
(
1−mct(z
t)st(z
t)
))
+ lim
t−→∞
∑
zt
q0,t(z
t)kt+1(z
t) + lim
t−→∞
∑
zt
q0,t(z
t)dt(z
t).
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The two latter terms are zero by the transversality conditions. The next
step is to eliminate q0,t by using q0,t(zt) = β
tpr(zt|z0) c
−σ
t (z
t)
c−σ0 (z
0)
, so that the
period zero intertemporal budget constraint is given by
c−σ0
[
d−1
π0
+ k0(r
k
0 + 1− δ)
]
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βtc−σt (ct − wtnt − yt (1−mctst)) .
Now, the wage, capital rental rate and real marginal cost are eliminated,
using
mct =
(
rkt
1− α
)1−α (wt
α
)α
,
rkt =
(1− α)
α
wtnt
kt
,
wt = χn
η
t c
σ
t µ
W
t ,
=⇒mct =
1
nαt k
1−α
t
χ
α
(
n1+ηt c
σ
t µ
W
t
)
Further, using aggregate production yt =
nαt k
1−α
t
st
implies that
c−σt yt (1−mctst)= c
−σ
t
nαt k
1−α
t
st
− c−σt n
α
t k
1−α
t mct
= c−σt
nαt k
1−α
t
st
−
χ
α
n1+ηt µ
W
t .
Thus, the period zero intertemporal budget constraint can be written as
A0=E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt − χn
1+η
t µ
W
t − c
−σ
t
nαt k
1−α
t
st
+
χ
α
n1+ηt µ
W
t
]
=E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt +
1− α
α
χn1+ηt µ
W
t − c
−σ
t
nαt k
1−α
t
st
]
,
where At = c
−σ
t
[
dt−1
πt
+ kt(r
k
t + 1− δ)
]
. Because households trade state-
contingent claims among each other, in the aggregate, no state contingent
bonds can be held so that in equilibrium dt =
∫
ditdi = 0 ∀ t . Thus, the
left hand side simplifies to At = c−σt
[
kt(r
k
t + 1− δ)
]
.
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Writing the intertemporal budget constraint recursively
The Ramsey planner faces an intertemporal budget constraint in every
period, as explained in section 3.3.3. Letting θt denote the multiplier on
the intertemporal budget constraint, the Ramsey planner’s Lagrange takes
the form
L=E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt
1− σ
− χ
n1+ηt
1 + η
]
+θt
{
Et
∞∑
j=0
βt+j
[
c1−σt+j +
1− α
α
χn1+ηt+j µ
W
t+j − c
−σ
t+j
IOt+j
st+l
]
− At
}
+λ1t [◦]
+...,
neglecting the other constraints so as to focus on the intertemporal budget
constraint. As described in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2004), the sequence of
intertemporal budget constraints can be written recursively as
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtθt
{
Et
∞∑
j=0
βt+j
[
c1−σt+j +
1− α
α
χn1+ηt+j µ
W
t+j − c
−σ
t+j
IOt+j
st+l
]
−At
}
=E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
Θt
[
c1−σt +
1− α
α
χn1+ηt µ
W
t − c
−σ
t
IOt
st
]
− (Θt −Θt−1)At
}
,
where Θt = Θt−1 + θt and Θ−1 = 0.
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First order conditions to the Ramsey problem without adjust-
ment cost
The Ramsey problem (3.27) reads
max
{c,n,k,R,s,π,Z˜,Z1,Z2}
J =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
c1−σt
1− σ
− χ
n1+ηt
1 + η
]
+Θt
[
c1−σt +
1− α
α
χn1+ηt µ
W
t − c
−σ
t
k1−αt n
α
t
st
]
− (Θt −Θt−1)
[
(1− α)χ
α
nη+1t µ
W
t + ktc
−σ
t (1− δ)
]
+λ1t
[
c−σt − Etβc
−σ
t+1
Rt
πt+1
]
+λ2t
[
c−σt −Etβ(1− α)
χ
α
nη+1t+1
kt+1
µWt+1 − Etβ(1− δ)c
−σ
t+1
]
+λ3t
[
Z˜t −
Z1t
Z2t
]
+λ4t
πt −
(
1 + (φ− 1)Z˜1−εt
φ
) 1
ε−1

+λ5t
[
st − (1− φ)Z˜
−ε
t + φπ
ε
tst−1
]
+λ6t
[
Z1t −
n1+ηt
st
χ
α
µWt − φβEtπ
ε
t+1Z
1
t+1
]
+λ7t
[
Z2t − c
−σ
t
k1−αt n
α
t
st
− φβEtπ
ε−1
t+1Z
2
t+1
]
.
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The first order conditions to this problem are
∂J
Θt
=0⇔ c1−σt =
(1− α)χ
α
[
c−σt
IOt
st
− βnη+1t+1µ
W
t+1
]
− βkt+1c
−σ
t+1(1− δ)
∂J
Rt
=0 ⇔ λ1t = 0 ∀ t (which is used in all further equations),
∂J
ct
=0 ⇔ 0 = c−σt [1 + Θt(1− σ)] + σ(1− δ)λ
2
t−1c
−σ−1
t
+σc−σ−1t
[
Θt
k1−αt n
α
t
st
+ (1− δ)kt − λ
1
t +
Rt−1
πt
λ1t−1 − λ
2
t + λ
7
t
k1−αt n
α
t
st
]
∂J
nt
=0 ⇔ c−σt
k1−αt αn
α−1
t
st
[
Θt + λ
7
t
]
+ χnηt
= (1 + η)
χ
α
[
Θt−1(1− α)µ
W
t n
η
t − λ
2
t−1(1− α)
µWt
kt
nηt − λ
6
t
µWt
st
nηt
]
∂J
kt+1
=0 ⇔ (1− δ)c−σt+1 (Θt −Θt+1) +
(1− α)χ
α
λ2tEt
nη+1t+1µ
W
t+1
(kt+1)
2
=
c−σt+1
st+1
(1− α)k−αt+1n
α
t+1
[
Θt+1 + λ
7
t+1
]
,
∂J
πt
=0 ⇔ λ4t = φ
[
εst−1λ
5
tπ
ε−1
t ελ
6
t−1Z
1
t π
ε−1
t + (ε− 1) λ
7
t−1Z
2
t π
ε−2
t
]
,
∂J
Z1t
=0 ⇔ −
λ3t
Z2t
+ λ6t − λ
6
t−1φπ
ε
t = 0,
∂J
Z2t
=0 ⇔ λ3t
Z1t
(Z2t )
2 + λ
7
t − λ
7
t−1φπ
ε−1
t = 0,
∂J
Z˜t
=0 ⇔ λ3t + ελ
5
t (1− φ)Z˜
−ε−1
t
= −λ4t
(
1 + (φ− 1)Z˜1−εt
φ
)( 1ε−1−1)
(φ− 1)
φ
(1− ε) Z˜−εt ,
∂J
st
=0 ⇔ Θtc
−σ
t
k1−αt n
α
t
s2t
+ λ5t
= λ5t+1βφπ
ε
t+1 −
χ
α
λ5t
nη+1t
s2t
µWt − λ
5
t c
−σ
t
k1−αt n
α
t
s2t
.
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B.2.3 Welfare measure
The welfare measure I use is derived in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006).
It is based on the representative household’s expected lifetime utility
W = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt) .
Conditional vs. unconditional welfare I will here follow Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2006) and evaluate welfare conditional on the initial
state being the deterministic steady state.58 This is sensible because all
models analyzed in the second chapter have the same deterministic steady
state independent of policy. For this reason, I do not face the problem
of having to evaluate transition periods from one to another deterministic
steady state, which is not straightforward when using local approximation
methods. However, I encounter a similar problem which stems from the
fact that the models’ stochastic steady states generally depend on monetary
policy. Therefore, an unconditional welfare measure will be biased because
it ignores the transition to a particular stochastic steady state.
Welfare measure When comparing two policies, the welfare measure I
use is the percentage γ of steady state consumption that a household would
be willing to give up under the superior policy A so that he can still gain the
same utility as under the inferior policy B (equivalent variation). Note that
γ can only be interpreted as percentage points of steady state consumption
when A refers to the deterministic steady state.59 Let superscripts A and
B denote a variable’s value under policy A or B. Thus, I need to solve
WB = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
(1− γ) cAt , n
A
t
)
58This approach is also recommended by Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2008).
59This is the reason why I compute the welfare loss separately for each policy and do
not directly compare simple rules to optimal policy.
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for γ. Given that σ = 1, the utility function collapses to u(ct, nt) = ln (ct)−
χn
1+η
1+η
, so that the preceding equation can be rewritten as
WB =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln
[
(1− γ) cAt
]
− χ
(
nAt
)1+η
1 + η
}
= (1− γ)WA − [1− (1− γ)]E0
∞∑
t=0
βtχ
(
nAt
)1+η
1 + η
.
Rearranging terms yields
WB =E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln
[
(1− γ) cAt
]
− χ
(
nAt
)1+η
1 + η
}
=E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln (1− γ) + ln cAt −
(
nAt
)1+η
1 + η
}
=
ln (1− γ)
1− β
+ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
ln cAt −
(
nAt
)1+η
1 + η
}
=
ln (1− γ)
1− β
+WA.
Solving for γ yields
ln (1− γ) =
(
WB −WA
)
(1− β)
⇐⇒
1− γ = exp
[(
WB −WA
)
(1− β)
]
⇐⇒
γ = 1− exp
[(
WB −WA
)
(1− β)
]
.
Evaluating welfare from a second-order approximated policy func-
tion Now define Vt = Et
∑∞
s=0 β
su (ct+s, nt+s) . The idea of Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe (2006) is that by determining the solution of Vt in terms of its
policy function, W is equal to the value of this policy function at the state
xt, which is assumed to be the deterministic steady state, xt = x. Thus, I
use standard methods to solve for the policy function of Vt and evaluate it at
the initial state. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004c) show that the solution
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to an equation system which can be written as Etf(zt+1, zt, xt+1, xt) = 0 is
given by a policy function zt = g(xt, ω). y here denotes non-predetermined
variables (such as Vt) while x includes endogenous and exogenous state vari-
ables. The parameter ω summarizes uncertainty in the model. As I analyze
wage markup shocks only, ω equals the standard deviation of that shock.
As mentioned above, welfare is evaluated conditional on the deterministic
steady state. Thus, the policy function of interest is V, evaluated at the
deterministic steady state V (x, 0). Algebraically, this approach implies
W = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, nt) = V (x, 0).
Computing γ from the approximated policy function for V Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004c) demonstrate the application of perturbation meth-
ods to solve for the policy functions. A second-order approximation of the
policy function for V around the deterministic steady state yields
V (xt, ω)≈V (x, 0) + Vx(x, 0)(xt − x) + Vω(x, 0)ω + Vσx(x, 0)ω(xt − x)
+
1
2
Vxx(x, 0)(xt − x)
2 +
1
2
Vωω(x, 0)ω
2,
using that in the deterministic steady state, ω = 0. I now proceed along
the lines of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006) to show that γ can be approx-
imated correctly up to second order from a second-order approximation of
the policy function V . The welfare measure γ is a function Λ of states xt
and the uncertainty parameter
Λ(xt, ω) = 1− exp
{[
V Bω (xt, ω)− V
A
ω (xt, ω)
]
(1− β)
}
.
Because welfare is evaluated conditional on the initial state being the de-
terministic steady state, it is sufficient to consider the derivatives of Λ with
respect to ω, so that
γ ≈ Λ(x, 0) + Λω(x, 0)ω + Λωω(x, 0)
ω2
2
.
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Computing the derivatives yields
Λω(xt, ω)=− exp
{[
V Bω (xt, ω)− V
A
ω (xt, ω)
]
(1− β)
}
∗
{[
V Bω (xt, ω)− V
A
ω (xt, ω)
]
(1− β)
}
,
Λωω(xt, ω)=− exp
{[
V Bω (xt, ω)− V
A
ω (xt, ω)
]
(1− β)
}
∗
{[
V Bω (xt, ω)− V
A
ω (xt, ω)
]
(1− β)
}2
− exp
{[
V Bω (xt, ω)− V
A
ω (xt, ω)
]
(1− β)
}
∗
{[
V Bωω(xt, ω)− V
A
ωω(xt, ω)
]
(1− β)
}
.
Identical (deterministic) steady states imply V A(x, 0) = V B(x, 0) and thus
Λ(x, 0) = 0. From Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004c), V Aω (x, 0) = V
B
ω (x, 0) =
0, which implies that Λω(x, 0) = 0. This can be used to simplify the second
derivative, evaluated at the steady state, to
Λωω(x, 0) = −
{[
V Bωω(x, 0)− V
A
ωω(x, 0)
]
(1− β)
}
.
Thus, the welfare measure is given by
γ ≈ (1− β)
[
V Aωω(x, 0)− V
B
ωω(x, 0)
] ω2
2
.
The terms V Aωω(x, 0)
ω2
2
and V Bωω(x, 0)
ω2
2
are obtained from the "correction
terms" in dynare.
Interpretation Because both policies have identical steady states,
V Bωω(x, 0)−V
A
ωω(x, 0) is the only welfare relevant difference between the two
policies.60 Thus, the welfare measure requires comparing the solution to
the value functions V under two policies, conditional on the same (deter-
ministic) steady state. In principle, I could use the approximate solutions
for the policy functions of V conditional on any other steady state, as long
as I condition on the same steady state for both policies. Here, I use the
deterministic steady state so that the welfare effects implied by the transi-
tion from the deterministic steady state to the (different) stochastic steady
states are taken into account.
60All other terms in the policy functions for V A and V B are zero in the deterministic
steady state when variables are expressed as deviations from their deterministic steady
state - except for the constant term V A(x, 0) which is equal across any two policies
with an identical deterministic steady state. Thus, computing V Bωω(x, 0)− V
A
ωω(x, 0) is
equivalent to computing V B(x, 0)− V A(x, 0).
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B.3 Steady state
Here, the steady state of the model without adjustment cost is derived
from the equilibrium conditions given in B.1.3. I proceed by assuming
existence of a steady state and confirm its existence analytically. Let vari-
ables without time index refer to steady state values. (B.2) implies that
the long-run nominal interest rate determines long-run inflation, R = π
β
.
Thus, by setting the long-run nominal interest rate, monetary policy de-
termines long-run inflation. From section 3.3.1, observe that the first-best
equilibrium is characterized by π = 1 and µT = µW/mc = 1. By setting
R = β−1, monetary policy ensures a long-run inflation rate of unity, thus
implementing the first-best allocation. The reasoning behind this is as fol-
lows: In steady state, the wage markup µW = ζ
ζ−1
1
νW
is eliminated by the
wage subsidy νW = ζ
ζ−1
, so that µW = 1. Further, setting π = 1 implies by
(B.8) that Z1/Z2 = 1. The steady state versions of (B.6) and (B.7) imply
Z1/Z2 = mc, so that real marginal cost equal unity in steady state if policy
sets π = 1. From (B.10), it then follows that in steady state, price disper-
sion must be zero, s = 1. Thus, the Ramsey planner will achieve first best
in the long-run by setting π = 1. I further assume that the simple interest
rate rule given in (3.2.3) targets long-run inflation of unity, π = 1. Thus,
both policies will lead to identical deterministic steady states characterized
by mc = µT = π = s = Z1/Z2 = 1 and R = β−1. This result is useful
for evaluating welfare because it permits conditioning welfare on identical
steady states when measuring the welfare loss implied by different policies.
The steady states of the remaining model variables can be found by using
the equilibrium conditions (B.1), (B.3), (B.4), (B.5) and (B.9), which imply
rk =
1
β
− (1− δ) ,
w=
[
αα (1− α)
1−α (rk)α−1]1/α ,
n/k=
α
1− α
rk
w
,
k=
(
w
χ
)1/σ (n
k
)−η/σ [(n
k
)α
− δ
]− 1
1+η/σ
,
c= k [(n/k)α − δ] .
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Further, it is important to note that the model variants with adjustment
cost imply an identical steady state. The reason is that in steady state,
adjustment cost are zero. Thus, the value of capital goods relative to
consumption goods equals unity, q = 1 and the investment capital ratio
equals the depreciation rate, i/k = δ under both specifications.
B.4 Calibration
Discount Factor β = 0.9901
Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity σ = 1
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply η = 1
Substitution elasticity intermediate goods ε = 6
Substitution elasticity labor goods (st.st.) ζ¯ = 6
Scale parameter for disutility of labor χ = 10
Labour share α = 0.64
Depreciation rate δ = 0.025
Calvo price stickiness φ = 0.7
Wage markup shock ρζ = 0.9; σ
ζ = 0.1112
(shock calibrated to match) σ(µWt ) = 0.051
Capital adjustment cost ψ = [6.7; 100]
Investment adjustment cost κ = [0.17; 2.48]
Table B.1: Parameter calibration
Calibration of the wage markup shock
It is assumed that the substitution elasticity ζt between labor varieties
evolves according to
ln ζt = (1− ρζ) ln ζ¯ + ρ
ς ln ζt−1 − ε
ζ
t ,
where εζt ∼ iid with standard deviation σζ . The resulting wage markup is
given by µWt =
ζt
ζt−1
1
νW
, where νW = ζ¯
ζ¯−1
. A first-order approximation of
µWt around µ¯
W = 1 yields
µˆWt =
1
ζ¯ − 1
ζˆt,
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where xˆt = xt−xx denotes percentage deviations from steady state. Thus,
the markup inherits the autocorrelation parameter of the stochastic process
for the substitution elasticity, ρς . This parameter is set to ρς = 0.9, slightly
below the value of 0.95 estimated by Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007).
Concerning volatility, a first-order approximation yields ζˆt = ρζ ζˆt−1 − ε
ζ
t
which implies that V ar ζˆt =
σ2ζ
1−ρ2ζ
. Therefore, the variance of the markup
depends on the variance of the driving shock, σ2ζ ,
V ar
(
µˆWt
)
=
σ2ζ(
ζ¯ − 1
)2 (
1− ρ2ζ
) .
σ2ζ is calibrated to match the standard deviation of the inefficiency gap
estimated by Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007) at 0.051. Given the
parameters in Table B.1, this implies setting σζ = 0.1112.
Calibration of the remaining parameters
The supply side of the economy is calibrated in a standard way. A model
period is taken to represent a quarter. α is calibrated to the labor income
share of 0.64, δ to a (yearly) steady state investment/capital ratio of around
0.1 and β is calibrated to a quarterly steady state real interest rate of 1%,
i.e. R = 1
β
= 1.01. Thus, the steady state capital output ratio is determined
by the capital Euler equation
1 = β
(
rk + 1− δ
)
⇐⇒
k
y
=
1− α
1
β
− 1 + δ
,
which yields k
y
= 10.29 given the parameter values in Table B.1. Note that
this is in line with empirical observations: Annually, k
y
is around 2.5-3 and
thus its quarterly value is between 7.5 and 12. Following Galí, Gertler, and
López-Salido (2007), the inverse of the labor supply elasticity is set to unity,
η = 1. Card (1994) suggests a range of 0.2 to 0.5 based on microeconomic
estimates. Further, Smets andWouters (2007) estimate an elasticity of 1.92
from macroeconomic data. Thus, the value of unity represents a reasonable
choice. I also follow Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido (2007) in the choice of
σ, the intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption goods and set
σ = 1, i.e. utility logarithmic in consumption. Barsky, Kimball, Juster,
and Shapiro (1997) estimate an elasticity of 0.18 using micro data, implying
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a value of around 5 for σ. However, the macroeconomic literature tends to
use lower risk aversion coefficients: For instance, Smets and Wouters (2007)
estimate σ = 1.39. Thus, σ = 1 is a choice rather close toward the lower
bound of available estimates. The parameter χ affects disutility from work
and is set to χ = 10 so as to generate a reasonable steady state share of
time spent working of 0.29.
A Calvo parameter of φ = 0.7 is in line with price stickiness in the euro
area, implying that on average prices are reset every 3-4 quarters: For the
euro area, Álvarez, Dhyne, Hoeberichts, Kwapil, Bihan, Lünnemann, Mar-
tins, Sabbatini, Stahl, Vermeulen, and Vilmunen (2006) estimate a mean
duration of prices of 13 months, i.e. 3.25 quarters. For the U.S., average
price duration is estimated much lower, at 6.7 months. The steady state
substitution elasticities between the differentiated labor and intermediate
goods are both set to 6 so that in the steady state, markups of firms and
workers are 20%. The price markup is in line with Galí, López-Salido,
and Vallés (2004) who assumes ε = 6 and Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido
(2007) who suggest steady state price markups of 0.15 to 0.20. Justini-
ano and Primiceri (2008), in a Bayesian estimation, find posterior means
of 0.17 for the wage markup and 0.22 for firm markups on goods prices.
Concerning the steady state wage markup, Galí, Gertler, and López-Salido
(2007) suggests values around 0.30 to 0.35, i.e. a value of 4 for the steady
state substitution elasticity. Sveen and Weinke (2006) use ζ¯ = 6 as well.
Note that the effects of both markups on the allocation are eliminated by
steady state subsidies. The parameter ε mainly affects the importance of
price dispersion (and thus inflation) for welfare: A low ε implies higher
market power and consequently less responsive demand. Thus, a given in-
flation rate implies less dispersion in factor input across firms, reducing the
welfare loss of price dispersion.
Adjustment cost
The calibration of adjustment cost is highly controversial. Macroeconomic
studies find rather high adjustment cost. For instance, Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005) estimate the investment adjustment cost para-
meter to κ = 2.48. Using that a first-order approximation to (3.30) yields
ıˆt =
1
1+β
ıˆt−1 +
β
1+β
Etıˆt+1 +
1
(1+β)κ
qˆt, which can be rewritten as ıˆt = ıˆt−1 =
κ−1
∑∞
s=0 β
sqˆt+s, this implies an elasticity of investment with respect to
the market value of capital of ηi,q =
∂i
∂q
i
q
= 1
κ
= 0.4. Smets and Wouters
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(2007) estimate an even higher adjustment cost parameter, implying an
elasticity of only ηi,q = 0.18. The q literature estimates this elasticity based
on stock market data and finds values between 0.4 and 1.1, which is the
range given by Christiano and Fisher (1995). Even lower adjustment cost,
i.e. higher elasticities are obtained from estimating factor demand equa-
tions. Hall (2004) estimates industry-specific adjustment cost parameters
which are close to and not significantly different from zero for almost all
industries he considers. Groth and Khan (2007) pursue a similar approach
and find evidence in favor of small adjustment cost. They estimate factor
demand equations to obtain industry-specific estimates of adjustment cost
and aggregate these, yielding an elasticity of ηi,q = 6. Thus, estimates of
adjustment cost differ largely between macroeconomic and microeconomic
estimation approaches. I acknowledge this high uncertainty by considering
a low adjustment cost scenario calibrated to yield a steady state elasticity
of ηi,q = 6, which implies setting κ = 0.17, and a high adjustment cost
scenario, which is calibrated according to the elasticity estimated by Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), ηi,q = 0.4 and implies a value of
κ = 2.48.
Capital adjustment cost are calibrated to these two elasticities as well.
The first order condition of the representative household with respect to
capital (3.32) reads
qt =
[
1− ψ
(
it
kt
− δ
)]−1
.
Thus, the elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin’s q is given by
ηi,q =
∂i
∂q
q
i
=
k
ψ
q
i
= (ψδ)−1 .
The two scenarios above thus require setting ψ = 100 and, respectively,
ψ = 6.7.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Rational expectations equilibrium
A RE equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct, nt, yt, λt, mRt , m
H
t , bt, b
T
t , lt,
wt, mct, Z˜t, Z1t , Z
2
t , st, πt, Rt, R
D
t , R
L
t , R
m
t }
∞
t=0 satisfying the following
conditions summarizing the optimal behavior of households
χnηt = wt
[
λt (1− θ) + θc
−σ
t
]
, (C.1)
RLt =
c−σt
λt (1− κt) + κtc
−σ
t /R
m
t
, (C.2)
λt = βEt
c−σt+1
πt+1
, (C.3)
λt = βRtEt
c−σt+1
Rmt+1πt+1
, (C.4)
λt = βR
D
t Et
λt+1
πt+1
, (C.5)
mHt +m
R
t = ct, if ψt = (R
m
t − 1) λt +
(
c−σt −R
m
t λt
)
> 0, (C.6)
or mHt +m
R
t ≥ ct, if ψt = 0,
κtlt + bt−1/πt
Rmt
= mHt −
mHt−1
πt
+mRt , if ηt =
(
c−σt /R
m
t
)
− λt > 0, (C.7)
or
κtlt + bt−1/πt
Rmt
≥ mHt −
mHt−1
πt
+mRt , if ηt = 0,
bt = (Γ− 1)
bTt−1
πt
− κtlt +m
R
t , (C.8)
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of firms
mctαn
α−1
t = wt
[
1 + θ
(
RLt − 1
)]
, (C.9)
lt/R
L
t = θwtnt, (C.10)
Z˜t = ε (ε− 1)
−1 Z1t /Z
2
t , (C.11)
Z1t = c
−σ
t ytmct + φβEtπ
ε
t+1Z
1
t+1, (C.12)
Z2t = c
−σ
t yt + φβEtπ
ε−1
t+1Z
2
t+1, (C.13)
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)1−ε
+ φπε−1t , (C.14)
the public sector
mRt = Ωm
H
t + (κt − κ) lt/R
m
t , (C.15)
Rmt =
(
Rmt−1
)ρ
R(1−ρ)m (πt/π)
wπ(1−ρ) [(yt/At) / (y/A)]
wy(1−ρ) exp εt, (C.16)
bTt = (Γ− 1) b
T
t−1/πt, (C.17)
and aggregate resources
yt = ct, (C.18)
yt = n
α
t /st, (C.19)
st = (1− φ)Z˜
−ε
t + φst−1π
ε
t , (C.20)
the transversality conditions, a monetary policy setting {Rmt ≥ 1, κt ∈
[0, 1]}∞t=0, Ω > 0 and the inflation target π ≥ β, for given sequences of
stochastic variables and initial values.
C.2 Steady state
In this appendix we examine the steady state of the model in detail (steady
state variables will not be indexed with a time index). The central bank
determines κ ∈ [0, 1] and target values for the inflation rate π ≥ β and the
policy rate Rm ≥ 1. In a steady state, all endogenous variables grow with
a constant rate. Thus, to be consistent with a long-run equilibrium, the
time-invariant policy targets have to be consistent with the steady state.
In what follows we examine properties of all other endogenous variables in
a steady state.
Given the steady state inflation rate π, the equilibrium condition (C.14)
implies the ratio Z1t /Z
2
t to equal ((1− φπ
ε−1) / (1− φ))
1/(1−ε) and thus
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to be constant. Condition (C.11) then implies that Z˜ is also constant.
The price dispersion term st satisfying (C.20), thus converges in the long
run to s = 1−φ
1−φπε
Z˜−ε > 0 if φπε < 1 ⇔ π < (1/φ)1/ε. Since s is
bounded from below and neither productivity nor labor supply exhibit
trend growth, real resources and therefore working time, output, and con-
sumption cannot permanently grow with a non-zero rate in the steady
state, y = c = nα/s. Then, (C.13) implies that Z2t converges to Z
2 =
y1−σ/ (1− φβπε−1) if φβπε−1 < 1 ⇔ π < [1/ (φβ)]1/(ε−1). Given that
Z1t /Z
2
t and Z
2
t are constant, and that (C.12) implies Z
1
t = Z
1 = c
1−σmc
1−φβπε
,
since Z1t /Z
2
t = Z
1,2, such that real marginal cost is constant and given by
mc = Z˜ (ε− 1) ε−1 (1− φβπε) / (1− φβπε−1).
Proof of Proposition 4.1 Combining (C.3) and (C.4) shows that the
government bond rate equals the (constant) long-run policy rate R = Rm.
Since (C.3) further implies λ = β
π
c−σ, the Euler equation for private debt
(C.5) leads to the usual Fischer equation RD = π/β. Eliminating ψt in
(4.12) with (4.10), gives ηt = (c
−σ/Rm)− λ and thus
η = c−σ (Rm − β/π) ≥ 0, (C.21)
which shows that the money market constraint (4.2) is binding in steady
state if monetary policy sets the policy rate below the private debt rate,
Rm < RD = π
β
⇒ η > 0. Using λ = β
π
and (4.10), gives
ψ = c−σ (1− β/π) ≥ 0, (C.22)
which shows that the goods market constraint (4.3) is binding in the steady
state if the central bank sets an inflation target π > β ⇒ ψ > 0. Condition
(C.2) further implies the steady state loan rate to satisfy
RL =
[
(1− κ) /RD + κ/Rm
]−1
. (C.23)
Given that the loan rate, marginal cost, and working time are constant,
(C.9) implies a constant steady state wage rate,
w = mcαnα−1
[
1 + θ
(
RL − 1
)]−1
.
The firms’ working capital constraint (4.1) is further binding l = θwnRL,
if Rm < RD ⇒ RL > 1 (see C.23). 
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Proof of Proposition 4.2 Now suppose that the central bank sets its
target according to π > β and Rm < π/β, the constraints in the goods
market and in the money market are binding (see C.21 and C.22). Further,
(C.23) then implies RL > 1, which implies the working capital constraint
to be binding, l = θwnRL (as shown in the proof of proposition 4.1).
Substituting out λ and w in (C.1) and eliminating working time with
y = nα/s gives the following steady state output and consumption level
y = c =
αmcsσ
χ
β
π
1 + θ
(
π
β
− 1
)
1 + θ (RL − 1)

α
1+η+σα−α
s−1, (C.24)
which decreases with the loan rate. Hence, a decline in the loan rate RL,
which can be induced by a higher κ or a lower Rm (see C.23), leads to an
increase of consumption and output in the steady state (see C.24). The
binding goods market constraint (C.6) and the central bank’s money sup-
ply (C.15) further imply that real balances held outright and held un-
der repurchase agreements are constant and satisfy mH = c/(1 + Ω) and
mR = cΩ/(1 + Ω). Households’ money holdings that evolve according to
(C.7) then satisfymH+mR = m
H
π
+ κl+bt−1/π
Rm
, which implies that household
bond holdings are constant in the steady state
b = π
[
Rmmh
(
1− π−1 +Ω
)
− κl
]
. (C.25)
Since household bond holdings evolve according to (C.8), the real stock of
government bonds has to be constant and equal to bT = π
Γ−1
[
b+ κl −Ωmh
]
.
Consequently, to be consistent with the supply of government bonds (C.17),
bTt = Γb
T
t−1π
−1, the growth rate Γ has to equals the long-run inflation rate
π = Γ, while the central bank can set the inflation target independently
from κ and Rm. An increase in κ tends to decrease the real value of house-
hold government bond holdings (see C.25) and the real value of total gov-
ernment bonds, as can be seen from
bT = πc
[
−κ
θRL
1 + θ (RL − 1)
mcα+
Rm +ΩπR
m−1
π−1
1 + Ω
]
, (C.26)
where we substituted out household bonds b using (C.25) and loans by
l = cθRLmcα/[1 + θ
(
RL − 1
)
]. Since the loan rate RL decreases with κ
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the overall impact on bT (see C.26) and thus on the aggregate price level
is ambiguous. It can easily be shown that the effect of κ on bT depends on
the sign of the term −[1 + ( 1
RD
− 1
Rm
) (1−θ)R
L
1+θ(RL−1)
], which is strictly negative
if (but not only if) θ ≥ 0.5. Since the latter is ensured by assumption (see
section 4.2.2), the price level sequence thus shifts upward in the long-run
for a higher κ. 
Cash holdings and intra-period loans We show that household pur-
chases of loans will not be constrained by money holdings in steady state
in our analysis, i.e. we examine under what conditions mh/π > l/RL
holds. Given steady state money holdings mh = c/(1 + Ω) and demand
for loans l = θwnRL, this inequality implies c/(1 + Ω) > πθwn. Using
wn = mcαnα/RL and nα/s = c, money holdings will exceed demand for
loans if the share of money supplied under repos is sufficiently small such
that Ω <
(
πθmcsα/RL
)−1
− 1. The central bank will then supply a suf-
ficient amount of money outright. For the parameter values (see below)
that will be applied in our analysis, this requires Ω < 2.34, while we set
Ω = 1.5. Thus, in a small neighborhood of the steady state, aggregate
money holdings will exceed demand for loans, so that MHt−1 ≥ Lt/R
L
t is not
a binding constraint.
158
C.3 Parameter values
Subjective discount factor β = 0.9940
Inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity σ = 1
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply η = 0
Substitution elasticity ε = 10
Steady state working time n = 0.33
Labour share α = 0.66
Share of working capital θ = 0.5
Calvo price stickiness φ = 0.75
Taylor coefficient inflation wπ = 1.92
Taylor coefficient output wy = 0.1
Interest rate smoothing ρ = 0.8
Steady state interest rate Rm = 1.0105
Steady state share of repos to outright purchases Ω = 1.5
Share of loans eligible in open market operations κ = 0
Steady state inflation Γ = 1.00575
Table C.1: Parameter calibration
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 5
The appendix contains the derivation of equilibrium conditions of the home
economy as well as summaries of home and foreign equilibrium conditions
for the case of binding open market constraints, a derivation of the steady
states, a proof of proposition 5.1 and responses to a foreign consumption
shock in a simplified version of Galí and Monacelli (2005).
D.1 Home economy equilibrium conditions
D.1.1 Price index and households’ goods demand
Households’ goods demand
First, I rewrite (5.10) by using (5.11) and
(
cF,t
cH,t
)1−η
= ct
cF,tγ
to obtain
cF,t =
ηuc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t qt
ct. (D.1)
Similarly, rewriting (5.9) by using
(
cF,t
cH,t
)η
= ct
cH,tγ
implies
cH,t =
(1− η) uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
) PH,t
Pt
ct. (D.2)
Using (D.1) and (D.2) in the definition of the price index yields
Ptct = PH,tcH,t + PF,tcF,t
⇐⇒
1 = (1− η)
uc,t
λt + ψH,t
+ η
uc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t
, (D.3)
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which characterizes the optimal labor leisure trade-off given that domestic
and imported goods are subject to cash credit frictions. Given this choice,
(D.1) and (D.2) determine how total consumption is split up into domestic
and imported goods.
Derivation of the price index
I use cH,t =
(
ct
γcηF,t
) 1
1−η
to cancel out cH,t in (D.1) and (D.2) and obtain
cF,t =
[
(1− η)uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
)
PH,t/Pt
] η−1
η
ctγ
−1
η
and
cF,t =
ηc−σt
(λt + µt)R
m
t PF,t/Pt
ct.
Combining these to substitute out cF,t and solving for Pt yields[
(1− η)uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
)
PH,t/Pt
] η−1
η
ctγ
−1
η =
ηuc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t PF,t/Pt
ct,
which is equivalent to
P
1
−η
t =
uc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t PF,t
η (1− η)
1−η
η γ
1
η
[
uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
)
PH,t
] 1−η
η
,
where γ1/η = η−η/η (1− η)
η−1
η so that
Pt =
[(λt + µt)R
m
t ]
η (λt + ψH,t)1−η
uc,t
P ηF,tP
1−η
H,t . (D.4)
Thus, the price index takes into account that households’ consumption
choice is influenced by the cash credit friction. For simplicity, define Φt =
[(λt+µt)R
m
t ]
η(λt+ψH,t)
1−η
uc,t
which measures the extent of the cash-credit fric-
tion. Introducing the real exchange rate qt =
StP ∗t
Pt
=
PF,t
Pt
and using
zt = PH,t/PF,t =
PH,t
StP∗t
= q−1t
PH,t
Pt
, which implies Φt
(
PH,t
PF,t
)1−η
= Pt
PF,t
, I
can rewrite (D.4) as
PH,t
Pt
= Φ
1
η−1
t q
η
η−1
t .
161
In differences,
πt = πH,t
(
Φt
Φt−1
) 1
1−η
(
qt
qt−1
) η
1−η
. (D.5)
D.1.2 Home firm sector
Cost minimization
Firms minimize cost for given production, where MCt denotes nominal
marginal cost,
min
nt(j)
Ptwtnt(j)−MCt [yH,t(j)− nt(j)] ,
so that firms’ marginal cost are given by, Ptwt = MCt ⇐⇒ MCtPt = wt and
are thus independent of the production level. In real (PPI) terms, marginal
cost are given by MCt
PH,t
= mct = wt
Pt
PH,t
.
Price setting
Firms produce varieties which are aggregated according to
yH,t =
[∫ 1
0
y
ε−1
ε
H,t (j)dj
] ε
ε−1
,
so that they face the demand constraint yH,t (j) = (PH,t(j)/PH,t)
−ε yH,t.
Following Calvo (1983), every firm resets its price in a given period with
constant probability φ. Firms who do not reset prices are assumed to
raise prices with the steady state PPI inflation rate πH . A firm’s nomi-
nal profits in period t are given by Πnomt (j) = [PH,t(j)−MCt] yH,t(j) =
[PH,t(j)−MCt]
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
yH,t. A firm resetting its price in period t thus
maximizes expected profits given the probability that it may not reoptimize
prices in future. Denote with Zt the sales price of firms resetting prices in
period t, which is determined by the solution of
max
Zt
∞∑
s=0
Λrealt,t+sφ
s
[(
πsHZt
PH,t+s
)1−ε
−mct+s
(
πsHZt
PH,t+s
)−ε]
yH,t+s,
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where Λt,t+s is the discount factor for real profits. Using that Λt,t+s =
βs uc,t+s
uc,t
, the first order condition requires
∞∑
s=0
uc,t+s
uc,t
(
βφπ1−εH
)s
P ε−1H,t+sZtyH,t+s
=
ε
ε− 1
∞∑
s=0
(
ct+s
ct
)−σ (
βφπ−εH
)s
mct+sP
ε
H,t+syH,t+s,
so that the optimal price is given by
Zt =
ε
ε− 1
∑∞
s=0
(
βφπ−εH
)s
uc,t+sP
ε
H,t+syH,t+smct+s∑∞
s=0
(
βφπ1−εH
)s
uc,t+sP
ε−1
H,t+syH,t+s
.
Defining Z˜t = Zt/PH,t and writing both the denominator and numerator in
a recursive way, this can be expressed as
Z˜t = Z
1
t /Z
2
t ,
where
Z1t = ε/ (ε− 1)uc,tytmct + φβEt (πH,t+1/πH)
ε Z1t+1,
Z2t =uc,tyt + φβπHEt (πH,t+1/πH)
ε−1 Z2t+1.
Price index
The zero profit condition of competitive retailers implies
PH,tyH,t=
∫ 1
0
PH,t (j) yH,t (j) dj
= yH,t
∫ 1
0
PH,t (j)
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj.
This gives
P 1−εH,t =
∫ 1
0
P 1−εH,t (j)dj
=(1− φ)
[
Z1−εt + φ (Zt−1πH)
1−ε + φ2
(
Zt−2π
2
H
)1−ε
+ ...
]
=(1− φ)
[
Z1−εt +
(
φπ1−εH
)
Z1−εt−1 +
(
φπ1−εH
)2
Z1−εt−2 + ...
]
.
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Lagging this expression by one period and pre-multiplying with φπ1−εH gives
φπ1−εH P
1−ε
H,t−1 = (1− φ)
[
φπ1−εH Z
1−ε
t−1 +
(
φπ1−εH
)2
Z1−εt−2 +
(
φπ1−εH
)3
Z1−εt−3 + ...
]
.
Subtracting both expressions yields the price index
P 1−εH,t = (1− φ)Z
1−ε
t + φπ
1−ε
H P
1−ε
H,t−1.
Dividing by P 1−εH,t gives, with Z˜t = Zt/PH,t
1 = (1− φ) Z˜1−εt + φπ
1−ε
H π
ε−1
H,t . (D.6)
Price dispersion
Further, I compute price dispersion and its impact on output. Define in-
termediate output IOt as the sum of produced intermediate goods,
IOt ≡
∫ 1
0
yH,t(j)dj =
∫ 1
0
njtdj = nt.
Demand for varieties is given by yH,t(j) =
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
yH,t, which implies
IOt =
∫ 1
0
yH,t(j)dj = yH,t
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj.
Let st =
∫ 1
0
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−ε
dj so that yH,t = IOt/st. Thus, st evolves according
to
st = (1− φ)Z˜
−ε
t + φπ
−ε
H π
ε
H,tst−1. (D.7)
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b) show that st is limited below by 1, st ≥ 1.
It increases above unity whenever firms reset their prices, i.e. Z˜t = 1. Thus,
any price dispersion implies an inefficient allocation of aggregate resources
which is evident by yH,t = ntst .
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D.2 Equilibrium conditions when open market con-
straints bind
D.2.1 Home economy
The representative household’s first order conditions can be summarized
by
λtwt=−un,t, (D.8)
1= (1− η)
uc,t
λt + ψH,t
+ η
uc,t
(λt + µt)R
m
t
, (D.9)
cF,t=
ηuc,t
(λt + µt)R
m∗
t qt
ct, (D.10)
cH,t=
(1− η)uc,t(
λt + ψH,t
)
Φ
1
η−1
t q
η
η−1
t
ct, (D.11)
λt=βEt
λt+1Rt
πt+1
, (D.12)
λtqt=βEtqt+1
λt+1 + µt+1
π∗t+1
R∗t , (D.13)
Rt
Etπt+1
=Et
qt+1
qt
RD∗t
π∗t+1
, (D.14)
ψH,t=λt (Rt − 1) , (D.15)
πH,t=πt
(
Φt
Φt−1
) 1
η−1
(
qt
qt−1
) η
η−1
, (D.16)
where Φt =
[(λt+µt)R
m∗
t ]
η(λt+ψH,t)
1−η
uc,t
. The binding cash and open market
constraints read
cF,t=
bF,t−1
Rm∗t π
∗
t
+
mF,t−1
π∗t
, (D.17)
mF,t=
1
1 + Ω
η∗c∗t , (D.18)
mt=Φ
1
η−1
t q
η
η−1
t cH,t, (D.19)
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where mF,t = MF,t/P ∗t , bF,t = BF,t/P
∗
t and mt = Mt/Pt denote real money
and bond holdings. The firms’ block of first order conditions is given by
mct = wtΦ
1
1−η
t q
η
1−η
t (D.20)
Z1t = uc,tyH,tmct + φβπ
−ε
H Etπ
ε
H,t+1Z
1
t+1 (D.21)
Z2t = uc,tyH,t + φβπ
1−ε
H Etπ
ε−1
H,t+1Z
2
t+1 (D.22)
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)1−ε
+ φπ1−εH π
ε−1
H,t (D.23)
The final block of equilibrium conditions contains, among others, the re-
source constraint, the production function including price dispersion and
the evolution of foreign debt,
yH,t= cH,t + c
∗
H,t, (D.24)
yH,t=n
α
t /st, (D.25)
st=(1− φ)
(
Z1t /Z
2
t
)−ε
+ φπ−εH π
ε
H,tst−1, (D.26)
Φ
1
η−1
t q
1
η−1
t c
∗
H,t − cF,t=
bF,t
R∗t
−
bF,t−1
Rm∗t π
∗
t
+
dF,t
RD∗t
−
dF,t−1
π∗t
+mF,t −
mF,t−1
π∗t
,
qt
qt−1
=
St
St−1
π∗t
πt
, (D.27)
c∗H,t= q
1
1−η
t Φ
1
1−η
t η
∗c∗t , (D.28)
tbt= qt (η
∗c∗t − cF,t) , (D.29)
where dF,t = DF,t/P ∗t denotes real holdings of foreign private debt. Mone-
tary policy follows a Taylor rule.
Rt = R
(1−ρR)R
ρR
t−1 (πH,t/πH)
wπ(1−ρR) (yH,t/yH)
wy(1−ρR) , (D.30)
where R = π/β is the steady state interest rate in the home economy.
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D.2.2 Foreign economy
When cash and open market constraints bind, the foreign economy can be
described by the behavior of households,
−u∗n,t
w∗t
=β∗Et
u∗c,t+1
πt+1∗
, (D.31)
Et
u∗c,t+1
π∗t+1
=R∗tEt
u∗c,t+1
π∗t+1R
m∗
t+1
, (D.32)
u∗n,t
w∗t
=βRD∗t
un,t+1∗
w∗t+1π
∗
t+1
, (D.33)
c∗t =(1 + Ω)m
∗
F,t, (D.34)
m∗F,t(1 + Ω)=
m∗F,t−1
π∗t
+
b∗F,t−1/π
∗
t
Rm∗t
, (D.35)
firms,
w∗t = mc
∗
tA
∗, (D.36)
Z1∗t = ε/ (ε− 1)u
∗
c,ty
∗
tmc
∗
t + φ
∗βπ∗−εEtπ
∗ε
t+1Z
1∗
t+1, (D.37)
Z2∗t = u
∗
c,ty
∗
t + φ
∗βπ∗1−εEtπ
∗ε−1
t+1 Z
2∗
t+1, (D.38)
1 = (1− φ)
(
Z1∗t /Z
2∗
t
)1−ε
+ φπ∗1−επ∗ε−1t , (D.39)
the public sector,
b∗F,t = (Γ− 1) b
T∗
t−1/π
∗
t − bF,t +m
R∗
F,t, (D.40)
bT ∗t = Γb
T ∗
t−1/π
∗
t , (D.41)
Rm∗t = R
m∗(1−ρ)
(
Rm∗t−1
)ρ
(π∗t/π
∗)w
∗
π(1−ρ) (y∗t /y
∗)wy(1−ρR) exp(ε∗t )
ρ, (D.42)
and aggregate resources,
y∗t = c
∗
t , (D.43)
y∗t = A
∗n∗t/s
∗
t , (D.44)
s∗t = (1− φ
∗)
(
Z1∗t /Z
2∗
t
)−ε
+ φ∗s∗t−1π
∗ε
t , (D.45)
where m∗F,t = M
∗
F,t/P
∗
t and b
∗
F,t = B
∗
F,t/P
∗
t denote real money and bond
holdings, A∗ is exogenous labor productivity and bT∗t = B
T ∗
t /P
∗
t denotes
the real stock of foreign bonds in circulation.
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D.3 Steady States under binding open market con-
straints
This section derives the steady state of the model given binding open mar-
ket constraints. This is required for the log-linear approximation used in
section 5.4.2.
D.3.1 Home economy
I use that the utility function is given by (5.65), which is repeated here for
convenience
u (ct, nt) =
c1−σt − 1
1− σ
− χ
n1+ηt
1 + η
.
The first order conditions for price setting imply
Z1 =
ε
ε− 1
ucyH
1− φβ
mc,
Z2 =
ucyH
1− φβ
,
mc =
ε− 1
ε
,
s =
(
Z1
Z2
)−ε
= 1.
The steady state inflation rate of home goods, πH , can be set by the central
bank through the interest rate rule. There is no price dispersion in steady
state due to indexation of non-optimized prices to steady state inflation.
The domestic Euler rate is given byR = π/β, and the UIP condition implies
identical real interest rates R/π = RD∗/π∗ and thus identical discount
factors, β = β∗. Further, in steady state CPI inflation equals PPI inflation,
π = πH .Moreover, I assume that the home central bank targets an inflation
rate identical to foreign inflation, π = π∗, so that R = RD∗ and the nominal
exchange rate is constant, St/St−1 = 1 but in its level not determined.
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Consider the remaining system of equilibrium conditions,
χ=λwn−ω (D.46)
λ= c−σ
[
1− η
RD
+
η
RD∗
]
= c−σ/RD (D.47)
λ= ηq−1c−σ
(
c
cF
)
1
RD∗
(D.48)
µ=λ
(
RD∗
R∗
− 1
)
(D.49)
ψF =λ
(
RD∗ − 1
)
(D.50)
ψH =λ
(
RD − 1
)
(D.51)
Φ=
λ
c−σ
(
RD∗
)η (
RD
)1−η
= 1 (D.52)
cF =
bF
Rm∗π∗
+
mF
π∗
(D.53)
mF =
1
1 + Ω
η∗c∗ (D.54)
w=Φ
1
η−1 q
η
η−1
ε− 1
ε
(D.55)
nα =(c/cηFγ)
1
1−η + η∗q
1
1−ηΦ
1
1−η c∗ (D.56)
bF
R∗
= η∗c∗ − dF
(
1
RD∗
−
1
π∗
)
−mF , (D.57)
where the last equation uses Rm = R∗ as well as the binding open market
constraint. Observe from the multipliers on the cash in advance constraint
(ψF , ψH) and the open market constraint (µ) that a foreign interest rate
policy satisfying Rm∗ < π
∗
β∗
and π∗ > β∗ as well as a positive domestic
interest rate in the long run (π > β) implies that all cash and open market
constraints bind in the long run. Using (D.54), I can rewrite (D.57) as
bF + dF
(
R∗
RD∗
−
R∗
π∗
)
= η∗c∗R∗
Ω
1 + Ω
and can solve for bF given a level of total foreign asset holdings relative to
imports d¯ = bF+dF+mF
cF
,
bF +
(
d¯cF − bF −mF
)( R∗
RD∗
−
R∗
π∗
)
= η∗c∗R∗
Ω
1 + Ω
,
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so that
bF =
η∗c∗R∗ Ω
1+Ω
+
(
d¯cF −
η∗c∗
1+Ω
) (
R∗
π∗
− R
∗
RD∗
)
1 + R
∗
π∗
− R
∗
RD∗
.
Using (D.53) to solve for bF yields
cF =
bF
Rm∗π∗
+
mF
π∗
=
η∗c∗R∗ Ω
1+Ω
+
(
d¯cF −
η∗c∗
1+Ω
) (
R∗
π∗
− R
∗
RD∗
)(
1 + R
∗
π∗
− R
∗
RD∗
)
Rm∗π∗
+
mF
π∗
⇐⇒
cF = B
−1η∗c∗R∗
Ω
1 + Ω
−
η∗c∗
1 + Ω
(
R∗
π∗
−
R∗
RD∗
)
+B−1
(
1 +
R∗
π∗
−
R∗
RD∗
)
Rm∗π∗
mF
π∗
,
where B =
[(
Rm∗π∗ − d¯
) (
R∗
π∗
− R
∗
RD∗
)
+Rm∗π∗
]
. Then, back out dF by
using holdings of foreign private debt by using dF = d¯cF−bF−mF . Further,
with (D.47) and (D.48), λ can be eliminated, so that consumption is given
by
c = q
(
1 +
RD∗
RD
1− η
η
)
cF .
To obtain q, I use this in (D.56) to replace c,
nα=
q
(
1 + R
D∗
RD
1−η
η
)
cF
cηF γ

1
1−η
+ η∗q
1
1−ηΦ
1
1−η c∗
= q
1
1−η
{[(
1 +
RD∗
RD
1− η
η
)
γ−1
] 1
1−η
cF + η
∗Φ
1
1−η c∗
}
. (D.58)
Further, I set n = 0.33 and use (D.46) to back out χ after the other steady
state variables are determined. Thus, (D.58) can be used to solve for the
real exchange rate,
q = nα(1−η)
{[(
1 +
RD∗
RD
1− η
η
)
γ−1
] 1
1−η
cF + η
∗Φ
1
1−η c∗
}η−1
.
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Thus, home consumption is given by
c = q
(
1 +
RD∗
RD
1− η
η
)
cF .
With this result at hand, the remaining variables can be backed out, yield-
ing
w = ε−1
ε
Φ
1
η−1 q
η
η−1 , mF =
η∗c∗
1+Ω
,
bF = cFRm∗π∗ −mFRm∗, λ =
c−σ
RD
,
χ = λwn−ω , ψH = λ
(
RD − 1
)
,
ψF = λ
(
RD∗ − 1
)
, µ = λ
(
RD∗
R∗
− 1
)
,
tb = q (η∗c∗ − cF ) , cH =
(
c
cηF γ
) 1
1−η
,
c∗H = q
1
1−ηΦ
1
1−η η∗c∗.
D.3.2 Foreign economy
I use that the utility function is given by (5.66). As shown in Reynard and
Schabert (2009), steady state inflation is determined by the growth rate of
short-term government bonds, Γ∗. The central bank is assumed to adjust
its long-run inflation target to this value, π∗ = Γ∗. The households’ first
order conditions imply that the steady state interest rate on private debt
is given by RD∗ = π
∗
β∗
. Further, using the first order conditions for money
holdings and consumption yields
µ∗ = c
∗−σ
(
1
Rm∗
−
1
RD∗
)
.
Thus, the open market constraint binds in steady state when policy sets
Rm∗ < RD∗ = π
∗
β
. Further, the multiplier on the cash in advance constraint
is given by ψ∗ = Rm∗η∗+λ∗ (Rm∗ − 1) where λ∗ = β∗ c
∗−σ
π∗
implies that ψ∗ =
c∗−σ
[
1− β
∗
π∗
]
. Thus, the cash in advance constraint binds whenever π∗ >
β∗, which is assumed to be fulfilled throughout the fourth chapter. Further,
attention is restricted to a small neighborhood of the steady state, where
the open market and cash in advance constraints bind. The steady state can
be derived analytically from the remaining equilibrium conditions. Using
the households’ and firms’ first order conditions (as well as the aggregate
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resource constraint c∗ = n
∗
s∗
) gives
n∗ =
[
ε−1
ε
A∗1−σβ∗
χ∗π∗
] 1
ω∗+σ∗
, w∗ = A∗mc∗,
c∗ = n
∗
s∗
, Z1∗ = ε
ε−1
c
∗
−σy∗
1−φβ
mc∗,
RD∗ = π
∗
β∗
, Z2∗ =
c
∗
−σy∗H
1−φβ
,
R∗ = Rm∗, Z1∗/Z2∗ = 1 =⇒ mc∗ = ε−1
ε
,
s∗ = (Z1∗/Z2∗)
−ε
= 1.
Further, the cash-in-advance constraint and the households’ holdings of
money and bonds can be used to obtain the steady state values for m, b
and bT ,
m∗F =
c∗
1 + Ω
,
b∗F = R
m∗m∗Fπ
∗
(
1 + Ω − π∗−1
)
,
bT ∗ =
π∗
Γ∗ − 1
[b∗F + bF − Ω(m
∗
F +mF )] .
Steady state under Γ∗ = 1
Consider the case analyzed in section 5.4.1 where nominal bond growth is
zero, Γ∗ = 1. In this case, the foreign economy’s equilibrium conditions are
fundamentally affected. (D.40) changes to b∗F,t = m
R∗
F,t and thus, the real
stock of government bond holdings becomes irrelevant for the equilibrium
allocation. Ignoring the influence of foreign asset holdings (as in section
5.4.1), I obtain identical conditions as above, except for the steady state
holdings of government bonds. Household money holdings (D.35) require
bF = R
m∗m∗Fπ
∗
(
1 + Ω− π∗−1
)
,
while the evolution of households’ bond holdings (D.40) requires
b∗F = Ωm
∗
F .
A steady state exists only if both equations are satisfied, i.e. if
Rm∗ =
Ω
Ωπ∗ + π∗ − 1
.
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Thus, if the central bank targets zero inflation, π∗ = 1, the long-run policy
rate has to be zero as well. For π∗ = 1 and Rm∗ > 1, the economy has
no steady state. The reason is that the central bank acquires bonds every
period in its open market operations when Rm > 1. Given a nominally
constant amount of bonds, and no steady state inflation, households’ real
bond holdings then must decline.
D.4 Proof of Proposition 5.1
(5.62) implies that the decline in the liquidity premium is larger than the
increase in the interest rate on foreign government bonds if the foreign debt
rate falls below its steady state, RˆD∗t < 0. Consider the foreign economy
under the assumptions in section 5.4.1, i.e. u (c∗t , n
∗
t ) = log c
∗
t−χn
∗
t , binding
cash and open market constraints, flexible prices, constant nominal foreign
government debt, Γ∗ = 1, zero steady state inflation π∗ = 1 as well as a pol-
icy rate governed by Rm∗ = 1 and Rm∗t = R
m∗ρ
∗
t−1 exp
(
εRt
)
and a negligible
impact of home households’ holdings of foreign government bonds on for-
eign households’ holdings, b∗F,t = Ωm
∗
F,t. The set of equilibrium conditions
describing the foreign economy is then given by the linearized versions of
(5.31) - (5.36), (5.41) with zero price dispersion s∗t = 1, (5.43), binding open
market and cash constraints (5.29) and (5.30), households’ money holdings
(5.50), labor demand w∗t = A
∗, the resource constraint y∗t = c
∗
t and the pol-
icy rule Rm∗t = R
m∗ρ
∗
t−1 exp
(
εRt
)
. Substituting out Lagrange multipliers in
(5.31) - (5.36) yields the following system of linear equilibrium conditions
Rˆ∗t =EtRˆ
m∗
t+1, (D.59)
RˆD∗t =Etπˆ
∗
t+1, (D.60)
−Etcˆ
∗
t+1=Etπˆ
∗
t+1, (D.61)
cˆ∗t =
m∗F
c∗π∗
mˆ∗F,t−1 +
b∗F
c∗π∗Rm∗
(
bˆ∗F,t−1 − Rˆ
m∗
t
)
− πˆ∗t , (D.62)
mˆ∗F,t= cˆ
∗
t , (D.63)
Rˆm∗t = ρ
∗Rm∗t−1 + ε
R
t , (D.64)
bˆ∗F,t=Ω
m∗
b∗F
cˆ∗t , (D.65)
and conditions for the wage, production, injections and real government
debt. Applying the expectations operator to (D.62), and using (D.63)
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yields,
Etcˆ
∗
t+1 =
m
∗
F
c∗π∗
cˆ∗t +
b∗F
c∗π∗Rm∗
(
bˆ∗F,t − EtRˆ
m∗
t+1
)
−Etπˆ
∗
t+1.
Thus, (D.61) can be rewritten as
cˆ∗t =−
b∗F
m∗Rm∗
(
bˆ∗F,t − EtRˆ
m∗
t+1
)
=−π∗
(
1 + Ω − π∗−1
) (
bˆ∗F,t − EtRˆ
m∗
t+1
)
,
where I use the steady state relation b∗F/m
∗
F = R
m∗π∗ (1 + Ω− π∗−1) de-
rived in Appendix D.3.2. Replacing bond holdings by (D.65) yields
cˆ∗t =−π
∗
(
1 + Ω − π∗−1
)(
Ω
m∗
b∗F
cˆ∗t − EtRˆ
m∗
t+1
)
=(1 + Ω/Rm∗)−1 π∗
(
1 + Ω − π∗−1
)
EtRˆ
m∗
t+1
=
Ω
1 + Ω
EtRˆ
m∗
t+1.
The debt rate is given by RˆD∗t = Etπˆ
∗
t+1 = −Etcˆ
∗
t+1, so that its solution
reads
RˆD∗t =−
Ω
1 + Ω
EtRˆ
m∗
t+2
=−ρa1Rˆ
m∗
t−1 − a1ε
R
t ,
where a1 = ρ2 Ω1+Ω > 0. Thus, a positive foreign policy shock leads to a
decrease in the private debt rate, which persists until the shock fades out.
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D.5 A foreign consumption shock in Galí and Mona-
celli (2005)
A simplified two-country version of Galí and Monacelli (2005) is character-
ized by sequences for {qt, πHt, Rt} given a monetary policy and exogenous
sequences for cˆ∗t and Rˆ
∗
t . The sequences must satisfy a Phillips curve
π̂H,t = κ
(
1
1− ϑ
+ ηψ
)
qˆt + κ (σ + η) cˆ
∗
t + βEtπ̂H,t+1, (D.66)
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and an Euler equation
1
1− ϑ
Et (qˆt+1 − qˆt) = Rˆt − Etπ̂Ht+1 − σEt
(
cˆ∗t+1 − cˆ
∗
t
)
, (D.67)
where κ = (1−φβ)(1−φ)
φ
where φ characterizes price stickiness, σ is the elas-
ticity of intertemporal substitution of consumption goods, η is the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ψ = ϑ+ ϑ
1−ϑ
+ 1−ϑ
σ
with ϑ character-
izing openness of the home economy. Note that I have used both market
clearing yˆH,t = ψqˆt + cˆ∗t and the risk sharing condition σcˆt = qˆt + σcˆ
∗
t to
derive the model. Monetary policy is given by a nominal exchange rate
peg which requires EtSt+1 − St = 0. This is ensured by Rˆt = Rˆ∗t where a
constant foreign interest rate, Rˆ∗t = 0, is assumed. Thus, (D.67) becomes
1
1− ϑ
Et (qˆt+1 − qˆt) = −Etπ̂Ht+1 − σEt
(
cˆ∗t+1 − cˆ
∗
t
)
. (D.68)
Applying the minimum state variable solution
qˆt= γ1cˆ
∗
t ,
π̂H,t= γ2cˆ
∗
t ,
and using that ρc is the autocorrelation of foreign consumption gives
γ2 = (1− βρc)
−1
[
κ
(
1
1− ϑ
+ ηψ
)
γ1 + κ (σ + η)
]
from the Phillips curve and
ρc − 1
1− ϑ
γ1 = −ρcγ2 − σ (ρc − 1)
⇐⇒
−ρcγ2 =
ρc − 1
1− ϑ
γ1 + σ (ρc − 1)
⇐⇒
γ2 =
1− ρc
ρc (1− ϑ)
γ1 + σ
1− ρc
ρc
from the Euler equation under the peg. Solving for γ1 yields
γ1 =
κ (σ + η)− σ (1−βρc)(1−ρc)
ρc
(1−βρc)(1−ρc)
ρc(1−ϑ)
− κ
(
1
1−ϑ
+ ηψ
) ,
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whose sign cannot be determined analytically. The same is true for the sign
of γ2 =
1−ρc
ρc(1−ϑ)
γ1 + σ
1−ρc
ρc
. The responses of production and consumption
are given by the risk sharing condition cˆt = qˆt/σ + cˆ∗t = γ3cˆ
∗
t and market
clearing yˆH,t = ψqˆt + cˆ∗t = γ4cˆ
∗
t where
γ3=1 + γ1/σ,
γ4=1 + ψγ1.
Given the parameterization summarized in Table 5.1, γ1 < 0, γ2 < 0,
γ3 > 0 and γ4 < 0. Thus, an increase in foreign consumption leads to a
real appreciation of the home currency, a decline in domestic production
and PPI inflation and an increase in consumption in the home economy.
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